QiyÉs is a general term
applicable to both syllogism and analogy, the former called qiyÉs
al-shumËl, and the latter qiyÉs al-tamthÊl. [1] The
two according to Ibn Taymiyyah have similarities in their elements,
though he believes that analogy is more reliable than syllogism. Therefore, in
this section we will examine his defence of analogy over syllogism and his
attempt to find justification from the Qur’Énic text by introducing
the concept of mÊzÉn. In addition, this will cover
his idea of two Qur’Énic methods of qiyÉs, namely, inference
by means of signs (al-istidlÉl bi-l-ÉyÉt) and a fortiori
analogy ( qiyÉs al-awlÉ).
Looking at Ibn Taymiyyah’s idea in the light of his
criticism, it appears that he does not totally reject logical syllogism as a
mode of inference. This is because he admits that there are similarities
between syllogism and analogy. Analogy consists of the original case (aÎl), the
assimilated or branch case (furˑ), the
cause (‘illah) and the judgement (Íukm). The middle term in
the syllogism is the cause in analogy, and the major premise in the syllogism
is equivalent to the necessary relation between the cause and the case (the
original and the branch case). The conclusion in the syllogism is the judgement
in analogy.[2]
In drawing this comparison, Ibn Taymiyyah recounts as an
example that date-wine is prohibited because it is an intoxicant. By analogy with
date-wine, grape-wine is prohibited because alcoholic beverages are forbidden
as being intoxicants. In this judgement we can see that intoxication is found
in both date-wine and grape-wine. This is similar to the statement in a
syllogism, “All wine is intoxicating and all intoxicants are prohibited,
therefore wine is prohibited.” ‘Wine’ is the subject of the conclusion and it
is the minor term. ‘Prohibition’ is its predicate and is the major term.
‘Intoxicant’ takes a middle position between the subject and the predicate, and
it is the middle term which represents the predicate of the minor and the
subject of the major.
In the eyes of Ibn Taymiyyah, there is nothing wrong
with the form of syllogisms, but he notes that a syllogism cannot lead to a
certain conclusion by virtue of form alone.[3] The thing that
determines the truth of the conclusion is the subject matter of the argument.
This is also applicable to analogy and therefore both analogy and syllogism are
capable of yielding certitude if their subject matters are true, and they
result in probability when their subject matter is uncertain. Thus, Ibn
Taymiyyah seems to admit that analogy and syllogism have equal value as modes
of reasoning.
However, it is because of the subject matter of
syllogisms that Ibn Taymiyyah prefers to rely on analogy for arriving at the
truth. In analogy, the formulation of judgement of a branch case is necessary
to mention the original case. By this way, to Ibn Taymiyyah, the mind can
perceive the similarity between the original and the branch case more quickly
than in the case of syllogism in which the mind has to comprehend subsumption
of the branch case under a universal, comprehensive statement.[4] Moreover,
the universal premise in syllogisms is the most vulnerable point, because in
the external world we cannot establish certainty with any universal
proposition, as to make complete apprehension of all particulars in
the external world is impossible. On the other hand, analogy is more
informative as it includes the mention of at least one particular upon which
the conclusion is based.
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the main work of the analogy
is to demonstrate a common factor between the original and the branch case. The
common factor is either the cause itself or the indication (dalÊl). It
does not need to be universal in its premise, but proceeds from particular to
particular based on sound comprehension of points of similarity and of
difference. It is more natural than demonstration, as the realities are
particular and specific. Analogical reasoning is a natural method of grasping
reality used by humankind. This is also a valid source of religious
understanding after the Qur’Én, the Sunnah and the IjmÉ‘. Therefore,
he calls it al-qiyÉs al-ÎahÊh (sound reasoning) and often
relates it to what he calls mÊzÉn (balance).
To fully appreciate his thought on what he claims to be
sound reasoning, we should explain his idea of mÊzÉn. The word mÊzÉn is
interpreted etymologically by Ibn Taymiyyah as justice (al-‘adl).
The term to him means an inference that includes the equating of two similar
things and the distinguishing of two dissimilar things.[5] ‘Justice’
is the meaning quoted from mufassirËn of the Qur’Én:”We sent
afore time our messengers with clear signs and sent down with them the Book and
Balance (mÊzÉn), that men may stand forth in justice.”[6]
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the capacity to discern what
is similar and what is distinct has been instilled by God in the
instincts (fiÏr) and the intellects of His worshippers.[7]
Besides, Ibn Taymiyyah also put mÊzÉn as the
characteristic of the truth that God revealed together with the Book.
