Understanding Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought about definition
in the light of his criticism suggests that he has totally different ideas from
those of Aristotelian logic. According to logicians the function of definition
is to describe the named object, while to Ibn Taymiyyah it is simply
giving a name to an object and does not describe an object.
This section will present Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought on the function of definition
and the rules of making it; it then follows the method of obtaining definition
in relation to the understanding religious teachings.
According to Ibn Taymiyyah a definition is similar to a
name. It is like a single expression signifying a meaning, which is tantamount
to a name signifying the named object (al-musamma). So, the
signification of a definition is the same as the signification of a name.[1]
In this sense, he describes that definition as “an elaboration of what is
indicated in the name, in general (tafÎÊl mÉ dalla ‘alayhi
al-ism bi-l-ijmÉl).”[2]
The function of definition is similar to that of a name, which is to
distinguish between one object defined and another.[3]
His idea that the function of definition is simply to
give a name to an object defined is based on his understanding of the Qur’Én.
The term al-hadd (definition) is mentioned in the Qur’Én, in
the sËrah al-Tawbah,[4] and it is understood
by Ibn Taymiyyah as definition. In addition, the Qur’Énic statement
that God taught Adam names,[5] is
interpreted by Ibn Taymiyyah as teaching him definitions (al-ÍudËd).[6]
The other meaning of al-Íadd is divine command or limit or
prohibition,[7]
but Ibn Taymiyyah does not explain the word in this sense.
As for the function of definition as to give a name and
to distinguish between the object defined and another, Ibn
Taymiyyah establishes a rule [8]
by which definition can be made, namely by stating the essential
attribute (al-waÎf al-lÉzim) of an object defined in terms of exhaustion (Ïardan)
and exclusion (‘aksan).[9] Using exhaustion we
find exact equivalence between the definition and the defined object. It is like
finding the similarities of knowledge as a defined object and information as a
definition. If the similarities are found it become a statement
“knowledge (al-’ilm) is information (al-ma’rifah).”
Consequently, every information is knowledge and every knowledge is
information. Using exclusion we exclude all
things that make the defined object different from the definition. If one
wants to define knowledge in this way, one has to exclude all qualities
not belonging to knowledge. It is as if to say that “everything
which is not knowledge is not information” and “everything which is not
information is not knowledge.” Accordingly, if ‘knowledge’ is defined
as an ‘accident’, it is not exhaustive because
not all accidents are knowledge and therefore knowledge cannot be
defined as an accident for the two are not exactly equivalent. Similarly,
if we define knowledge as all ‘temporal information’, (al-ma‘rifah
al-hÉdithah), this is not exclusive because there is
a knowledge which is not temporal and therefore the term cannot describe
the knowledge in a general sense.[10]
By following this rule, definition will then include the entire qualities of
the object defined and exclude the qualities that do not belong to it, just
like the name. The purpose of definition is to clarify only the named object
and to draw a distinction between the defined object and other things, but not
to form a concept of the defined object.
Since the use of definition lies in the clarification of
the named object, and since naming is a matter of language and convention, Ibn
Taymiyyah infers that definition is also obtainable from two ways, first by
verbal definitions (al-hudËd al-lafziyyah) and the second by
convention. In describing the application of these ways, Ibn Taymiyyah
stressed that the fundamental thing to be considered in this regard is the
intention and the language of the one who names.[11]
Accordingly, Ibn Taymiyyah refers to the method of making definition employed
by the jurists (al-fuqahÉ’), especially in understanding certain
‘religious names’ (al-asmÉ’ al-shar’iyyah). In his opinion,
jurists hold that the definitions of some names are known by three means,
namely, custom (‘urf), religious law (shar’), and language
(lughah).[12]
The first, custom, is known through the
customs that prevail among the common people in their daily life, such as
marriage (nikÉh), trading (bay’), the making of contracts and so
on. The definitions of these things are within the understanding of the common
people.[13]
The second is known from
the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Messenger. In
fact, the meaning of some names in the Book are not always understandable or
they are understood only in general terms, while one should try to understand
the exhaustive and exclusive meaning (jÉmi‘ mÉni‘) of those names.[14]
Here, Ibn Taymiyyah suggests that one should refer to the explanation of the
Prophet.
The third, which is by means of
language or known from ordinary language, such as sun, moon, stars and
others. It is equivalent to knowing what a thing is (mÉ huwa).[15]
But this can be done through linguistic means rather than philosophical.
For one who does not know the language, Ibn Taymiyyah assumes that the inquirer
can be in one of two situations. First the one who may have a
concept of that meaning without the words; second one who may
have neither a concept of meaning nor an indication of the word. To know
the object, the first needs only the translation of the word,
while the second needs the translation and the concept of that
meaning.
To know the concept of that meaning, Ibn Taymiyyah
introduces two methods: the first is ta‘yÊn (equation), where
the named object is presented to the speaker who has to decide
its similarities with the named object. The second is by Îifah (attributing), which means giving
an attribute to that thing, as attributing, can often represent the actual
inspection.[16] Supporting
this idea Ibn Taymiyyah mentions that in Islamic jurisprudence the jurists
agree that selling unseen goods by speaking about their qualities is legal.[17]
Looking at the above concept of making a definition, it
seems that definition in the eyes of Ibn Taymiyyah is understanding a word by
seeing the thing identified by that word or by giving the characteristics
of that thing. It is totally different from the ideas of logicians, who
construct definition based on their concepts of genus and differentia or
essence and existence, by which they claim that it can describe the object
defined.
