The
emergence of this sect took place during the latter part of the first century
or at the beginning of the second. Obviously 'ilm al-kalam, like any
other field of study, developed gradually and slowly attained maturity.
First we
shall enumerate the principal Mu'tazilite beliefs, or what is better to say,
the basic and salient points of their school of thought. Second, we shall point
out the well-known Mu'tazilite figures and speak of their fate in history. Then
we shall give an account of the main outlines of the transitions and changes in
their thought and beliefs.
The
opinions held by the Mu'tazilah are many, and are not confined to the religious
matters, or which according to them form an essential part of the faith. They
cover a number of physical, social, anthropological and philosophical issues,
which are not directly related with the faith. However, there is a certain
relevance of these problems to religion, and, in the belief of the Mu'tazilah,
any inquiry about the matters of religion is not possible without studying
them.
There are
five principal doctrines which, according to the Mu'tazilah themselves,
constitute their basic tenets:
(i) Tawhid,
i.e. absence of plurality and attributes.
(ii)
Justice ('adl), i.e. God is just and that He does not oppress His
creatures.
(iii)
Divine retribution (at-wa'd wa al-wa'id), i.e. God has determined a
reward for the obedient and a punishment for the disobedient, and there can be
no uncertainty about it. Therefore, Divine pardon is only possible if the
sinner repents, for forgiveness without repentance (tawbah) is not
possible.
(iv) Manzilah
bayna al-manzilatayn (a position between the two positions). This means
that a fasiq (i.e. one who commits one of the "greater sins,"
such as a wine imbiber, adulterer, or a liar etc.) is neither a believer (mu'min)
nor an infidel (kafir); fisq is an intermediary state between belief
and infidelity.
(v) al-'amr
bil ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar [bidding to do what is right and
lawful, and forbidding what is wrong and unlawful]. The opinion of the
Mu'tazilah about this Islamic duty is, firstly, that the Shari'ah is not the
exclusive means of identifying the ma'ruf and the munkar; human
reason can, at least partially, independently identify the various kinds of ma'ruf
and munkar. Secondly, the implementation of this duty does not
necessitate the presence of the Imam, and is a universal obligation of all
Muslims, whether the Imam or leader is present or not. Only some categories of
it are the obligation of the Imam or ruler of Muslims, such as, implementation
of the punishments (hudud) prescribed by the Shari'ah, guarding of the
frontiers of Islamic countries, and other such matters relating to the Islamic
government.
Occasionally,
the Mu'tazilite mutakallmun have devoted independent volumes to
discussion of their five doctrines, such as the famous al-'Usul al-khamsah of
al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar al-'Astarabadi (d. 415/ 1025), a Mu'tazilite
contemporary of al-Sayyid al-Murtada 'Alam al-Huda and al-Sahib ibn 'Abbad (d.
385/995).
As can be
noticed, only the principles of tawhid and Justice can be considered as parts
of the essential doctrine. The other three principles are only significant
because they characterize the Mu'tazilah. Even Divine Justice - although its
notion is definitely supported by the Qur'an, and belief in it is a necessary
part of the Islamic faith and doctrine - has been made one of the five major
doctrines because it characterizes the Mu'tazilah. Or otherwise belief in
Divine Knowledge and Power is as much an essential part of the Islamic faith
and principal doctrine.
Also in
the Shi'ite faith the principle of Divine Justice is considered one of the five
essential doctrines. It is natural that the question should arise: what is
particular about Divine Justice that it should be counted.among the essential
doctrines, though justice is only one of the Divine Attributes? Is not God Just
in the same manner as He is the Omniscient, the Mighty, the Living, the
Perceiver, the Hearer and the Seer? All those Divine Attributes are essential
to the faith. Then why justice is given so much prominence among the Divine
Attributes?
