Ibn Taymiyyah’s principle
The principle
of Ibn Taymiyyah is that Islam is a total way of life, taught
by God through the message of the infallible Prophet. To exercise Islam
in society in all its aspects requires
sound understanding of the Qur’Én and the Sunnah of the Prophet.
The best interpretation of both the Qur’Én and the Sunnah can be
discovered and rediscovered from the belief, thought and practices of the Salaf
generation. Judgement about succeeding developments in Islamic thought, whether correct or wrong, is only possible by
referring to the Qur’Én and the Sunnah as interpreted by the Salaf.
In the course of his struggle to vindicate his
principles in Islamic society, he realizes
that Muslim theologians and philosophers hold an unacceptable understanding of Islam. Then, he finds
that they ‘adapt’ foreign
elements that were from the Greek
philosophers. From them the philosophers borrow their concept of God and its related issues, even
though the Greek philosophers had no
known prophet and thus their knowledge on divine matters was not reliable in
any sense or way.
Ibn Taymiyyah also understands that philosophy is
an effort to obtain the truth by rational methods and it is based on specific rules that which the
philosophers had constructed themselves. The Muslim philosophers attempted to
apply these rules for understanding their religion and ‘manipulated’ the revelation
to support their thought, by which they presumed that reason explains
revelation. According to them, revelation is best understood only by reason.
Their principle then is that reason is
the basis of revelation, and therefore revelation cannot precede reason. In the case
of contradiction between reason and revelation reason must be preferred.
This kind of approach might be the major
determinant that awakened Ibn Taymiyyah’s extraordinary
enthusiasm to criticise the philosophers. His counter-idea is that sound reason
can never contradict the revelation, and the revelation can never be wrong
since it comes from God. To prefer reason to revelation is logically and
religiously unacceptable. If there is a logical argument that is incompatible
with revelation, the former must be judged as erroneous rather than the latter.
This enthusiasm to expound his counter-idea is reflected in the title of his
major and most voluminous work, which he calls “The Repulsion
of the Contradiction between Reason and Revelation” or “The Agreement between Sound Reason and True
Revelation.” Thus, it is only sound reason that agrees with revelation and that which contradicts revelation is not sound anymore.
On logic
Since the philosophers give priority to reason, Ibn
Taymiyyah’s first criticism is directed towards logic. It is
from logic that the philosophers developed their knowledge about God or
metaphysics. He deems the philosophers’ theory of logical reasoning which is mainly based
on the concepts of definition and syllogism as artificial. He rejects the philosophers’ theories of
genus (jins) and differentia (faÎl), essence (dhÉt) and accident
(‘arad ) also
because of their artificiality.
1. On logical definitions: Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism
concerns the logicians’ principles which negate any means of forming
concept than definitions, and their
affirmation that definition lead a
true conception of things. To him both principles are logically
unacceptable and theoretically untenable.
If the concept of reality cannot be formed except by definitions, none
of those philosophers have really discovered any reality, since they never
define something agreed upon by all. In fact, many scholars have formed many
concepts without using definitions and many things cannot be described by
definition, such as love, pleasure, and sadness. By definitions alone one
cannot perceive the concept of a thing, unless the terms and their meaning are
already known. Moreover, the logicians’ affirmation
that definition leads to a true conception of things is also untenable, as they
limit definitions to genus and differentia,
both of which are essences without accidents. On this principle the essence of
a thing is separated from its existence, and existence become nothing more
than an accident added to essence or quiddity. Since Ibn Taymiyyah believes
that essence or quiddity is in the mind and existence is outside the
mind, he rejects the notion that definition can describe the object defined. He
says that its function is really no more than giving names to an object. It is
at best similar to an explanation or even a translation which differentiates
one thing from another. Quite often a simple noun or title describes reality
better than a definition does, and in an obviously less complicated way.
2. On syllogism: as with definition, Ibn Taymiyyah rejects the
logicians’ claim that there is no means to obtain judgement
other than syllogism, and their affirmation that syllogism leads to certain
knowledge and judgement. Again, to Ibn Taymiyyah this big claim is untenable.
Syllogisms are presented as containing universal premises to reach any
conclusion, while he believes that to establish a universal proposition with
certainty from the external world is impossible. It is nothing more than intellectualisation of external realities, which may or may not
conform to those realities. He asserts that the universal is only in the mind,
as realities are always specific and particular.
