With regard to definitions, Ibn Taymiyyah directs his criticism to two propositions: the
negative ( al-maqÉm al-salabÊ ) and the affirmative ( al-maqÉm al-ÊjÉbÊ ). The word negative’implies that any method
other than the propositions created
by logicians cannot attain the
concept. The word ‘affirmative’ means that propositions alone permits them to attain the concept. The same distinction between negative and
affirmative applies to the syllogism.[1]
a) The negative proposition that “no concept can be
formed except by means of definition” (inna
al-taÎawwur al-maÏlËb lÉ yunÉlu illa bi al-hadd) is refuted by
Ibn Taymiyyah in sixteen arguments.[2] However, only five of the
most important criticisms will be
discussed here; the rest will be
mentioned in brief.
First, a definition is only the
statement made by the definer about the quiddity (mÉhiyyah) [3] of the defined object. The knowledge of definition occurs after the
knowledge of the defined object. If the definer knows the defined object
without the definition, then the
principle of the philosophers that something cannot be obtained except by
definition is invalid. If the definer
knew the defined object after having known the previously made definition, it
would then result in a vicious circle (dawr) and endless chain (tasalsul)
in the reasoning process.[4]
Second, a definition is
undefendable because philosophers can never define something that is agreed upon by all. Every definition they make is claimed as true by some and refuted by
others. If reality cannot be discerned except by definition, then none of those
philosophers has really discovered any reality, since any definition they have
made is disputable.[5] Moreover, there is no permanent definition in any human knowledge. Even
the well-known definition of a human
being (al-insÉn) as a the speaking animal has
been challenged by eminent scholars.
Grammarians, scholars of UsËl al-Fiqh, philosophers, mutakallimËn
and others have different and conflicting
definitions. So, Ibn Taymiyyah concludes that if the concept of things were
bounded by making ‘definitions’, human beings would never
understand the concept of anything.[6]
Third, according to
the logicians, correct definitions are a combination of genus (jins) and
differentia (faÎl), but entities
that do not have structure and are not classified under
‘genus’ have no definition. Reason (al-’aql) is among these non-structural realities and is
therefore not defined. However, Ibn Taymiyyah holds that logicians
have their own concept of
intellect (al-’uqËl) and of some entities which have
no structure. This means that they themselves affirm that to obtain the concept
without recourse to definition is possible, in which case they contradict their
own theory. In addition scholars in many branches of knowledge have major
concepts that are not based on genus and class.[7] Therefore, definition is not
needed.
Fourth, God gives man external as
well as internal sense perceptions such as taste, colour and air, or internal
feelings such as hunger, love, hate, pleasure or sadness, by which he perceives
realities. None of these methods of
perception needs definition. Ibn Taymiyyah is doubtful that mere verbal definition can comprehend the
reality of a particular thing. Although
man can describe reality, it does not mean that we have to use definition. The
reality of honey, for example, can be perceived and tasted without the need of
definition, whereas one who has never tasted honey cannot grasp the reality of
such a substance through definition. He may be given some description of honey
through comparison with another substance like sugar, but this comparison is
analogical and not a definition.[8] So, Ibn Taymiyyah inferred that
whatever cannot be known through the senses can be known through analogies but
not through definition.
Fifth, the definition of a thing
consists of several terms, each of which indicates a definite meaning. Unless a
man knows the terms and their meaning beforehand, understanding the definition
itself is impossible for him. The knowledge of the term that indicates the
meaning is preceded by the conception of meaning (taÎawwur al-ma’nÉ). For example,
anyone who does not know the concepts of water, sky, earth, father or mother
cannot know what the terms indicate. Here Ibn Taymiyyah makes a distinction
between conception (taÎwÊr) and differentiation (tamyÊz). He
holds that definition is useful for differentiation and not for conception.[9]
The other arguments that Ibn Taymiyyah employs in
refuting the negative proposition relate to contradictions in the procedure of
making definitions and the conflict between Aristotle’s analysis of the mental process of perception and our experience of
that process. The point that Ibn
Taymiyyah discusses minutely concerns the philosophers’ concept of the
basic structure of reality - which is the defined object in a definition - such
as genus, differentia and species including the division of their
qualities.[10] Although he does not question the basic validity of this division, he
states that it is nothing more than the intellectualisation of reality. If they
affirm that it is a fixed description of the real world, it is wrong, because
intellectual perception is relative and conditional. For this he argues that
the conception in the mind is true only if it directly and exactly corresponds
to the factual being of an object, because the conception in the mind is not
something permanent in the object described. Therefore, to obtain the true
conception in the mind, one should differentiate the essential from the
accidental by a permanent quality (waÎf
thÉbit).
Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticisms of negative propositions of definitions, stated above,
indicate that he attempts in all possible ways to reject the theory of the necessity of
using definition in acquiring all knowledge, although he justifies its use for
other purposes. Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation of
the logicians’ claim that there is no means of attaining knowledge
other than definition may be
justifiable, but his own claim that
definition is totally irrelevant seems
exaggerated, since there are many scholars who may use definition in
their inquiries.
b) The
affirmative proposition of the logician that
“definition leads to the concept of things” (inna al-hadd yufÊdu al-’ilm bi al-taÎawwurÉt ) is refuted by Ibn Taymiyyah in nine arguments which basically consist of
two kinds: the first part is directed towards the affirmative
proposition, while the second part is directed towards the elements of
definition (al-hadd). However, on
this occasion only his major arguments representing the two parts, will be mentioned.
First, if the conception of the object defined is achieved
by definition, then it is obtained before one has known the
correctness of the definition, since knowledge of the correctness of the
definition is not attained except after one has known the object defined. Ibn Taymiyyah is also sceptical as to whether
the definer can give proof on the correctness of the
definition if the listener cannot know the object defined by definition.[11] Moreover, he asserts that conceiving the object defined by the
definition is impossible without
knowledge of the veracity (Îidq) of the definer and we
cannot know the veracity of the
definer simply by the definition.
Therefore, the definition will not lead us to the object defined.
The point that Ibn Taymiyyah cannot justify in his
search for religious truth is that while logicians accept the statement of a
single individual in the case of logical argument, they refuse to accept the
words of a single individual (khabar al-wÉhid) in the
case of religious traditions (al-umËr al-sam‘iyyah).
Second, logicians establish
that “what provides the concept of reality is the complete definition” (al-mufÊd
li taÎwÊr al-haqÊqah huwa al-hadd al-tÉmm). This
complete definition consists of essences and not accidents. The core of this
argument is the distinction between the essential and the accidental. The
essential to them is something within the quiddity (mÉhiyyah), and the accidental is
beyond the quiddity.[12]
Criticising this concept, Ibn Taymiyyah infers that
this is fundamentally based on two invalid principles, namely, the
differentiation between the quiddity’(al-mahiyyah) and ‘its existence’(wujËdihÉ ), and what is essential (al-dhÉtÊ lahÉ ) and what is
necessary (al-lÉzim lahÉ)
concomitant to it. However, Ibn Taymiyyah concerns about the
differentiation between the quiddity and its existence, as it will relate
closely to the problem of metaphysics.
Based on the above principle, the logicians hold
that the ‘quiddity’ (mÉhiyyah) has a permanent reality other than its own
existence, subsisting outside the mind.
This, according to Ibn Taymiyyah,
is unacceptable as they perceive
a thing before it exists. The source of
their error is that they think that before its coming into existence a thing
can be the object of knowledge and intention.
In fact, when we talk about the realities of these things, we actually
talk about permanent realities in the mind,
not beyond the mind, and what
exists in the mind is sometimes wider
than the real existence, so that ‘quiddity’ (al-mÉhiyyah) is universal (kulliyyah). Nevertheless,
the affirmation that the ‘quiddity’ is beyond the mind will lead to the assumption that the realities of species,
such as humanity (al-insÉniyyah) are externally permanent (thÉbitah) and the substance of the
‘quiddity’ is not externally existing. If it is so this will
lead to the idea of establishing the
‘quiddity’ of substance (mÉhiyyÉt al-mÉddah) separate from the external
permanent concept whereby they establish
the eternity of material (al-huyËlÉ ), which subsequently becomes the basis of their idea
on the eternity of the universe. Ibn
Taymiyyah objects that this proposition
was derived from Plato and is against
the concept of unity (tawhÊd) in Islam, despite the attempt of some
Muslim philosophers to reconcile it with Islam.[13]
Thus the truth according to Ibn Taymiyyah is that
all things are permanent and subsistent only in the mind and not beyond the
mind or in the object itself. For him,
the correct idea of differentiation is that
the ‘existence in the mind’ (al-wujËd al-dhihnÊ ) is a quiddity in the mind (al-mÉhiyyah allatÊ
fÊ al-dhihnÊ ), and the quiddity of something beyond the mind is the
actuality (‘ayn) of its
existence beyond the mind. In other words, the quiddity (al-mÉhiyyah) of a thing is the
representation (rasm) of that
thing in the mind, and existence is what exists of that matter beyond the mind.[14]
The first part of Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation of the affirmative proposition of
definition pertains mostly to the criticism about the efficacy of definition in providing concepts. This covers the
vulnerability of the definer as the maker of a
concept, the weaknesses of the rules of logicians in defining an object
and the significance of the object defined in a definition. In the second part,
which concerns the concept of definition,
Ibn Taymiyyah expounds his elaboration of the concept of reality which
becomes an important part of
constructing definitions. This issue is
taken seriously by Ibn Taymiyyah because it relates closely to the metaphysical
problems, which correspond to the essence and existence of God.