The
answer is that Justice has no advantage over other Attributes. The Shi'ite mutakallimun
have specially mentioned justice among the principal Shi'ite doctrines
because the Ash'arites - who form the majority of the Ahl al-Sunnah -
implicitly deny that it is an Attribute, whereas they do not reject the
Attributes of Knowledge, Life, Will, etc. Accordingly, justice is counted among
the specific doctrines of the Shi'ah, as also of the Mu'tazilah. The
above-mentioned five doctrines constitute the basic position of the Mu'tazilah
from the viewpoint of kalam, otherwise, as said before, the Mu'tazilite
beliefs are not confined to these five and cover a broad scope ranging from
theology, physics and sociology to anthropology, in all of which they hold
specific beliefs, a discussion of which lies outside the scope of these
lectures.
1. The Doctrine of al-Tawhid:
Beginning
with tawhid it has various kinds and levels: al-tawhid al-dhati (Unity
of the Essence), al-tawhid al-sifati (Unity of the Attributes, i.e.,
with the Essence), al-tawhid al-'af'ali (Unity of the Acts), al-tawhid
al-'ibadi (monotheism in worship).
Al-Tawhid
al-dhati: It means
that the Divine Essence is one and unique; it does not have a like or match.
All other beings are God's creations and inferior to Him in station and in
degree of perfection. In fact, they cannot be compared with Him. The idea of
al-tawhid al-dhati is made clear by the following two [Qur'anic]
verses:
Nothing is like Him. (42:11)
He does not have a match
[whatsoever]. (112:4)
AI-Tawhid
al-sifati: It
means that the Divine Attributes such as Knowledge, Power, Life, Will,
Perception, Hearing, Vision, etc. are not realities separate from God's
Essence. They are identical with the Essence, in the sense that the Divine
Essence is such that the Attributes are true of It, or is such that It
manifests these Attributes.
Al-Tawhid
al-'af'ali: It
means that all beings, or rather all acts [even human acts] exist by the Will
of God, and are in some way willed by His sacred Essence.
Al-Tawhid
al-'ibadi: It
means that except God no other being deserves worship and devotion. Worship of
anything besides God is shirk and puts the worshipper outside the limits
of Islamic tawhid or monotheism.
In a
sense al-tawhid al-'ibadi (tawhid in worship) is different from other
kinds of tawhidi, because the first three relate to God and this kind
relates to the creatures. In other words, the Unity of Divine Essence, His
Uniqueness and the identity of the Essence and Attributes, the unity of the
origin of everything - all of them are matters which relate to God. But tawhid
in worship, i.e. the necessity of worshipping the One God, relates to the
behaviour of the creatures. But in reality, tawhid in worship is also
related to God, because it means Uniqueness of God as the only deserving object
of worship, and that He is in truth the One Deity Worthy of Worship. The
statement "la ilaha illallah" encompasses all aspects of tawhid,
although its first signification is monotheism in worship.
Al-tawhid
al-dhati and al-tawhid
al-'ibadi are part of the basic doctrines of Islam. It means that if there
is a shortcoming in one's belief in these two principles, it would put one
outside the pale of Islam. No Muslim has opposed these two basic beliefs.
Lately,
the Wahhabis, who are the followers of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, who was a
follower of Ibn Taymiyyah, a Hanbali from Syria, have claimed that some common
beliefs of the Muslims such as one in intercession (shafa'ah) and some
of their practices such as invoking the assistance of the prophets (A) and holy
saints (R) are opposed to the doctrine of al-tawhid al-'ibadi. But these
are not considered by other Muslims to conflict with al-tawhid al-'ibadi.
The point of difference between the Wahhabis and other Muslims is not whether
any one besides God - such as the prophets or saints - is worthy of worship.
There is no debate that anyone except God cannot be worshipped. The debate is
about whether invoking of intercession and assistance can be considered a form
of worship or not. Therefore, the difference is only secondary, not a primary
one. Islamic scholars have rejected the viewpoint of the Wahhabis in elaborate,
well-reasoned answers.
Al-tawhid
al-sifati (the
Unity of Divine Essence and Attributes) is a point of debate between the
Mu'tazilah and the Asha'irah. The latter deny it while the former affirm it. Al-tawhid
al-'af'ali is also another point of difference between them, with the
difference, however, that the matter is reverse; i.e. the Asha'irah affirm it
and the Mu'tazilah deny it.