Therefore, Ibn Taymiyyah considered that the Qur’Én contains two methods of
analogical judgement: the first is by drawing
similarities, which he calls qiyÉs al-Ïard and the second is
by drawing distinctions, which is called qiyÉs al-‘aks. The former
means the apprehension of two similar entities by applying judgement to
one concrete particular and drawing an analogy between it and another similar
particular, primarily by mentioning the common factor, such as two pools of
water, two piles of soil and so on. The latter signifies the apprehension of
two different entities and the distinction between them, like water and soil.[8]
At this point he actually emphasises that there can be no measurement of the
universal without identifying the particulars. Therefore, the external existing
realities should be ‘measured’ justly until the common universal quality of it
is affirmed in the mind. Here, he basically refers to the formal logic that if
the truth of the common universal quality of the particular is not measured and
verified, the universal premise would be useless.
The human capacity to apprehend similarities and
differences, to Ibn Taymiyyah, has been taught by the Qur’Én and he believes
that it is the greatest attribute of the human intellect. The example
given by Ibn Taymiyyah is the prohibition of date-wine (khamr). It is
prohibited on the grounds that it deters people from remembering God and from
performing prayer, and that sows the seeds of enmity and hatred among the
faithful. Now when a person observes that grape-wine resembles date-wine, he
will find the common factor, namely the middle term. The common factor, in
jurisprudence, is attained from the branch case (al-furˑ) and the
original case (al-uÎËl),
and this is called mÊzÉn.[9] The
implication is that to know another kind of wine, whether it is
prohibited or not, one should measure by using a common factor, which is the
cause of the prohibition. Ibn Taymiyyah calls this ‘a common universal meaning’
(al-ma’nÉ al-kullÊ al-mushtarak) or common measure (qadr
al-mushtarak), which is the balance (mÊzÉn).
In addition, Ibn Taymiyyah regards mÊzÉn as
a ‘rational balance’ (mÊzÉn al-’aqlÊ), even so he rejects the Muslim
philosophers’ claim, such as Ibn Rushd and al-Ghazzali, that it is Greek logic,
or it necessarily follows the Greek form of syllogisms.[10]
The form used for the rational balance is not the most important thing to be
followed, and can be either syllogism or analogy. The principal thing in
the rational balance is also the common factor or the middle term (al-hadd
al-wasÏ). However,
he suggests that using the form of analogy is more reliable than the syllogism,
as the former is the source.[11]
To get a clear sketch, it is worth citing Ibn
Taymiyyah’s statement on how mÊzÉn can act to the human mind:
God sent mÊzÉn to the heart, while the
messengers explained justice and what is weighed by it and known by the heart.
So, God sent knowledge to the heart, where matters are weighed, and then the
similarities and differences are known. Moreover, men are devised with sensory
faculties required for this, such as critical power and others. This is mÊzÉn that
is sent by God.[12]
From the above description it seems that Ibn Taymiyyah
understands the term mÊzÉn in two senses: one is the
instinctive and intellectual capacity of the human being to find a common
factor or a common universal quality in both similar and different things, and
the other is a characteristic of the truth contained in revelation. Supporting
this second sense, he asserts that the method of exercising mÊzÉn has
been exemplified by God through His Book and the tradition of His prophets.
This is a clear indication that Ibn Taymiyyah wants to bring sound logical
inference into accord with revelation, so as to posit that there is no
contradiction between reason and revelation, as the two have the same quality
of mÊzÉn.
When God sent mÊzÉn, He also provided a
method of logical inference in the Qur’Én, especially to prove His Sovereignty,
lordship, His unity, His power and other attributes related to knowledge about
God. The forms of the Qur’Énic inferences, to Ibn Taymiyyah, are two in number:
inference from signs (ÉyÉt) and a fortiori
analogy (qiyÉs al-awlÉ).[13] Since the term for this
latter method is found nowhere in the logical discourse of the logicians, Ibn
Taymiyyah may have coined the term. According to Ibn Taymiyyah the Prophet employed
these two methods, particularly the second, for proving the lordship, the unity
and other attributes of God.
Inference by means of signs (al-istidlÉl bi al-ÉyÉt)
as conceived by Ibn Taymiyyah, is inference based on the method in which the
form and subject matter are derived from the Qur’Én.[14] ÓyÉt as
understood by Ibn Taymiyyah in this context are “the indication
that entails the very thing indicated.”[15] (al-dalÊl
alladhÊ yastalzimu ‘ayn al-madlËl). But, the thing indicated is not a
universal matter common to what is to be proven as well as other things, but
it only linked in a limited way to the actual thing indicated. It
is the knowledge of inference by which the particular entails another
particular, where the existence of one entails the existence of another and the
absence of one entails the absence of another. The example given by Ibn
Taymiyyah is that the sun’s rising is the sign or the indication of the
existence of the day. This is derived from the verse in the Qur’Én:
We made the night and the day as two signs; then We have
obscured the sign of the night, while We made the sign of the day to
enlighten.[16]
So, the very knowledge of the sun’s rising entails the
knowledge of the existence of the day. In relation to God Himself, it
implies that the very knowledge of the signs of the Lord entails knowing
His sacred soul, but it does not entail a universal knowledge common to Him and
others; it is the result of the indication (dalÊl )
specifically. The same is the case when applied to the prophethood of
Muhammad. His miracle is the sign of his prophethood. The very knowledge of the
affirmation of that miracle entails the knowledge of the affirmation of his
prophethood. However, the knowledge of the affirmation of Muhammad’s
prophethood cannot necessarily be common or universal to any other things or
persons, for this miracle is specific to him alone.
