On the
creation of the universe
Anyone
who tries to understand Ibn Taymiyyah’s doctrine of creation
throughout his works will be struck by the simplicity of his discourse. Not
only does he not agree with the theories and ramifications of the philosophers
on cosmological doctrine, but apparently he dares not speculate beyond the
revealed knowledge of the Qur’Én and the information given by the prophets. This is for this reason, he
contends, that knowledge of the creation cannot be attained simply from logical
proof. It must be referred to the revelation that should initially be preceded
by the knowledge of the veracity (Îidq) of the
prophets.134
Close
examination of Ibn Taymiyyah’s concept of creation suggests that he maintains the createdness of the
universe and denies its qualification of being eternal. This section will
discuss in detail his teaching based on his principle of creation in relation to the concept of time, the eternity of God’s acts of creation, the attributes of will and action, and
finally his description of the creation of the heavens and earth from matter.
The
general principle of Ibn Taymiyyah about
the creation is that the universe
(al-‘Élam), is “everything other than God”, and
this must be discerned as created (makhlËq),
brought into being in time (hÉdith) and
existing after it previously did not (kÉ’in
ba‘da an lam yakun). It is only God, the Eternal,
Sempiternal (qadÊm ‘azalÊ) who creates the universe.135
Moreover, he asserts that the creation of creatures (al-makhlËqÉt) is
preceded by non-being (‘adam) and does not coexist with the existence of the Creator.136
The
first point emphasised by Ibn Taymiyyah to prove the createdness of the
universe and to refute the idea of its
being eternal is the concept of time in creation. If the Creator and the
creature are discerned in the sense of the relationship between the perfect
cause (al-mu’thir al-tÉmm), and the effected object,
it should be understood that an effect (‘athar) comes
after it has been caused. This is based on the pronouncement of the Qur’Én that
God creates something directly without any intermediate means: Verily, when
He wishes a thing, His command is ‘Be’ and it
is.137
Moreover, if creation is viewed from the perspective that God is the First (al-awwal
) and the Preceding (al-mutaqaddim),
it should be perceived that He precedes everything, meaning that every other
existing things must, subsequently,
come after Him in time.138
Employing the principle of causality, he shows that God created everything and His creatures
came into being after they were created, just like the brokenness of a thing
that comes after the act of breaking or the articulation of the words of
divorce that happens before the occurrence of divorce.139
Thus,
Ibn Taymiyyah understands the precedence of the act of creation over the
existence of things created, or the
cause (‘illah) over the caused object (ma‘lËl), in
the general sense of time. This is
fundamentally different from the philosophers’ idea that the cause is
contemporaneous with its effect.
A
further aspect of Ibn Taymiyyah’s concept of creation is his delineation of God’s eternal creation. In this matter Ibn Taymiyyah explains that
‘eternal’ (al-’azal) means without beginning and limit of time. To him, to state that God
is eternally omnipotent would imply that He is continuously omnipotent and His
being omnipotent is an eternal attribute of His, without beginning and limit of
time. But, to say that He is speaking and acting eternally, indicates that He
is speaking and acting eternally by His wish and power,140 hence the eternity of His act of creation. The idea of the eternity
of God’s act of creation is a crucial point that led the theologians and
philosophers raised different view concerning the existing world. The
philosophers, for instance, postulated that since God is eternal and eternally
creating, the world is an eternal creation from eternal God.141 The problem rests on perceiving two
different beings, God and the creature, in one process of God’s
eternal action. How can the eternal action produce something temporal or how
can temporal things (al-hawÉdith) come
from eternity?
Observing
different points of view, particularly those which declare the eternity of the
universe, Ibn Taymiyyah put forwards his own opinion. He insists that all
things other than God are created, preceded by non being and cannot be eternal
like the Creator as there is nothing eternal like His eternity. The eternity of
His creation, should be understood in the sense that He creates the created
creatures one after the other. In the creature the creation is indicated in the
occurrence of the temporal phenomena and movements. In God it indicates nothing
more than the eternity of His action, for the created object is not conjoint
with Him.142 Besides, God’s act of
creation is also different from the created creature, because one is the source
and the other is the object. The former
has no time limit, while the latter exists with a beginning and limit of time.
