Grasping
Ibn Taymiyyah’s idea on the existence of God is somewhat difficult as he only makes
brief comments on the problem in his treatises. Another problem is that his
discourse is highly polemical and refutative, particularly when he rejects
certain philosophical and theological arguments that he believes to be false or
lacking validity, he does not always provide an alternative argument. However, this does not preclude the
possibility of discovering Ibn Taymiyyah’s argument on the existence
of God. This is discernable through his
various works which deal with logic, theology, legal opinions and certainly
metaphysics. Therefore, understanding his attitude towards the philosophical
doctrine on logic is pivotal for comprehending his thought, since logic is
connected to and instrumental for his rebuttal of metaphysics.
As Ibn
Taymiyyah realised, the philosophers’ way of
proving the existence of God is dominated by
their theory of being, which rests basically on the theory of
essence.72 Essence in this theory has no connection
with existence, as existence is
superadded to quiddity and can be either in the mind or in the external world.
On the other hand, an essence in itself can be universal in the mind when it is
abstracted from extra mental particulars.
In the
frame of Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism, this point could bring
us to his basic concept of God’s existence. To him, the essence is no more than a generalization or
abstraction by the mind of an externally existing individuals, 73 and therefore
it has no existence other than in the mind.74 In being consonant to this, Ibn Taymiyyah
holds that the universal can never exist
in the extra mental world, but only in the mind.75 To him, external individuals cannot be formed
into an external universal, as individuals, even if some of their aspects are
similar, cannot be entirely identical.76 Accordingly, all universals have only a mental existence, exactly like
absolute existence when it is
conditioned or unconditioned by anything.77 If absolute existence is a merely mental
concept, then the Necessary Existence does not exist in external reality, but
only in the mind.78
It seems
that Ibn Taymiyyah’s rebuttal of the philosophers’ theory of universals,
leads him to reject the use of
syllogism (qiyÉs
al-shumËl). This is because the
philosophers’ knowledge of Necessary Existence is actually knowledge of a particular in whom plurality could be
perceived. Therefore, Necessary Existence
cannot be proven by means of
syllogisms.79 Moreover, he believes that there is nothing
in the conclusion that is not already
found in the premises, even if the syllogism is valid. For being so,
the syllogism is not the right way to introduce new knowledge of the
real world.80 Similarly, when this categorical syllogism is utilized to prove the existence
of God, it does not bring new knowledge,
for this could be known merely by
statement and not necessarily by syllogistic proof.
Furthermore,
Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that proving the existence of the Creator does not depend
on syllogisms. This is because what is
achieved by syllogism is the same as what is obtained by way of analogy and the
result will be a universal matter common to everything others than God, and it does not lead to the knowledge which
is only particular to the Lord.81 Adopting an empiricist view of knowledge, he
argues that, leaving aside revelation, the process of acquiring knowledge
begins with the experience of particular objects and events through sense
perception. The formation of the universal in the mind begins with the
observation of particulars, if those qualities found in a number of observed
particulars are extracted, the formation of a general notion of such existing
particulars becomes possible.82 In extracting such qualities a man relies on
his capacity to draw an analogy between one particular and another. It is by using the existing particular and
the tool of analogy that the universal concept can be found. Be that as it may,
God cannot be subject to analogical inference since He is certainly unlike any
other being. As God is not amenable to analogy, He cannot be included in a
universal proposition. Thus, neither analogy nor syllogisms are instrumental to
provide proof of His existence.83
Alternatively,
Ibn Taymiyyah introduces two means by which God’s existence may be known.
The first is by intuition involving no inference, and the second
is by exercising the faculty of reasoning.84 The first, which is called the fiÏrah, is the
way that to which Ibn Taymiyyah always reiterates to comprehend God’s
existence.85 This concept has been elaborated previously
in his thought on logic.86 It indicates the innate faculty of perception
that produce a concept in human minds. However, in the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah
it is a source or mechanism for acquiring knowledge which involves no
inferential process. Unlike the mind (‘aql) whose
function is to conduct inferential operations, the notion of the fiÏrah is that
God is known
through man’s awareness that God is the
self-evident truth, and this knowledge
is necessarily valid.
It is also known from man’s general consciousness of
the divine attributes that God is the Almighty and the Unique, who is not
comparable to anything else.87
Moreover,
the knowledge of God’s existence is necessarily (darËrÊ)
ingrained in a sound, healthy fiÏrah, and requires no inference whatsoever.88 The term darËrÊ 89 is
frequently used by Ibn Taymiyyah when he explains the concept of the fiÏrah. It is a way by which people attain knowledge
in the mind, while being unaware of that process.90 Once this knowledge is attained in the mind,
the cause is not always clear. This is because sometimes the knowledge is
attained at once, like that which is attained by sense perception, in other
cases it is attained gradually, like the knowledge of
‘the multiply transmitted report’ (khabar al-mutawÉtir).91 Regarding
God’s existence, once the concept of
particulars such as miracle, tree or animal enters the domain of cognisance, the fiÏrah
necessarily (darËratan)
apprehends God’s existence. Also when the fiÏrah observes a human in existence, it
instinctively realizes that there is a Creator, for a human
can never create himself.92 Thus,
by the fiÏrah one can
innately know that every created thing must necessarily have a
Creator.