Supporting his idea that the external existence of
something is the external substance of its quiddity (mÉhiyyah), Ibn Taymiyyah claims that this agrees with those thinkers who were associated with the ahl al-sunna wa al-jamÉ‘ah.[15] Moreover, his idea on the
difference between quiddity and
existence seems to be directed at the
idea of Ibn SÊnÉ in his al-IshÉrÉt.[16] However, it is worth mentioning
that this criticism was first advanced
by Ibn Rushd in his TahÉfut al-TahÉfut.[17] Besides, Ibn Taymiyyah also
mentions the different ideas of the philosophers such as Aristotle, Pythagoras
and Plato on this issue. This implies
that Ibn Taymiyyah has learnt something from his predecessor for his criticism,
and that he utilizes the ideas he deems
to be sound to support his own. It is
clear that Ibn Taymiyyah has joined the philosophical debate while striving to
vindicate his own beliefs.
In conclusion, Ibn
Taymiyyah makes it clear that the function of a definition is the same as the
function of a single name or noun (al-ism), which is the differentiation
between the object defined and others. But sometimes it provides a general
explanation of what is indicated in the name. This explanation varies according
to the predicates (al-ÎifÉt) and is not particular to certain predicates that suit the predicated
object (al-mawÎËf) So, the definition is, in fact, the explanation of the named object
and the differentiation of the object defined (al-mahdËd) from others, and not the
concepts of the object defined. Giving a
name (tasmiyah) is linguistic convention (waÌ‘Ê ) that should be
referred to the purpose of the named object and language. In this regard jurists state that the definitions of some names are known by language, others
through religious law (shar‘Ê )
and some are through custom or tradition.
Thus, reality cannot be conceived in mere words. [18] Such a verbal expression will
never be understood unless the meaning of the words contained in it is first perceived by some other means than the
words themselves. This is the reason why most definition makes the perception
of realities even more difficult so that they create more confusion among the
philosophers themselves.[19]
[1] Mahmud MÉdÊ, Waqfah
ma’a al-Radd ‘alÉ al-ManÏiqiyyÊn li-Ibn Taymiyyah, DÉr al-Da’wah, Iskandariyyah, 1996, p. 49.
[2] There are sixteen arguments in
his Naqd al-ManÏiq but only eleven in his al-Radd. See al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Îamad, pp.7-14, 180; cf. Naqd
al-ManÏiq, p. 184ff.
[3] The term ‘quiddity’ is of
Latin origin quidditas the
synonym of >whatness’ which means the real
essence or nature of a thing. See Simon
Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 1996, under ‘quiddity’. The synonymous term in Arabic logic mÉhiyyah is derived from the Arabic
question mÉ huwa that implies the request to
perceive something in mind. Al-FÉrÉbÊ and Ibn SÊna employed the word
mÉhiyyah to represent the meaning of
essence or nature of the thing.; See al-Radd, ed.R.’Ajam, vol.I. p.85; cf. Nicholas
Rescher, Studies on The History of Arabic Logic, p. 40.
[4] Naqd al-ManÏiq, p.184; al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Îamad, p. 38.
[5] Naqd al-ManÏiq, p.184, al-Radd, ed.Abd al-Îamad, p. 8.
[6] al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Îamad, p. 8.
[7] Ibid, p. 9.
[8] Naqd al-ManÏiq, p. 186.
[9]al-Radd, ed.R.’Ajam, vol.I p. 38; MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol.IX, p. 86.
[10] Naqd al-ManÏiq, pp.
188-189.
[11] Naqd al-ManÏiq, pp. 11,
16, 18.
[12] al-Radd, ed.R.’Ajam,
vol.I, pp. 82-84; MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. IX, p. 96. cf. Rescher, Studies in the History of Arabic Logic, pp. 67-68.
[13] al-Radd, ed.’Abd al-Îamad, pp. 64-68.
[14] al-Radd, ed.R.’Ajam, vol.I, pp. 82-86.
[15] Ibn Taymiyyah speaks of AbË Muhammad bin KullÉb, AbË al-Hasan al-Ash’arÊ, AbË ‘Abd Allah bin KarrÉm as the exponent of Ahl
al-Sunnah wa al-Jamɑah. See al-Radd,
ed. R.’Ajam, vol.I, p. 85.
[16] Ibn SÊnÉ, al-IshÉrÉt, ed. SulaymÉn DunyÉ, vol.I, DÉr al-Ma’Érif, Cairo
[17] Ibn Rushd said:”Existence according to Ibn SÊna is an accident that
is concomitant with quiddity. In this he
makes a serious mistake. In order for
something to exist, there must be proof of its existence. Otherwise there will
be unlimited accidents, which is impossible. See Ibn Rushd, TahÉfut al-TahÉfut, ed. SulaymÉn DunyÉ, vol.I, DÉr al-Ma’Érif, Cairo
[18] al-Radd, ed.R.’Ajam,
vol. I, pp. 63-64; 91-92.
[19] Naqd al-ManÏ}iq, p.
200.