The act of creation is attached to the source, while the created creature is
separated from it.143
Looking
at Ibn Taymiyyah’s idea about gradual creation, it appears to follow, if not to coincide
with, Ibn Rushd’s idea of gradual creation from moment to moment in a series of
phenomena.144 The two have similar
attitudes in rejecting the idea of Neoplatonic emanation. However, Ibn
Taymiyyah disagrees with Ibn Rushd’s concept of direct
emanation of all the ever-changing existence from The First (al-wÉhid
al-awwal). To him, the One creates (khalaq) everything and yet it does
not emanate from him; He is not the cause but the agent ( fɑil ) of
everything by His will and power.
In the
context of God’s will and power that we shall now move to another thought of Ibn
Taymiyyah about creation. In this respect Ibn Taymiyyah’s conviction is that any
attempt to understand the concept of creation and the affirmation of the maker
of the universe or the temporal phenomena (al-muhdathÉt) should
be preceded necessarily by the affirmation of
God’s attributes ( ÎifÉtih ) and
acts ( af‘Élih).145 It is because, he believes, without
attributes such a being cannot create
this universe.
In
explaining his concept of creation, Ibn Taymiyyah begins with his contention
that God creates everything since He has permanent attributes, such as power of
autonomous action (al-qudrah).146
He is also voluntarily omnipotent (qÉdir
mukhtÉr) and creates by will (mashÊ’ah)
and choice (ikhtiyÉr), without any compulsion,
as He is necessary by His will and power.147 In
consequence, he infers, ‘we have to admit whenever it is God’s will
to create something, it comes to exist,
and whenever it is not His will, the
thing will never exist. Thus, everything in the universe exists by His power and will.148 This implies that the agent (fɑil) will
never act unless with His will and
power, while every object of will (murÉd) and
power (maqdËr) is the indication of
their being created creatures or in other words is a proof that they were
brought into being (muhdath).149
As in
God’s eternal creation, there is also an obscure problem faced by the
theologians and the philosophers regarding the eternal will and acts of God in
relation to the production of temporal phenomena from it. If the ‘will’ and ‘acts’ are
eternal, they must produce eternal creatures. The solution of Ibn Taymiyyah to
this problem is clear. To him, God’s attributes are eternal,
some are eternally necessary for His essence, like living, and some
others, like knowledge (al-’ilm), will
(irÉdah), speech (kalÉm) and
the like, are eternal, but there are units ( ÉhÉd ) of God’s
essence from which the temporal phenomena occur. The attribute of ‘will’, for
instance, is an eternal attribute, but there are particular ‘wills’ (irÉdÉt juz’iyyah) from
which the new ‘willed object’ flows.150 This solution
allows the possibility of producing temporal phenomena from the eternal will
and acts of God, without attributing eternity to the creature like the eternity
of God. Thus, God is eternal and by His
eternal acts of creation, He creates many creatures with quality of temporality.
Moving
aside from Ibn Taymiyyah’s description of the principle of creation, now we shall look at his
discourse on the creation of the heaven and the earth (al-samÉwÉt wa
al-ard}). With reference to the Qur’Én, Ibn Taymiyyah holds that
the creation mentioned in the Qur’Én is only about the
creation of the heaven and the earth while there were many other things that
existed before, though no detailed information is provided by the Qur’Én.