When the
Mu'tazilah call themselves "ahl al-tawhid", and count it among
their doctrines, thereby they mean by it al-tawhid al-sifati, not al-tawhid
al-dhati, nor al-tawhid al-'ibadi (which are not disputed), nor al-tawhid
al-'af'ali. Because, firstly, al-tawhid al-'af'ali is negated by
them, and, secondly, they expound their own viewpoint about it under the
doctrine of justice, their second article.
The
Asha'irah and the Mu'tazilah formed two radically opposed camps on the issues
of al-tawhid al-sifati and al-tawhid al-'af'ali. To
repeat, the Mu'tazilah affirm al-tawhid al-sifati and reject al-tawhid
al-'af'ali, while the Ash'arite position is the reverse. Each of them have
advanced arguments in support of their positions. We shall discuss the Shi'ite
position regarding these two aspects of tawhid in the related
chapter.
2. The Doctrine of Divine Justice:
In the
preceding lecture I have mentioned the five fundamental Mu'tazilite principles,
and explained the first issue, i.e. their doctrine of tawhid. Here we
shall take up their doctrine of Divine Justice. Of
course, it is evident that none of the Islamic sects denied justice as one of
the Divine Attributes. No one has ever claimed that God is not just. The
difference between the Mu'tazilah and their opponents is about the
interpretation of Justice. The Asha'irah interpret it in such a way that it is
equivalent, in the view of the Mu'tazilah, to a denial of the Attribute of
Justice. Otherwise, the Asha'irah are not at all willing to be considered the
opponents of justice.
The
Mu'tazilah believe that some acts are essentially 'just' and some intrinsically
'unjust.' For instance, rewarding the obedient and punishing the sinners is
justice; and that God is Just, i.e. He rewards the obedient and punishes the
sinners, and it is impossible for Him to act otherwise. Rewarding the sinners
and punishing the obedient is essentially and intrinsically unjust, and it is
impossible for God to do such a thing. Similarly, compelling His creatures to
commit sin, or creating them without any power of free will, then creating the
sinful acts at their hands, and then punishing them on account of those sins -
this is injustice, an ugly thing for God to do; it is unjustifiable and
unGodly. But the Asha'irah believe that no act is intrinsically or essentially
just or unjust. Justice is essentially whatever God does. If, supposedly, God
were to punish the obedient and reward the sinners, it would be as just.
Similarly, if God creates His creatures without any will, power or freedom of
action, then if He causes them to commit sins and then punishes them for that -
it is not essential injustice. If we suppose that God acts in this manner, it
is justice:
Whatever that Khusrow does is sweet
(shirin).
For
the same reason that the Mu'tazilah emphasize justice, they deny al-tawhid
al-'af'ali. They say that al-tawhid al-'af'ali implies that God, not
the human beings, is the maker of human deeds. Since it is known that man
attains reward and punishment in the Hereafter, if God is the creator of human
actions and yet punishes them for their evil deeds - which not they, but God
Himself has brought about - that would be injustice (zulm) and contrary
to Divine Justice. Accordingly, the Mu'tazilah consider al-tawhid al-'af'ali
to be contrary to the doctrine of justice.
Also,
thereby, the Mu'tazilah believe in human freedom and free will and are its
staunch defenders, contrary to the Asha'irah who deny human freedom and free
will.
Under the
doctrine of justice - in the sense that some deeds are inherently just and some
inherently unjust, and that human reason dictates that justice is good and must
be practised, whereas injustice is evil and must be abstained from - they
advance another general doctrine, which is more comprehensive, that is the
principle that "beauty" (husn) and "ugliness" (qubh),
(good and evil), are inherent properties of acts. For instance,
truthfulness, trustworthiness, chastity and God-fearing are intrinsically good qualities,
and falsehood, treachery, indecency, neglectfulness, etc. are intrinsically
evil. Therefore, deeds in essence, before God may judge them, possess inherent
goodness or evil (husn or qubh).