Analysis: Ibn Taymiyyah’s general
criticism of logic does not represent the traditional standpoint of
anti-logical discourse. He emerges as an
open-minded scholar compared with his predecessors’ traditionally minded
thinkers. In his criticism he demonstrates firsthand knowledge of the writings
of Muslim logicians and philosophers, such as al-NawbakhtÊ, Ibn SÊna, al-FÉrÉbÊ, AbË al-BarakÉt, Ibn Rushd
and others. From them he ingeniously and creatively selects the sound ideas and
uses them for his criticisms. As a
result of this procedure, he may often seem to be against the opinions of a
philosopher in one place, and in favour of his arguments in another. Actually,
however, Ibn Taymiyyah approaches the problem within his own intellectual
framework. He criticises logic and brings various arguments from a wide range
of sources, theology, jurisprudence, philosophy and the like, and fits them into his own logical framework
with some kind of modification. This might be unacceptable to the logicians or
the philosophers and even a strange thing in the realm of philosophy, but his
stance is strongly supported by his clear understanding of the Qur’Én.
His criticism of metaphysics:
1. On the subject matter: Ibn Taymiyyah criticises the philosophers’ designation of
the subject matter of metaphysics, namely the whole of caused being or the
principle abstracted from the whole of caused being and not God. Since he
himself holds that metaphysics is knowledge about God, its subject matter is
God, Who is the universal being. His
rejection of positing the whole of caused being as the subject
matter of metaphysics is intended to rule
out any possibility of confusion between God and creatures. This implies that
knowing God on the basis of a thing other than God will allow the possibility
of applying the same principle both to God and things other than God. If this
could be done, God would be subsumed under the principle shared in common with
His own creatures and He could not be universal anymore. Alternatively, Ibn
Taymiyyah asserts that knowledge about God is attainable by knowing His
attributes, which are intrinsic in His essence. However, he does not offer a
solution for the difficulty faced by the philosophers, as for them positing God
as the subject matter of metaphysics will result in the existence of a higher
science as the starting point of demonstration.
2. On contingent being and God’s existence: He accepts the philosophers’ postulate that
God is Necessary Being and the universe is contingent being, because of its
clear distinction between the Creator and the creature. Yet he does not accept any further
application of this concept, because in the philosophers’ mind it leads
to the idea of the eternity of the universe. Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyyah rejects
the philosophers’ argument of movement as proof of the existence of
God. The reason is that the philosophers did not regard God as the agent (fɑil) of the movement of the celestial sphere. God is
also not regarded as the innovator and the creator of the movement, neither as
the agent of the temporal phenomena (al-hawÉdith) nor the cause
of temporally emerging phenomena. This theory to Ibn Taymiyyah cannot properly
describe the nature of the Creator of the universe as it against the active
Qur’Énic vision of the sovereign creative God.
3. On the attributes of God: Ibn Taymiyyah criticises the philosophers’ idea of
negating God’s attributes. Ibn Taymiyyah regards the
philosophers’ argument, which is based on their fear of composition in God’s
essence, as baseless, because He has perfect attributes and cannot be discerned
in such a way. He also rejects the
philosophers’ arguments that giving attributes to God would mean
that the essence would be the cause of the attributes. To him, God cannot be
depicted in terms of cause and effect or subject and object, since the argument
on the bases of causality is only applicable for two things, while God is one.
The idea of the philosophers is based on their assumption that in God essence
is existence, and therefore His essence is His attribute, while Ibn Taymiyyah
holds that God’s attributes are intrinsic in His essence; one cannot
exist without the other, but God is one.
4. On the origination of the universe: Ibn Taymiyyah rejects the philosophers’ doctrine of
the eternity of the universe and their doctrine of emanation. The idea of the
eternity of the universe is based on the argument that God,
the First Cause ( ‘illah al-ËlÉ ), is concomitant with the universe, the caused
object (al-ma‘lËl). Since God is
eternal the universe is also eternal.
Ibn Taymiyyah replies that if the universe exists from a first cause and
if such a cause is always concomitant with its object of causation eternally,
nothing could occur from the eternal cause, logically or temporally. He also
finds contradiction in the idea that on the one hand the philosophers call the
universe an object of power and will, but on the other they consider it
eternal.
