As in the
case of definitions Ibn Taymiyyah
divides his criticism of syllogisms into two propositions: the negative (al-maqÉm al-salabÊ ) and the
affirmative (al-maqÉm al-ÊjÉbÊ ). The implicit meaning of
the word negative and affirmative is exactly the same as in definition.
a) The negative proposition that “no
judgement may be known except
by means of syllogism (inna
al-taÎdÊq al-maÏlËb lÉ yunÉlu illa bi al-qiyÉs) is refuted by Ibn Taymiyyah on
various grounds.[1] But, this study will deal
only with three important points.
First, Aristotelian logic admits
that some judgements are self-evident (badÊhÊ) while others are speculative
(naz}arÊ ); yet no judgements can be speculative as speculative
knowledge must be self-evident. The non-self-evident judgement cannot be known
except by means of the logical deductions in a syllogism (qiyÉs al-shumËl).[2] This is also called demonstrative inference (al-qiyÉs al-burhÉnÊ ) and is regarded as the highest form of syllogism.
This is because the demonstration (burhÉn) which is the universal premise (qadiyyah
kulliyah) is the best way to obtain
indisputable knowledge (al-’ulËm al-yaqÊniyyah).
Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation focuses on the basis
of the conviction that the premise (qadiyyah)
is the pivot of knowledge (manÉÏ
al-‘ilm). He says that
if the universal premise is necessary one should know whether it is universal
or particular. If it is particular, it
cannot be considered knowledge,
since universality is a condition of
producing knowledge. Further, if it is
universal, acquired knowledge is either self-evident or speculative. In the case that it is self-evident, every
one of its individual parts should be self-evident and in the case that it is speculative, it needs
self-evident knowledge. Undoubtedly,
this leads to a continuous circle and endless chain, which are unacceptable. If
the universal premises need proof of their soundness, says Ibn Taymiyyah, how
can this deduction become the best way to acquire knowledge?[3]
Second, the logicians
assert that the syllogistic process of gaining knowledge requires two premises,
but Ibn Taymiyyah believes that such knowledge can be attained by one, two,
three or even more premises according to the needs and requirements of an
argument. Some may not require any premises at all, since they know the matter
by some other source, such as innate
knowledge (fiÏrah). He takes an
example of the saying of the Prophet:”Every intoxicating thing is wine (khamr),
and all kinds of wine are unlawful (harÉm)”, implying that any intoxicating beverage is
included in the designation of the word ‘wine’ that God has made unlawful to drink, as ordained in the Holy Book of
Islam.
Another similar example is in a Hadith
narrated by al-BukhÉrÊ and Muslim which says
that once the Prophet was asked about a beverage made from Indian corn called mizr and from honey called
bit‘. The Prophet answered in an all-embracing formulation (jawÉmi‘ al-kalim), “Every intoxicant is unlawful”. This means he
wanted to clarify the matter in universal terms or universal premises. In this
regard Ibn Taymiyyah agrees with the logicians that these prophetic traditions
are included in the designation of syllogistic proof. But he refuses to accept
their claim that the Prophet also used Aristotelian logic. He insists that such
a method of proof is innate ( fiÏrÊ ) and can be known without formal learning.[4]
Third, the logicians
claim that syllogism gives benefit of perfect knowledge, and that it deals with
the knowledge of ‘universal’. The ‘universals’ are attained by intellectual propositions which are necessary, such as
“all men are animal” and “every existing thing
is either necessary or possible”, and the like which do not
accept any change. Refuting this
argument Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that since logicians claim that syllogism deals
only with intellectual matters having no connection with the physical world, it
gives no knowledge of existing thing. Therefore, we may consider it useless for
all practical purpose. Moreover, he
questions the validity of logic in exposing the concept of universal, for he
believes that in the world of reality there is no such thing as universal,
because the external and the internal sense of man perceive only the particular
object.
In conclusion,
Ibn Taymiyyah refutes the claim of the logicians that judgement
cannot be obtained by other than
syllogistic methods, for he believes that the instinctive method (al-Ïuruq al-fiÏriyyah)[5] is another possible method of acquiring knowledge and is simpler
than syllogisms. Although he
refutes the proposition, he does not question the validity of this deductive
method in obtaining the truth. The point that he criticises is on the necessity
of using universal premises in syllogism, as he prefers to use particular
premises based on sensory experience (al-tajribah al-hissiyyah). After
all, his main concern is about the
necessity of using two premises in a syllogism, and he argues against this
extensively.
b) The affirmative proposition of the logicians
about syllogisms is that Aa syllogism leads to the certain knowledge of judgements (anna al-qiyÉs yufÊd al-’ilm bi al-taÎdÊqÉt ). The refutations of Ibn Taymiyyah on this
proposition are partly similar to those
on negative propositions discussed
previously, yet he tends to assess rather than criticise. Again in this study only two major points
that he makes, which have not been mentioned before, will be presented.
First, Ibn Taymiyyah
argues that if the knowledge we want to obtain by means of a syllogism is the
knowledge of universal matters, this actually does not exist in reality and does not serve any certain knowledge of reality, since the
knowledge of the particular is more certain than the knowledge of the universal. For this reason Ibn Taymiyyah
asserts the importance of using analogy (qiyÉs al-tamthÊl) in obtaining knowledge compared with the other
type of syllogism. This point is almost similar to his criticism of negative
proposition, but here he emphasises to use particular knowledge so as to lead
to the important of using analogy.