Thus, the sound method of thinking according to Ibn
Taymiyyah is that the indication (dalÊl ) entails that which is
indicated (al-madlËl). The particular entails another particular.
Likewise, the existence of a man entails the existence of another man, and this
existence is entailed the existence of a third man, and so on.[17]
This is a method of thinking by which the indication of the particular is used
for another particular.
Therefore, his view is that if there is a universal
knowledge, it is basically a consequence of particular knowledge. Similarly,
the existence of ‘humanity’ is the consequence of the existence of the
‘human being’. Accordingly, if a person claims to know the existence of the
absolute human or animal, it does not mean that he knows the particular
itself. If a person knows an absolute Necessary Being, an absolute Agent
or an absolute Self-sufficient being it would not mean that he knew the Lord of
all being Himself or that which distinguishes Him from others. The aim of
Ibn Taymiyyah at this point is to emphasise that identifying and regarding all
things other than God as a proof of His self and a sign of His existence can
only attain knowledge of God. This is what he calls logical inference by means
of signs (al-istidlÉl bi-l-ÉyÉt).
Looking at this method, it seems that he contradicts his
principle of the subject matter of metaphysics, in which he holds that to know
God is to know His intrinsic attributes, and that the knowledge about God is
from God and not from other than Him. But by this method he uses signs,
which are the creatures, as a means to know the existence of the Creator.
This implies that he proves God’s existence from things other than God.
However, though he uses a thing other than God to know about God, he is still
consistent with his concept that knowledge about God is universal and not
common to things other than Him.
Another logical inference to prove the lordship, unity,
power of God is a fortiori analogy (qiyÉs al-awlÉ).
This is not really analogy in the general sense of the term, but a type of
argument employed by the Messenger and the early pious generation (salaf)
in conformity with the Qur’Én. This method is a tool to prove that the
qualities of God are more perfect than the qualities that might be affirmed
of those other than God.[18] The perfect qualities
of God cannot be compared to those of others than Him, as the intellect cannot
draw a real distinction between the two, the Creator and creatures.
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the Salaf employed
this method by affirming in the mind that the qualities of God are
superior to the qualities of things other than Him. The grace bestowed by
God upon all creatures is greater than that which is bestowed by
creature upon another. Thus, the a fortiori argument
is a method that leads the mind to what is particular to God.[19]
However, taking two different things and preferring one
over another by using the attributes that are particular to it, like ascribing
attributes to both God and another being, may be a problem, as it will imply
that God is the same object as the human being. For this reason, Ibn
Taymiyyah offers a solution by way of analogical predication (bi-ÏarÊq
al-tashkÊk). This means to ascribe one attribute to things that are
intrinsically different from each other. Such an attribute varies in strength
of application to each of these things and is necessarily more evident in the
one than in the other.[20] The attribute of ‘existence’, for
instance, may be applied to ‘the Necessary and possible being’ or for God
and the human being, but it is a fortiori evident that
existence applies more strongly to the Necessary than to the possible.
However, a fortiori analogy is
different from pure analogy (qiyÉs al-shumËl) or syllogism (qiyÉs
al-tamthÊl), as he realizes that God has no like and cannot be subsumed
under a universal whose instance are equal. The method leads the mind to
perceive what is particular to God by comprehending the qualities found in the
creatures and those analogous qualities found in the Creator. In other words
all the qualities enjoyed by the created being, are predicated in a more
powerful and accentuated form in God.
Looking at Ibn Taymiyyah’s explication of qiyÉs, suggests
that his view was considerably coloured by his characteristically
juristic thinking. In fact, Ibn Taymiyyah was first and foremost a lawyer
and jurist, and by the century in which he lived analogy (qiyÉs) had
already become one of the most sophisticated discussion in Islamic legal
theory. Therefore, he must have utilised the concept of qiyÉÎ which
has been developed by his predecessors, but, likely, his concept of a
fortiori analogy was creatively constructed by Ibn Taymiyyah
from his own understanding of the Qur’Én.
[1]
For the division of qiyÉs , see Chapter II, note no. 39.
[2] al-Radd,
ed.’Abd al-Øamad, pp. 204, 211.