Ibn Taymiyyah also thinks that the philosophers’ doctrine of
emanation is based on their denial of God’s attributes,
which prevent them from conceiving of two actions emanating from Him. To him
what they assume as a duality of agent or source, or a multiplicity of actions
is nothing more than multiplicity of God’s attributes,
and these should be perceived as permanent in God. Their assumption that
emanation is like heat, which radiates from fire to him is also irrelevant, for
God is subject by volition and choice, and cannot be similar to fire. Thus, the
doctrine of emanation is untenable.
Analysis: In his criticism of metaphysics, Ibn Taymiyyah is
very alert to any unclear distinction between God and the creature. He rejects
the philosophers’ distinction between essence and existence, because
he contends that ‘being’ has different implication when applied to God and
to the world. Therefore, he rejects their concept of ‘being’, which is
constructed on five types of substance, namely form, matter, body, soul and
intellect, and Aristotle’s concept of ten categories. To him, this is not
applicable to God, for it makes Him share in common with the creature or the
human being.
Ibn Taymiyyah’s main tool for
his criticism of the Philosophers’ idea in both Logic and Metaphysics is his concept
of essence or quiddity (mÉhiyyah) and existence
(al-wujËd) and his
understanding of the universal. In God
essence is intrinsic (lÉzim) to His
existence (al-wujËd), meaning one
cannot exist without the other, while in others than God essence is in the mind
and existence is in the external reality. Regarding his understanding of the
universal he insists that the universal is only in the mind, while all
realities are particulars. Ibn Taymiyyah maintains these postulates
consistently, especially in refusing the philosophers’ concept of
negating God’s attributes,
and their doctrine of emanation.
Philosophical aspects in the thought of Ibn
Taymiyyah.
1. His understanding of philosophy: Ibn Taymiyyah understands ‘philosophy’ in the general
sense of the term without questioning its origin and etymological meaning. Like his understanding of the term Íikmah,
philosophy can be understood in negative and positive ways. The aspect that
can bring ‘philosophy’ to a positive meaning is the concept of belief in
God, because to him philosophy is the knowledge about God and this is attained
from the prophets. Therefore philosophy should rely on the veracity of what is
brought by the prophets, for they knew information about God better than
philosophers. He deems this kind of philosophy as true philosophy (al-falsafah al-haqÊqiyyah)
or sound philosophy (al-falasafah al-ÎahÊhah), and those
philosophers who have wrong concepts of
belief as infidel philosophers (al-falÉsifah al-mushrikËn). Thus, the
term ‘philosophy’ and Íikmah are general terms that can be
Islamic and un-Islamic, based on the soundness of the thought and belief.
2.a. On the concept of fiÏrah: Ibn Taymiyyah
discerns reasoning as a natural and spontaneous process of mind in forming a conception. This natural
process, to him, is fiÏrah or human instinct. It is a basic natural capacity of the human
being to incline to the truth and to realize the true knowable object (al-haqq
al-ma‘lËm). Since it is
the basic nature of the human capacity, it needs to be complemented by the
faculty of reasoning. Thus, the fiÏrah is like the
controlling factor in the human mind for the attainment or rejection of the
truth. The fiÏrah can be developed by remembering God through
activities like reading, studying religion and the like, for remembering God is
the spring of wisdom, as knowledge
itself is not only the result of human endeavour but also come
from God. Looking at his concept of fiÏrah, Ibn Taymiyyah seems more Sufi rather than
rational, as in some places he
exaggerates in characterising
fiÏrah as being able
to attain the truth without any way of acquisition. However, examining his
concept in general will reveal that fiÏrah has three stages: the faculty of natural
intelligence, the source of a mechanism for acquiring knowledge and the
reasoning faculty without the process of reasoning.
2.b. On definition: Definition according to Ibn Taymiyyah is similar to
giving a name. He refers this meaning to
his understanding of the Qur’Én, that
when God taught Adam names He actually taught him definitions. It is a single
expression signifying a meaning, which is tantamount to a name signifying the
named object. This kind of definition can be made by putting the necessary
attribute (al-waÎf al-lÉzim) of the named
object. This is by finding the exact equivalence between definition and the
defined object or by excluding all things that make the defined object
different from the definition. By this way definition will then include the
entire quality of the object defined and exclude the qualities that do not
belong to it. In this sense he
introduces two means of obtaining definition for religious understanding, by
verbal definitions (al-hudËd al-lafziyyah) and by convention. But with reference to the jurists (fuqahÉ‘) there are
three methods, by means of religious law, language and custom. As for obtaining
definition by means of language, Ibn Taymiyyah emphasises the importance of
understanding the concept of the meaning of a word. To know the concept of the
meaning of a word he introduces two methods: equating the definition with the
object defined, and giving attributes to the object defined. These ideas, to
Ibn Taymiyyah are related closely to the understanding of the Qur’Én and the
Prophetic messages, in which he asserts that the intended meaning of the
speaker is pivotal. Therefore understanding religious names should rely on the
intention and the language of the Qur’Én with the help of the explanation given
by the Prophet.