Based on
this concept, it is clear that there are instinctive volition (al-irÉdah
al-fiÏriyyah) and knowledge (al-ma’rifah al-fiÏriyyah) in the
mind. Some times knowledge and volition are attained by action (fi‘l) or
by power resulting from action. If the mind perceives something bad, it refers
to the existing knowledge and volition in the mind or turns to its purpose,
which is to attain knowledge and love of God. It is because God creates man
that he has the natural disposition of loving and knowing Him. This is what Ibn
Taymiyyah calls al-HanÊfiyyah (The true Religion). 93 It
seems that Ibn Taymiyyah tries to relate
the concept of fiÏrah in terms of human inclination
towards truth and fiÏrah in the sense of natural disposition
of knowing and loving God.
However,
Ibn Taymiyyah admits that acquiring knowledge of God’s existence by means of
natural fiÏrah is to grasp truth in a general sense, for the natural fiÏrah
implanted in the human mind is incomplete. Therefore, it is completed by the
sent-down fiÏrah (al-fiÏrah al-munazzalah), which is the revealed
religion. Religion gives more detail and
complete elaboration of truth, providing a framework for the natural fiÏrah.94 For this, Ibn Taymiyyah gives the non-inferred and
self-evident truths of scripture at the
same value as the truth of intuitive knowledge acquired through fiÏrah. True
information about God is, therefore, known from God through the Qur’Én and
the Sunnah.95
Consequently,
all man’s intellectual activities, such as inference, reasoning, reflection and
the like, will lead to truth if they are based on scriptural precepts, the
highest form of truths based on self-evident and non-inferred premises. The
result of this process will necessarily be true knowledge and guidance.96 As
God creates the fiÏrah in a
sound and perfect condition, the falsehoods
found in the thought of individuals are due to their own error.97
The second
method is by exercising the faculty of reasoning (naÐar). Ibn Taymiyyah’s early
statement that to prove the existence of God needs no inference whatsoever,98 suggests
that this method is ambivalent. But, if
Ibn Taymiyyah’s division of knowledge is put into context, there is no contradiction
at all. Knowledge, to him, is of two kinds: necessary (al-’ilm
al-d}arËrÊ ) and inferential (al-’ilm
al-naÐarÊ).99 The former is acquired through the necessary instinctive methods (al-Ïuruq
al-darËriyyah al-fiÏriyyah), which
is naturally implanted in the human
minds and is indeed the origin of the latter.100 The latter is attained by inference (al-naÐar),
which to Ibn Taymiyyah can be of two types: inference in search of indication (al-naÐar
Ïalaban li al-dalÊl ), like
inquiring about someone who claims
prophethood, and inference on the indication (al-naÐar fÊ al-dalÊl), like the
reasoning of the Qur’Énic
verses and al-Hadith.101 Subsequently,
all acquired knowledge is attained by means of inference from premises
which are known without inference. This is because if the premise is known through inference it
will depend on another,102
and it will become relative. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah also sees the possibility
of subsuming a particular under a universal proposition by
means of sense perception (al-hiss), but not by means of syllogisms.103 Thus, he
thinks that proving the existence of God
by means of the inferential method is possible, though this
is not better than necessary
instinctive knowledge. It is because of this perception that he believes there
is no contradiction between reason and revelation.
Taking
the above method a step further, Ibn
Taymiyyah deduces two methods of proving
the existence of God. These are
alternatives to syllogism which
has been discussed previously in his thought about logic.104 They
are inference by signs (al-istidlÉl bi-l-ÉyÉt) and a
fortiori argument (qiyÉs al-awlÉ ). As far as proving the existence of God is
concerned, the first method assumes
that all existing things in the
world are signs (ÉyÉt)
of God, whether insects, the sun, a
stone, a river, a mountain, etc. Just as
we observe light, we will know with
certainty that there is a sun. In other
words, every existing thing in the world
must have a Creator of whom all
creatures are necessarily in need. 105 Secondly by
a fortiori argument is
meant that the existence of God is conceived through the relationship between the
qualities found in the created universe and those similar qualities found in the Creator. Employing the terms ‘necessary’ and
‘possible’ Ibn Taymiyyah demonstrates that
the Necessary being and the possible being have the same quality of ‘existence’, but
the ‘existence’ of God is unlike that of
possible beings; the former has permanent qualities that differ sharply from those of all possible
beings.106
This
might seems that by a fortiori argument,
Ibn Taymiyyah is permitting analogy between God and created things.
