Like his
ideas on the existence of God, Ibn Taymiyyah’s thoughts about God’s
attributes are established on the basis of his understanding of scriptural text
and the prophetic tradition. His consistent principle is that God is
characterised as He has characterised Himself and His Prophet has characterised
Him, without exaggerated transcendence or anthropomorphism (bilÉ ta‘ÏÊl aw
tashbÊh).107 Moreover, he asserts that the problem of
God’s attributes is inseparable from
that of the essence of God (al-kalÉm fÊ al-ÎifÉt naw‘
min al-kalÉm fÊ al-dhÉt).108 The affirmation of the essence is the
affirmation of existence as well as that of attributes. Thus, to describe the
attributes of God is delineate the nature of God.
The
point of departure taken by Ibn Taymiyyah in depicting the nature of God is the
Qur’Énic sËrah al-IkhlÉÎ.109 This reveals the fundamental doctrine of the unity of God (tawhÊd) and His absolute incomparability which
relates to His name and attributes. The sËrah is
considered as equal to one-third of the Qur’Én.110
From this verse, Ibn Taymiyyah states his major criterion, “nothing is
like unto Him, whether His essence, his attributes or His actions” (laysa ka
mithlihÊ shay’, lÉ fÊ dhÉtihÊ wa
lÉ fÊ ÎifÉtihÊ wa
lÉ fÊ
af’ÉlihÊ ).111
His attributes are unlike those of His creatures: for example, the knowledge of God exists by virtue of His
essence, while the knowledge of the human being exists by the guidance of God.
In order
to avoid ambiguity between God’s
attributes and those of creatures through common usage of
language, Ibn Taymiyyah uses
three types of expression: the first
is expressed in relation to God,
the second is expressed in
relation to human being and the third
is expressed in general, related specifically to neither God nor human
beings.112 When one says “God’s speech, God’s
knowledge, God’s life”, these refer only to God
and are uncreated, likewise if one says ‘man’s power, man’s
speech, man’s knowledge’ these are particular to man and are created. General expressions such as knowledge, power,
life and the like, would depend on their respective designation, either to God
or to man. Thus, to Ibn Taymiyyah the attributes follow the attributed object (al-mawÎËf);113 once they are designated of God, they must be uncreated,114 for God is the Creator, and once they are
designated of the creatures, the
attributes must be created.
Directly
related to this matter, Ibn Taymiyyah underlines the concordance of attributes
and essence. He says that “the attributes of every attributed object agree with
its essence and conform to its reality.”115
Once God
names Himself and names His
attributes, they are specifically designated for Himself and shared by none, but when He puts
names and attributes to His creatures they are particular to them.
If we
attempt to understand this notion we may assume that to Ibn Taymiyyah, a
general and common quality (waÎf) does
not necessarily indicate similarity and
likeness in attribute, let alone
similarity of the attributed object (al-mawÎËf). God and the creatures may share in common
qualities such as ‘existence’, ‘speech’, ‘knowledge’ and others. God has knowledge so does the human being, God speaks with
voice so does the human being, and so on.
However, from these common qualities it cannot be discerned that the essence or reality of
God and man are one and of the same type, for this is logically impossible and against revelation. Ibn Taymiyyah even regards the
expression of common qualities as a universal matter that does not exist except
in the mind. 116
Looking
at the problem, it seems that Ibn Taymiyyah wants to maintain his concept of
reality that what is in the mind is a construct (mahiyyah) and what is
in the real world is existence. Because
of this concept he does not agree with the ideas of those who negate the
attributes. Since they consider quiddity in the mind as the very thing that
exists in reality, they assume that there are self-subsisting entities in the
reality of human beings. Thus the predications of man as animal, speaking,
sensible, moving with his own volition, and so on are perceived as a
self-subsisting entities. On the other
hand, Ibn Taymiyyah holds that all of what they assume as self-subsisting
substances (jawÉhir) are, basically, the names
of one reality. Accordingly, the reality is one and the names and attributes
are many.117 Therefore, in the opinion
of Ibn Taymiyyah the attributes of God
and those of creatures are common only in a name and not in genus (al-jins), for
a genus is divided into species or particulars.