2.c On qiyÉs : Ibn Taymiyyah
partly accepts the form of syllogism as a way to obtain truth. To him, if its universal premise is not
really universal, syllogism will be useful to attain knowledge. Due to this attitude, one might be suspicious
that he is applying the syllogistic method of reasoning in his own way. But, in
fact, Ibn Taymiyyah realizes that there are some similarities between analogy
and syllogism. Analogy consists of the original case (aÎl), the branch
case (far‘), the cause (‘illah) and the
judgement (Íukm). The middle term in the syllogism is similar to the
cause in analogy, and the major premise in the syllogism is equivalent to the
necessary relation between the cause and the case (the original and the branch
case). However, in analogy the conclusion is drawn from a single particular,
while in the syllogism it is established inductively from a number of
particulars.
However, he contends that the only valid logical
reasoning is reasoning by analogy (qiyÉs al-tamthÊl). Analogy does not need a universal in its
premise. It proceeds from particular to
particular based on sound comprehension of the point of conformity or
disagreement between different facts. It is more natural than demonstration, as
the realities are particular and specific. The humankind used analogical
reasoning as a natural method of grasping reality. This reasoning is also a
valid source of religious understanding after the Qur’Én, the Sunnah and IjmÉ‘, and he calls it al-qiyÉs al-ÎahÊh (sound
reasoning).
Showing that the concept of analogy is more certain
than the syllogism, he often relates the sound analogy to what he calls mÊzÉn or mÊzÉn al-’aql (rational balance). This is a means for
understanding the common factor between the branch case and the original case
in analogy or the middle term in the syllogism. It is also the truth revealed
by God with His Book.
Beside balanced reasoning (mÊzÉn) which
is related to logical inference by sound analogy (qiyÉs al-ÎahÊh), Ibn Taymiyyah introduces the other two
methods derived from the Qur’Én
to prove the Lordship of God, His unity and
His power. The two methods are inference by means of signs (al-
IstidlÉl bi al-ÉyÉt) and a
fortiori analogy (qiyÉs al-awlÉ). These two kinds of analogy are, in fact, using
the creature as the subject of analogy to attain the knowledge about God. In these methods he apparently uses the same
way as the philosophers in their subject matter of metaphysics, but a close
examination does not suggest that. While the philosophers draw the concept of
universal from the creature and apply it to God, Ibn Taymiyyah regards the
creatures as no more than the signs which prove the Lordship, the unity and the
existence of God, and cannot be drawn from them
any universal principle common to God.
His ideas about metaphysics.
3.a. On the existence of God: Having rejected all unsatisfactory delineation
about God, Ibn Taymiyyah advances the concept of fiÏrah. FiÏrah is a medium of
knowing the existence of God through the necessary sense perception of
the Signs (ÉyÉt). Man could
know God by fiÏrah, but in a
general sense; the comprehensive
knowledge is completed by what he calls the revealed fiÏrah (al-fiÏrah al-munazzalah). In this concept Ibn Taymiyyah seems to construct
a valid argument grounded in Islamic metaphysics. Another method of proving the
existence of God is using the rational faculty by perceiving the signs ( ÉyÉt ) of God in
external reality and employing a fortiori analogy to understand the
relationship between the two.
3.b.On God’s attributes: Ibn Taymiyyah’s concept of
God’s attributes is
represented in various principles. The main principle is that the description
of God’s attributes is inseparable from the depiction of
God’s essence.