However, looking at the procedure he employs,
it appears different from
analogy. The argument is that the
qualities or attributes which are affirmed of God are, to an incomprehensible extent, greater than
all that is affirmed of all other beings. Understanding the incomprehensible
greatness of God’s attributes, will lead the mind
to what is particular to God and impossible of application for anything other
than God. The problem is that although this is
not analogy in the general sense of the term, Ibn Taymiyyah employs the
very term used for analogy, which is qiyÉs. Therefore, this method is not found under
general heading of ‘logic’, he must have coined it himself.
To sum
up, Ibn Taymiyyah’s ideas
to prove the existence of God consist generally of two aspects: first by
exercising the internal capacity of human beings, which is the natural instinct
(fiÏrah), and second by utilizing the rational faculty
by perceiving the signs of God in external reality and understanding natural phenomena with a fortiori analogy. However, it seems that Ibn Taymiyyah
restricts the use of speculative reason
that may contradict the rational proof of revelation.
While he admits the possibility of inferred knowledge (‘ ilm
al-naÐarÊ ) resulting from logical
deduction he sees it as inferior to intuitive knowledge (al-ma‘ifah al-fiÏriyyah).
75 Naq al-ManÏiq, pp.164, 194-196, MuwÉfaqat, vol. I, pp. 128-129; al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Øamad, pp. 22-30, 62-80.
77 Ibid, p.174.
80 al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Øamad, pp. 251-252, 355, 293; MajmË‘at
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, pp. 218, 235. The
ground of this accusation is that the universal premises in syllogism is
regarded by Ibn Taymiyyah as not truly universal. They are formed through an
enumeration of particulars which is only the work of the mind and not of the
actual enumeration of all instance found in the world. It is therefore, not
tenable and no more certain than the knowledge derived from the actual
particulars that were subject to our sense perception. See NaqÌ al-ManÏiq, pp. 186-8, 202-3, 206-7; MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, IX, pp. 113, 235.
82 NaqÌ al-ManÏiq, pp. 188, 196, 206; MuwÉfaqat, vol.II, p. 222, al-Radd, ed. ‘Abd al-Øamad, p. 368; MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 238.
87 NaqÌ al-ManÏiq, pp. 38-39.
89 Ibn Taymiyyah expounds three meanings of the term ÌarËrÊ in relation to FiÏrah: first, it
is a common external
knowledge required by man. Second,
it is knowledge that is perceived by the
mind without any learning process. Third, it is knowledge
that has no doubt in it and the fourth is what entails
in the human mind that cannot be separated. See Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, vol.
VII, p. 422.
90 It is like intention (niyyah)
and volition (irÉdah), which are in the heart. Volition is already exists in human
minds, but they are dubious or could not
express its existence in their mind, so does the necessary knowledge ( al-’ilm al-ÌarËrÊ ). See Ibid, p. 424.
91 Ibid, p. 424.
100 Ibid; See also
al-Jalayand, M.S, TaqrÊb al-TurÉth Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ al-‘Aql wa al-Naql, Li Shaykh Al-IslÉm Ibn Taymiyyah, Markaz al-AhrÉm, Cairo
1988, p. 136.
101 This idea is Ibn Taymiyyah’s response to
a dispute among Muslim thinkers whether the naÐar (reasoning) for knowing God is compulsory
for every believer or not. Ibn Taymiyyah was in favour of making it
compulsory, but he has different
ideas on the type of compulsory
reasoning. Unlike the philosophers who
assume naÐar to be speculation,
Ibn Taymiyyah sees
compulsory reasoning as ‘reasoning
on the indication’ (al-dalÊl) to know what is indicated (al-madlËl ) it is not ‘reasoning in search of the indication’, as the latter will not
provide knowledge. As far as naÐar
for knowing God is concerned, Ibn Taymiyyah suggests that in perceiving the indication one
should not be doubtful on what is
indicated (al-madlËl), because that doubt may be
from the ignorance of the
heart about the indication and
what is indicated. See Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, VII, pp. 405-420.
103 MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 235. Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, vol. VII, p. 241; MuwÉfaqat, vol. II, pp. 254-255.
106 An analogue of such
differentiation is the whiteness found in snow and ivory; both have a white
colour, but the strength of whiteness of snow is different from the whiteness
of the ivory. This implies that all
qualities of created beings, like love, mercy, generosity and others are
predicated in God in a more powerful and accentuated form. See
MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p.145; see also “TawhÊd al-UlËhiyyah” , in MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ’, vol. I, p.48.
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