Although Ibn Taymiyyah’s idea of definition look simple,
he can describe it in a wider context of religious understanding. Apart from
his idea of using definition for religious names in Islamic jurisprudence, Ibn
Taymiyyah applies his concept of definition to the interpretation and the
explanation of speech (tafsÊr al-kalÉm wa sharhih). For this
purpose he discusses two possibilities; the first is
that ‘interpretation and explanation’ of speech can be
meant as explaining the intention of the speaker. Here the explanation must
be based upon knowledge of the definition of his words. The second possibility
is that it can be meant to be validation and verification of what the speaker
says, and this case the proof in favour of such validity must be adduced.[18] For
him the first, involves the explication of how a concept of in
speech was formed, while the second addresses the validity of
inferences by means of which statements were derived. Thus, forming a concept
of his speech is like forming a concept of the named object (al-musammÉ)
by means of translation (tarjamah).
Ibn Taymiyyah argues that, in fact, discussion of the
obscure verses of the Qur’Én, prophetic reports and so forth belong to the
problem of drawing up definition. The exegesis of the Qur’Én and the
interpretation of other types of discourse, for instance, are attained through
understanding of their definitions. This is because the aim is to reveal the
intended meaning of the speaker by the names he uses and the discourse he
presented. This verbal definition is needed in studying all books and all sorts
of discourse. Therefore, to understand the correct meaning of religious
nomenclature one should derive the knowledge of definitions from religious
writings, which are found in the Book of God and the Sunnah of
His Messenger. So the verbal definition is the only means that serves the
attainment of knowledge, either religious, philosophical or scientific. [19]
In conclusion, the above survey suggests that to obtain
definitions for religious understanding Ibn Taymiyyah emphasizes the use of
verbal definition rather than custom (‘urf). For this he considers
that language and the intentions of him who gives a name for the first time are
the most fundamental things. Supporting his idea he notes that in
Aristotle’s logic the distinction between essential and accidental attributes
is also based on the intention (maqÎad) and the language (lafz)
of the one who classifies or categorises these things.[20]
Thus, making distinction from one to another thing is man’s own creation and is
based on the particular individual as well as man’s unique perception of
things. However, in the quest for religious
understanding, intention (maqÎad) and language (lughah)
cannot be based on man’s own perception, but they refer to that of the
Qur’Én. Here, Ibn Taymiyyah might be saying that to define some religious
names, one should rely on the intention and the language of the Qur’Én with the
help of the explanation given by the Prophet. It is clear that Ibn
Taymiyyah criticises the definition of the logicians without giving a solution
of his own. What is manifest in his thought is his insistence upon
putting definitions into a religious context to facilitate the understanding of
religion.
[1] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 91.
[2] Ibid; al-Radd,
vol. I, ed.R.‘Ajam, p. 58; MuwÉfaqat, vol. III, p. 332.
[3] Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, vol.
III, p. 320.
[4] The verse reads:”The Arab of the desert are the
worst in unbelief and hypocrisy, most fitted to be in ignorance
of the command (hudËd) which God has sent down to His
messenger”. The Qur’Én, 9:97.
[5] The
Qur’Én 2:3, 33.
[6] al-Radd, ed.R.‘Ajam,
vol.I. p. 38.
[7] Hans
Wehr, Arabic English Dictionary, ed. J.M.Cowan, Spoken Language
Service Inc, Ithaca, New York, 1976, p. 159.
[8]
This rule according to Ibn Taymiyyah is in consonance with the idea of Muslim
thinkers from all groups, hence he mentions AbË HÉshim al-JubbÉ‘Ê
(d. 321 A.H./933), AbË al-Hasan al-Ash’arÊ (d. 324 A.H./935), al-QÉdÊ AbË Bakr
al-BÉqilÉnÊ (d. 403A.H./1013), al-QÉdÊ AbË Ya’lÉ (d. 458
A.H./1066), AbË al-WafÉ’ Ibn ‘AqÊl (d. 513 A.H./1119). However,
he mainly refers to AbË al-Ma’ÉlÊ al-JuwaynÊ’s statement that the
investigators of the Muslim thinkers agreed to justify that the exhaustion and exclusion are
the conditions of making a definition. Ibid; see also Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol.IX, p. 91.
[9] al-Radd,
ed. R.‘Ajam, vol. I.pp. 43-44.
[10] Ibid.
[11] al-Radd, ed. ‘Abd
al-Øamad, pp.68, 70, 402.
[12] Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, pp. 93-94; al-Radd, ed.
R.‘Ajam, pp. 63-64; 74.
[13] al-Radd, ed.R.‘Ajam,
vol. I, pp. 74-75.
[14] The
example of some religious names are al-ØalÉt (prayer), al-hajj (pilgrimage), al-ribÉ (interest), al-maysÊr (gambling)
and the like. See al-Radd, ed. R.‘Ajam, p.74
[15] Knowing
by linguistic definition can be in two ways, first is
answering to the question AWhat is it” simply by name, second is
by a synonymous name or other name that corresponds to it, or
by example as when the word al-hubz (bread) is known by
showing zaghÊf (bun,roll), Ibid, p.
74.
[16]Ibid, p.
78.
[17] Ibid, pp.
76-77.
[18]Majmˑat
al-FatÉwÉ, p. 94; al-Radd, ed. R.‘Ajam, p.
64.
[19] Ibn
Taymiyyah asserts that since the Qur’Én is understood through the
interpretation of the Prophet, it does not need evidence of the
linguist or others. However, following the jurists Ibn Taymiyyah
mentions three ways of understanding a name: by religion (shar’),
language (lughah) and custom (‘urf ). The
term al-ma’rËf ( kindness
and equity) in the Qur’Én 4:19, for instance, is known by
custom. See “Muqaddimat al-TafsÊr” in MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ,
vol.XIII, p. 28.
[20] al-Radd, ed.’Abd
al-Øamad, pp. 68, 70, 402.