Hereupon,
they arrive at another doctrine about reason: human reason can independently
judge (or perceive) the good or evil in things. It means that the good or evil
of some deeds can be judged by human reason independently of the commands of
the Shari'ah. The Asha'irah are against this view too.
The
belief in the inherent good or evil of acts and the capacity of reason to judge
them, upheld by the Mu'tazilah and rejected by the Asha'irah, brought many
other problems in its wake, some of which are related to theology, some to
human predicament; such as, whether the Divine Acts, or rather, the creation of
things is with a purpose or not. The Mu'tazilah claimed that absence of a
purpose in the creation is "qabih" (an ugly thing) and so
rationally impossible. How about a duty which is beyond one's power to fulfil?
Is it possible that God may saddle someone with a duty which is over and above
his capacity? The Mu'tazilah consideied this, too, as "qabih", and
so impossible.
Is it
within the power of a believer (mu'min) to turn apostate? Does the
infidel (kafir) have any power over his own infidelity (kufr)?
The answer of the Mu'tazilah is in the affirmative; for if the believer and the
infidel had no power over their belief and infidelity, it would be wrong (qabih)
to award and punish them. The Asha'irah rejected all these Mu'tazilite
doctrines and held opposite views.
3. Retribution (al-wa'd wa al-wa'id):
"Wa'd"
means promising
award and "wa'id" means threat of punishment. The Mu'tazilah
believe that God does not break His own promises (all Muslims unanimously accept
this) or forego His threats, as stated by the Qur'anic verse regarding Divine
promise:
Indeed God does not break the
promise. (13:31)
Accordingly
(the Mu'tazilah say), all threats addressed to the sinners and the wicked such
as the punishments declared for an oppressor, a liar or a wine imbiber, will
all be carried out without fail, except when the sinner repents before death.
Therefore, pardon without repentance is not possible.
From the
viewpoint of the Mu'tazilah, pardon without repentance implies failure to carry
out the threats (wa'id), and such an act, like breaking of promise (khulf
al-wa'd),is "qabih", and so impossible. Thus the
Mu'tazilite beliefs regarding Divine retribution and Divine forgiveness are
interrelated, and both arise from their belief in inherent good and evil of
deeds determinable by reason.
4. Manzilah Bayna al-Manzilatayn:
The
Mu'tazilite belief in this matter emerged in the wake of two opposite beliefs
in the Muslim world about the faith ('iman) or infidelity (kufr) of
the fasiq. For the first time the Khawarij maintained that committing of
any of the capital sins (kaba'ir) was contrary to faith ('iman) and
equal to infidelity. Therefore, the perpetrator of a major sin is a kafir.
As we
know, the Khawarij emerged after the incident of arbitration (tahkim) during
the Battle of Siffin about the year 37/657-58 during the caliphate of Amir
al-Mu'minin 'Ali (A). As the Nahj al-Balaghah tells us, Amir al-Mu'minin
(A) argued with them on this issue and refuted their viewpoint by numerous
arguments. The Khawarij, even after 'Ali (A), were against the caliphs of the
period, and staunchly espoused the cause of al-'amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy
'an al-munkar, denouncing others for their evil and calling them apostates
and infidels. Since most of the caliphs indulged in the capital sins, they were
naturally regarded as infidels by the Khawarij. Accordingly, they were
adversaries of the current politics.
Another
group which emerged (or was produced by the hands of vested political interests)
was that of the Murji'ah, whose position with regard to the effect of capital
sins was precisely opposite to that of the Khawarij. They held that faith and
belief is a matter of the heart. One should remain a Muslim if one's faith -
which is an inner affair of the heart - were intact, evil deeds cannot do any
harm. Faith compensates all wickedness.
The
opinions of the Murji'ah were to the benefit of the rulers, and tended to cause
the people to regard their wickedness and indecencies as unimportant, or to
consider them, despite their destructive character, as men worthy of paradise.