Second, as he does not
totally disagree with the syllogistic method, Ibn Taymiyyah emphasises the
subject matter of the syllogism, which is the soundness of the indication (dalÊl).[6] The target is knowledge and the
way to achieve it is indication. Anyone
who knows the indication for the target
will know the target, either by the way of syllogism or by other ways. So, for
one who does not know the indication for the target, the syllogistic method is
useless. To know the indication means to understand the concomitance (al-luzËm). The example of this is that everyone who
knows that everything is a sign of God and necessarily in need of Him, will
realise that its existence necessitates the existence of the Creator. This is
just precisely similar to the knowledge
that the created things necessitate the Creator.[7] Here Ibn Taymiyyah rejects the
above claim of logicians and emphasises
that one can obtain judgement by
means of sound knowledge of indication and this is even more important than
mere form of syllogistic or analogical inference. Thus, relying on the form of
syllogism alone will be useless.
In short, Ibn Taymiyyah partly agrees that a
syllogism provides the knowledge of judgements, as he finds that this method
may yield a valid or invalid conclusion. In this connection he suggests that the sound syllogism is fiÏrah. The basis of this suggestion is his belief that God created man based on
fiÏrah, wherein “lies the
knowledge of truth and his attestation of it, and the recognition of falsehood
and his rejection of it”.[8] His concept of fiÏrah will be discussed in detail in chapter IV.2.a.
To sum up, reading through Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism of Aristotelian
logic we can grasp the salient
features of his attitude towards
it. Firstly, when he launches his
attack against Aristotelian logic he alludes to
the earlier polemical writings of theologians, even though he does not
limit himself to theological discourse, but enters the realm of philosophical
discussion and tries to introduce his own argument. This means that he is quite conversant with
the philosophical discourse and even has a first- hand knowledge of the philosophers’ thought. Secondly,
unlike his predecessors among the Salaf who simply censured the use
of logic in general, Ibn Taymiyyah
approaches the problem with an intellectual framework of his own by introducing
a variety of arguments derived from a wide range of sources. Thirdly, his
criticism of logic is intended chiefly to undermine the validity of
philosophical postulates making up and deriving from logic, especially that of
metaphysics.
In addition to
the foregoing, it is worth categorising his mode of argument. First is the argument that follows the
logical structure of the logicians, which can be judged from his refutation of
definition mentioned above. Another category which is dominant in Ibn Taymiyyah’s argumentation is his attack on the content of
arguments rather than the structure. In this mode he usually questions the
basic concept of a statement or an assumption and then expounds his
counter-ideas in the same way. A lucid example of this is his refutation of the logicians’ concept of quiddity and existence where he
elucidates his own ideas. Finally comes
the argumentation based on religious concepts, where he cites Qur’Énic verses or
prophetic traditions. These quotations
are consistently introduced as subsidiary arguments, since the ideas he wants
to refute are the logical arguments of the logicians.
[1] al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Îamad, pp. 88, 240.
[2] Ibn Taymiyyah finds that the
logicians had three methods of qiyÉs, they are 1) Syllogism ( qiyÉs al-shumËl), meaning the inference that proceeds from universal to particular and become the
procedure of deductive logic, it is also called
qiyÉs al-’umËm 2) Analogy (qiyÉs al-tamthÊl ) meaning
the inference that moves from
particulars to particulars, it is also called
qiyÉs al-shabah; 3) Induction ( qiyÉs al-istiqrÉ‘ ) is constructed from particular
to universal and is also called is qiyÉs al-tatabbu’. See Naqd al-ManÏ}iq, pp. 200-211.
[3] al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Îamad, p. 107.
[4] Naqd al-ManÏiq, pp.200-201; al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Îamad, vol.I, pp. 123-124.
[5] What Ibn Taymiyyah means by the concept of fiÏrah is that man has the faculty of reason (al-naz}ar) which consist of power of cognizance, perception and comprehension,
and the faculty of volition (al-irÉdah) which comprises the powers of
discernment and emotion. According to him by these faculties human beings can naturally differentiate between truth and
falsity, good and bad. See Naqd
al-ManÏiq, p. 29.
[6] The term ‘indication’ (dalÊl) acquired
several technical connotation among the philosophers and religious scholars.
The most general and agreed-upon definition seems to be “that which leads to
what is being sought (maÏlËb)”. In other words, an indication
is anything, which, once known, entails the knowledge of another. Logicians in
two principle meanings acknowledge this term. The first being a synonym
of hujjah, namely, a syllogistic, inductive or analogical inference
through which a judgement is formulated, whereas the second is
demonstrative syllogism, defined as a set premises which when placed together
entail (yalzam) another premise or conclusion. See TahÉnawÊ, KashshÉf, vol. I, s.v.’dalÊl’, p.429
[7] al-Radd, ed.A.Îamad,
p.252; cf. Mahmud MÉÌÊ, Waqfa ma’a al-Radd ‘alÉ al-ManÏiqiyyÊn, pp. 132-33.
[8] Naqd al-ManÏiq, p.29; al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Îamad, p. 428.