Moreover, God is characterised as He characterises Himself and as His Prophet
characterised Him. The general principle
is the affirmation of the particular attributes and negation of the general,
meaning that Ibn Taymiyyah affirms God’s particular attributes and negates the similarity
of God with the human being. In other words he says that “nothing is like Him, whether His essence,
his attributes or His action”. By this
principle he intends to avoid ambiguous between God and creature. For this he classifies
the expressions of attributes into three types: the attributes expressed in
relation to God, in relation to human
beings, and in general expressions, related neither to God nor to the human
being. God’s knowledge is
related to God only, man’s speech in related to man only, while attributes
such as power, knowledge, life are general and would vary in their respective
designation. Thus God and His creatures may share common qualities, but it does
not means that the essence of God and the human being are the same. In this,
Ibn Taymiyyah underlines that the proper relationship between attributes and
their essence is pivotal. Above all, Ibn
Taymiyyah attempts to show a harmonic relationship between God’s essence and
attributes. They are intrinsic and inseparable, but are not the same thing. In addition, he
maintains the idea of absolute incomparability of God, for He has a unique
essence and attributes, and He is impossible to be completely known by man.
3.c. On the creation of the universe: The general principle of Ibn Taymiyyah on the
creation is that the universe is everything other than God and this must be
discerned as created (makhlËq), come into
being in time (hÉdith) and
existing after it was previously
not. The universe does not exist along
with the existence of the Creator and therefore it is not eternal. Moreover, he
posits that since the universe is a temporal phenomenon, it was
created from the particular wills (irÉdÉt juziyyah) and acts of
God, from which the new willed object outflows. This idea responds
to the philosophers who see the
impossibility of the eternal will of God
producing temporal phenomena, like
the universe. Regarding the principle of creation Ibn Taymiyyah is in favour of
the concept of creatio ex nihilo,
meaning that the universe is created
based on the free will of the Creator.
Analysis: Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism of
philosophy was initially influenced by al-Ghazzali, but he was disappointed
with al-Ghazzali for the similarity of his concept of the MÊzÉn in the
Qur’Én with that of Greek syllogisms.
Ibn Taymiyyah also initially agreed with Ibn Rushd for he rejected the
philosophers’ theory of emanation, but then he was dissatisfied
with him too, especially with Ibn Rushd’s idea that all
the creatures are ‘emanated’ from God at once. Above all, Ibn Taymiyyah is
particularly critical of the concept which posits God as not
creating by His will and action, as without both nothing can occur or be
created, let be emanated.
Examining the whole criticisms of Ibn Taymiyyah and
looking at his own thought on respective issues, suggest that there appear to
be imbalances between his expressed criticisms and the solution he offers as
the alternative idea from what he thinks false. If he criticises that A is erroneous
he does not say what the correct A is, but he asserts that B is correct
instead.
As a matter of fact, we could hardly find a single
work of Ibn Taymiyyah where he constructs a system of logic to enable the
Muslim to abandon Aristotelian logic and begin using sound logic. We also
cannot prove that Ibn Taymiyyah was interested in constructing a systematic
discourse on metaphysics to enable the Muslim to quit the influence of the
Greek thought, which he deems as hazardous. His ambition is perhaps to construct
a set of arguments to undermine the validity of metaphysical postulates that he
deems seriously dangerous to the sound concepts of the Qur’Én, by tracing them
from logic.
However, the problem is that despite his excellent
capacity to criticise and to find out the thought, which is incompatible with
Islam, he is not a writer who has a systematic and organised method. When
discussing an important issue, he moves away before offering a full treatment
of it. So one who hoped to find genuine and Islamic philosophical thought from
the criticisms of Ibn Taymiyyah would be disappointed. Nevertheless, his
contribution, which we cannot undermine, is that he has shown that better
understanding of the Qur’Én and Sunnah is the proper way to develop a
sound philosophy, rather than adapting foreign thought. He seems to be
suggesting that the Muslim should develop a sound philosophy (al-falsafah al-ÎahÊhah) independently
by referring mainly to the Qur’Én, the Sunnah and the ideas of the Salaf.
In the context of the development of Islamic
philosophy, his attack on philosophy is not as influential as that of
al-GhazzÉlÊ, but his mission and his invitation to return to re-understand the
Qur’Én has greater influence than al-GhazzÉlÊ. Watt terms his influence as
still ‘pregnant in the future’. The recent movements that claim to represent the
salaf thought are intensely inspired by the message brought by Ibn Taymiyyah,
but unfortunately none of them has been significantly inspired by the implicit
message to develop a sound Islamic philosophy. This work still remains to be
done. The full implication of Ibn Taymiyyah’s falsafah
al-ÎahÊhah will maybe inspire future disciples of this Muslim
master.