The Murji'ah stated in unequivocal terms, "The respectability of the
station of the ruler is secure, no matter how much he may sin. Obedience to him
is obligatory and prayers performed in his leadership are correct." The
tyrannical caliphs, therefore, backed them. For the Murji'ah, sin and
wickedness, no matter how serious, do not harm one's faith; the perpetrator of
the major sins is a mu'min, not a kafir.
The Mu'tazilah
took a middle path in this matter. They maintained that the perpetrator of a
major sin is neither a mu'min, nor he is a kafir, but occupies a
position between those two extremes. This middle state was termed by the
Mu'tazilah "manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn."
It is
said that the first to express this belief was Wasil ibn 'Ata', a pupil of
al-Hasan al-Basri. One day Wasil was sitting with his teacher, who was asked
his opinion about the difference between the Khawarij and the Murji'ah on this
issue. Before al-Hasan could say anything, Wasil declared: "In my opinion
the perpetrator of the major sins is a fasiq, not a kafir." After
this, he left the company, or as is also said, was expelled by al-Hasan
al-Basri - and parting his way started propagating his own views. His pupil and
brother-in-law 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd also joined him. At this point Hasan declared,
"'I'tazala 'anna", i.e. "He [Wasil] has departed from
us." According to another version, the people began to say of Wasil and
'Amr "'I'tazala qawl al-'ummah", i.e. "they have departed
from the doctrines held by the ummah," inventing a third path.
5. Al-'Amr bi al-Ma'ruf wa al-Nahy 'an
al-Munkar:
Al-'amr
bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar is
an essential Islamic duty, unanimously accepted by all Muslims. The difference
occurs only in the limits and conditions related to it.
For
instance, the Khawarij believed in it without any limits and conditions
whatsoever. They believed that this twofold duty must be performed in all
circumstances. For example, when others believed in the conditions of
probability of effectiveness (of al-ma'ruf) and absence of any dangerous
consequences as necessary for this obligation to be applicable, the Khawarij
did not believe in any such restrictions. Some believed that it is sufficient
to fulfil the duty of al-'amr wa al-nahy by the heart and the tongue i e
one should support al-ma'ruf and oppose al-munkar in his heart
and use his tongue to speak out for al-ma'ruf and against al-munkar. But
the Khawarij considered it incumbent to take up arms and to unsheathe one's
sword for the sake of fulfilling this duty.
As
against them there was a group which considered al-'amr wa al-nahy to be
subject to the above conditions, and, moreover, did not go beyond the confines
of the heart and the tongue for its sake. Ahmad ibn Hanbal is counted among
them. According to this group,a bloody uprising for the sake of struggling
against unlawful activities is not permissible.
The
Mu'tazilah accepted the conditions for al-'amr wa al-nahy, but, not
limiting it to the heart and the tongue, maintained that if the unlawful
practices become common, or if the state is oppressive and unjust, it is
obligatory for Muslims to rise in armed revolt.
Thus the
belief special to the Mu'tazilah in regard to al-'amr bi al-ma'ruf wa
al-nahy 'an al-munkar - contrary to the stand of the Ahl al-Hadith and the
Ahl al-Sunnah - is belief in the necessity to rise up in arms to confront
corruption. The Khawarij too shared this view, with the difference pointed out above.
OTHER MU'TAZILITE NOTIONS AND
BELIEFS:
Whatever
we said in the last two lectures was related to the basic doctrines of the
Mu'tazilah. But as we mentioned before, the Mu'tazilah raised many an issue and
defended their opinions about them. Some of them were related with theology
some with physics, some with sociology, and some with the human situation. Of
the theological issues, some are related to general metaphysics (umur
'ammah) and some with theology proper (ilahiyyat bi al-ma'na al-'akhass). [8]
Like all other mutakallimun, the intended purpose of the Mu'tazilah by
raising metaphysical questions is to use them as preparatory ground for the
discussion of theological issues, which are their ultimate objectives. So also
the discussions in the natural sciences, too, serve an introductory purpose for
them. That is, the discussions in the natural sciences are used to prove some
religious doctrines, or to find an answer to some objections. Here we shall
enumerate some of these beliefs, beginning with theology:
Theology:
(i) Al-tawhid
al-sifati (i.e. unity of the Divine Attributes)
(ii) 'Adl (Divine
Justice).