According
to Ibn Taymiyyah God created (khalaqa) and brought this heavens and the earth into being
(ahdatha) from matter that was created before.151 He also mentions that before this, there
were other creatures, namely the throne and the water.152
The creation of the heaven and the earth from matter, he says, agrees with the ideas of the People of the Book as well as the ancient philosophers.153
He even concludes that the heavens and earth were created from matter (mÉddah) before
their form (ÎËrah).154
However, he does not explain further how this idea agrees with that of
the ancient philosophers, just as he does not subsequently speculate whether
the matters from which all the universe is made are eternal entities or created
after they were previously not. He just believes in the basic concept that
everything other than God is created and hence, is not eternal.
In
conclusion, looking at his depiction of the general principle of creation, it
appears so simple that does not represent a theory with a variety of logical
arguments. Unlike his refutation of the philosophers’ ideas on the origination of
the universe, his own though which represents the truth as he sees it is not
followed by much argument. His main idea is that the universe is created ex-nihilo
155 in the sense that it is
created by the free will of the Creator and created from nothing. But, the case
of the heavens and the earth he takes a different views, as he asserts that
these were created from the will of the Creator but not from nothing. The
heavens and the earth were created from matter which had been created before. These two ideas appear to pose a
contradiction that Ibn Taymiyyah does
not clarify further. The possible meaning, perhaps, is that to the
whole of creation, the concept of creatio ex-nihilo applies, while for
the creation of the heaven and the earth, it does not. This is because he believes on the basis of
the Qur’Én that there was another creation before the creation of the heavens and
the earth.
134 Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, vol.
I, p. 132.
135 Ibn Taymiyyah claims that
the definition is consonant with the Qur’Énic description of the
universe as it begins with the
declaration:” Praise be to God, the
Cherisher and Sustainer of the Worlds” . Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ,
vol. I, p. 125; See also “Sharh} HadÊth ‘Umar Ibn HuØain”, in MajmË‘at al-RasÉ’il wa al-MasÉ’il, vol, V, sixth treatise, p. 177.
136 MinhÉj al-Sunnah, ed.R.SÉlim, I, p. 101.
137 The Qur’Én, 36 : 82.
138 MinhÉj al-Sunnah, I, pp. 118-119.
139 FÊ TahqÊq,
pp. 38-39.
140 Sharh HadÊth, p. 192.
141 Sheikh, M.S., Islamic
Philosophy, p. 89.
142Sharh HadÊth, pp. 192-193; cf. Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ,
vol. I, p. 369.
143Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, vol.
IV, p. 6o.
144 As quoted by al-ÏablÉwÊ, S.M. in Mawqif Ibn Taymiyyah,
p. 151.
145 Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, vol.
I, p. 375.
146 MinhÉj al-Sunnah, vol. I, pp. 286-287.
147 Ibid, p. 112.
148 Ibid, p. 113.
149 MinhÉj al-Sunnah, ed.R.SÉlim, vol. I, p. 115.
150 HarrÉs, M.K., Ibn Taymiyyah
al-SalafÊ, p. 111.
151 It reads:” Moreover He comprehended in
His design the sky, and it is smoke, and said to it and to the earth ‘come
together willingly or unwillingly.” The Qur’Én, 41: 11; See Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, vol.I, p. 123.
152 It reads:” He is who created the
heaven and the earth in six days, and His throne was over the water.” The Qur’Én, 11: 7; In his treatise called Sharh HadÊth he mentions the hadÊth of ØahÊh BukhÉrÊ which reads:” God exists and nothing before Him, (in the other narration is “nothing along
with him” or “nothing after him”) and His throne was over the water, He wrote everything in His
remembrance (al-dhikr), then He created the heavens and the earth.” See Sharh
HadÊth, p. 172.
153 His claim that the ideas
of the ancient philosophers were consonant with the Qur’Én is without further
clarification, such as how their ideas were constructed and what were the
consequences of those ideas.
154 MinhÉj al-Sunnah, vol. I, pp. 256-257.
155 The doctrine of creation ex-nihilo, means that the universe is
created from nothing and it is created from free will of the Creator. See Simon Blackburn, Oxford
Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford
University