[3] Ibid, pp.
200-201; MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 188.
[4] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 200.
[5]
Ibn Taymiyyah quotes these definitions from the ideas of the Salaf
scholars, as he himself declares. See al-Radd, ed.R. ‘Ajam,
pp.80-81.
[6] The
Qur’Én, 58:25; The term ‘balance’ is taken from other verse: AIt
is Allah Who has sent down the Book in truth and ‘Balance’ (mÊzÉn). The
Qur’Én, 42:17; the terms ‘balance’ in the sense of syllogism or
judgement is derived from the verse:” And with them He sent the Book in
truth to judge between people in matters wherein they differed.” The
Qur’Én, 55: 7
[7]
Giving example of this, he quotes the admonition of the Qur’Én of those
who treat the dissimilar things as similar:” Shall We then
treat those who have surrendered as We treat the sinner? What is
the matter with you? how do you judge?” (The Qur’Én, 68:
35-36). On those who treat similar things as dissimilar he quotes:” Or
do you think that you shall enter Paradise without such
trials, like those who passed away before you?” . The
Qur’Én, 2: 214; Ibid, p. 242.
[8] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol.IX, p.239. See also al-Radd, ed.’Abd Øamad,
p. 374.
[9] al-Radd, ed.’Abd
al-Øamad, pp. 372-73.
[10] This
idea is directed to the idea of Ibn Rushd who argued that the study of
philosophy and logic is decreed by shari’ah. See ‘FaÎl
al-MaqÉl’ in Falasafat Ibn Rushd ed. MuÎÏafÉ ‘Abd
al-JawÉd ‘ImrÉn, Maktabah al-Muhammadiyyah al-TijÉriyyah, Cairo,1968, p.9;
it is also directed to al-Ghazzali who related the meaning of mÊzÉn to
Aristotle syllogism; see al-Ghazzali, al-MustaØfÉ,
vol.I, p.10; al-Ghazzali, al-QiØÏÉs al-MustaqÊm, ed.
Victor S. Al-YasË)Ê,
n.p. Beirut, 1353 A.H., p . 15.
[11] MajmË) al-FatÉwÉ,
al-Mantiq, p. 243; al-Radd, ed.’Abd
al-Øamad, p. 373; See also MahmËd MÉdÊ, Waqfah ma’a al-Radd, p.
227.
[12] al-Radd, ed.’Abd
al-Øamad, p. 282.
[13] al-Radd, ed.
R.‘Ajam, vol. I, p. 158; MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 141.
[14] al-NashshÉr, ManÉhij
al-Bahth, p. 216.
[15] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 142.
[16] The
Qur’Én, 17: 12.
[17] al-Radd,
ed.’Abd al-Øamad, pp. 348-350.
[18] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 145.
[19] al-Radd,
ed.R.‘Ajam, vol. I. p. 162; MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol.
IX, p. 145.
[20] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 145.
t-� �El : � � ��Z w
Arabic";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language: EN-GB'>. The
Qur’Én, 2: 214; Ibid,
p. 242.
[8] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol.IX, p.239. See also al-Radd, ed.’Abd Øamad,
p. 374.
[9] al-Radd, ed.’Abd
al-Øamad, pp. 372-73.
[10] This
idea is directed to the idea of Ibn Rushd who argued that the study of
philosophy and logic is decreed by shari’ah. See ‘FaÎl
al-MaqÉl’ in Falasafat Ibn Rushd ed. MuÎÏafÉ ‘Abd
al-JawÉd ‘ImrÉn, Maktabah al-Muhammadiyyah al-TijÉriyyah, Cairo,1968, p.9;
it is also directed to al-Ghazzali who related the meaning of mÊzÉn to
Aristotle syllogism; see al-Ghazzali, al-MustaØfÉ,
vol.I, p.10; al-Ghazzali, al-QiØÏÉs al-MustaqÊm, ed.
Victor S. Al-YasË)Ê,
n.p. Beirut, 1353 A.H., p . 15.
[11] MajmË) al-FatÉwÉ,
al-Mantiq, p. 243; al-Radd, ed.’Abd
al-Øamad, p. 373; See also MahmËd MÉdÊ, Waqfah ma’a al-Radd, p.
227.
[12] al-Radd, ed.’Abd
al-Øamad, p. 282.
[13] al-Radd, ed.
R.‘Ajam, vol. I, p. 158; MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 141.
[14] al-NashshÉr, ManÉhij
al-Bahth, p. 216.
[15] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 142.
[16] The
Qur’Én, 17: 12.
[17] al-Radd,
ed.’Abd al-Øamad, pp. 348-350.
[18] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 145.
[19] al-Radd,
ed.R.‘Ajam, vol. I. p. 162; MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX,
p. 145.
[20] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 145.