(iii) The Holy
Qur'an (Kalam Allah) is created (kalam, or speech, is an
attribute of Act, not of the Essence).
(iv) The Divine Acts
are caused and controlled by purposes (i.e. every Divine Act is for the sake of
some beneficial outcome).
(v) Forgiveness
without repentance is not possible (the doctrine of retribution - wa'd wa
wa'id).
(vi) Pre-eternity (qidam)
is limited to God (in this belief, they are challenged only by the
philosophers).
(vii) Delegation of
a duty beyond the powers of the mukallaf (al-taklif bima la yutaq) is
impossible.
(viii) The acts of
the creatures are not created by God for five reasons;[9]
the exercise of Divine Will does not apply to the acts of men.
(ix) The world is
created, and is not pre-eternal (only the philosophers are against this
view).
(x) God cannot be
seen with the eyes, either in this world or in the Hereafter.
Physics:
(i) Physical bodies
are made up of indivisible particles.
(ii) Smell relates
to particles scattered in air.
(iii) Taste is nothing
but the effect of particles.
(iv) Light is made
up of particles scattered in space.
(v) Interpenetration
of bodies is not impossible (this belief is attributed to some
Mu'tazilah).
(vi) Leap (of
particles) (i.e. tafrah) [10]
is not impossible (this belief, too, is attributed to some Mu'tazilah).
Human
Problems:
(i) Man is free,
endowed with free will; not predetermined (this problem, the problem of the
nature of human acts whether [created by God or man], and the problem of Divine
Justice, all the three are interrelated).
(ii) Ability (istita'ah);
that is, man has power over his own acts, before he performs them or
desists from them.
(iii) The believer (mu'min)
has the power to become an infidel and the infidel (kafir) is able
to become a believer.
(iv) A fasiq is
neither a mu'min, nor a kafir.
(v) Human reason can
understand and judge some matters independently (without the prior need of
guidance from the Shari'ah).
(vi) In case of
conflict between reason and Hadith, reason is to be preferred.
(vii) It is possible
to interpret the Qur'an with the help of reason.
Political
and Social Problems:
(i) The obligatory
nature of al-'amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar, even if it
necessitates taking up of arms.
(ii) The leadership (imamah)
of the Rashidun Caliphs, was correct in the order it occurred.
(iii) 'Ali (A) was
superior to the Caliphs who preceded him (this is the view of some of the
Mu'tazilah, not of all. The earlier Mu'tazilah - with the exception of Wasil
ibn 'Ata' considered Abu Bakr as the best, but the majority of the latter
Mu'tazilah considered 'Ali (A) as superior).
(iv) Evaluation and
criticism of the Companions of the Prophet (S) and their deeds is
permissible.
(v) A comparative
study and analysis of the state policies of 'Umar and 'Ali (A).
These
represent a sample of the issues touched by the Mu'tazilah, which are far more
numerous than what we have referred to. In some of these problems, they were
contradicted by the Asha'irah, in some by the philosophers, in some by the
Khawarij, and in some by the Murji'ah.
The
Mu'tazilah never submitted to Greek thought and did not accept Greek philosophy
indiscriminately, which entered the Islamic world contemporaneous with the
emergence and rise of the Mu'tazilah. On the other hand, with great courage,
they wrote books against philosophy and philosophers, boldly expressing their
own opinions. The controversy between the mutakallimun and the
philosophers benefited both kalam and philosophy. Both of them made
progress, and in the course of time came so close to each other that there did
not remain any disagreement except on few issues. An elaborate discussion of
the reciprocal services of kalam and philosophy, and an exposition of
the essential differences between the two, are outside the scope of these
lectures.