With
reference to different viewpoints in the realm of philosophical and theological
thought, Ibn Taymiyyah’s principle of God’s attributes is consonant with the Hanbalite tradition and the idea of
the Salaf. It is at once an
affirmation of the absolute uniqueness of God, and a refutation of the argument
and the methods of those philosophers who affirm the general and negate the
particular. Ibn Taymiyyah, on the other hand, affirms the particular and
negates the general ( ithbÉt al-mufaÎÎal wa
nafyu al-mujmal).118 This implies that God, in His Book, informs and affirms His
particular attributes, for instance He is all-living, all-knowing, all-hearing
and He is pleased, He is angry, He loves and so forth. In addition, he negates a general comparison
that “nothing whatever is likes Him”119 and “There is none like Him.”120 The principle follows the
idea that to believe God’s
attributes is to affirm them without
distortion (bilÉ tahrÊf), without stripping (bilÉ ta‘ÏÊl), without saying how (bilÉ takyÊf) and without
comparison (bilÉ tamthÊl).121
In accordance with this precept, it is understood that in the ideas of
Ibn Taymiyyah as well as the
Salaf the concept of the absolute
incomparability of God indicates not only
that He is unique in His essence
and in His attributes, but that it is also impossible for him to be completely known by man. To support this idea, Ibn Taymiyyah cites the
words of MÉlik bin Anas; when he was asked how ‘God is above the throne’,122 he replied that “being above the throne
is not unknown, the modality is unknown, believing in it is compulsory and
asking about it is heresy (bid‘ah).”123 This concept
seems to indicate that there is a
sacred limit to grasping the complete nature of God which should be supported with belief.
As far
as the concept of God is concerned, it is highly significant and interesting to
note that Ibn Taymiyyah’s position among the philosophers as well as the mutakallimËn is moderate. While some negate the attribute (nufÉt al-ÎifÉt)124
and some others allow similarity between
God’s attributes and those of
creatures, ‘the anthropomorphists’ (mushabbihah),125 Ibn Taymiyyah’s position is between the
two.126 Ibn Taymiyyah himself claims this moderate
position to be of Ahl al-Sunnah wa
al-Jamɑah, which
is not only moderate in the problem of attribute but also
moderate in the case of the act of God between al-Jabriyyah (pre-destination) and al-Qadariyyah (free-will) and of all
case in all sects in Islam. In addition, without elaborating further, Ibn
Taymiyyah also claims that the moderation of this group corresponds to the
moderation of Muslims among all religious denominations; a claim that might be
unacceptable to other groups.
In fact,
his moderate stance is indicated mainly in his affirmation of God’s
attributes without invoking resemblance, and keeps Him free from resemblance to
creatures without denying attributes. In
addition he believes that the
moderate position is the
path of the follower of the so-called ahl
al-haqq (people of right
belief). The path is called tanzÊh 127 (God’s transcendence) and
ithbÉt (affirmation).128
This
position basically indicates the harmonious relationship between essence and
attributes, or in another sense the harmonisation between the principle of
unity and the notion of multiplicity of attributes in the doctrine of God. Ibn Taymiyyah’s concept of unity is more
manifest in his insistence on the inseparability between essence and
attributes. His formula, as has been
mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, is that “the essence is like
attributes” (al-dhÉt ka al-ÎifÉt) and
“to speak of the attributes is to speak of the essence.”129 Arguing about this notion he holds that an attribute is not a
self-subsisting entity, it is dependent upon its essence. It becomes eternal
due to the eternity of the attributed object (al-mawÎËf) and it
necessarily entails the attributed object.130
To him, it is impossible that a
self-existing thing in the external world can exist without a permanent attribute at all. It must, accordingly, have
an attribute and the attribute must be of a self-subsisting thing.131 For example if someone prays or worships
God, he does not pray and worship His essence which is apart from His
attribute. This is because His name includes His attributed essence (al-dhÉt al-mawÎËfah) and is
either an augmentation of His essence or
His attributes.
With
regard to the matter of God’s essence and attribute, Ibn Taymiyyah does not consider them as having
a subject-object or Creator-created relationship, as is assumed by those who
negate the attributes, since God is neither the subject nor the Creator of his
own attributes. Ibn Taymiyyah adopts the principle of concomitance (talÉzum),
meaning that one cannot exist without the other.132 God does not exist unless He is eternal
and self-necessary; He is not knowing (‘Éliman) and
nor does he has power (qÉdiran) unless
He is living. Thus to posit essence as
separable from the attributes is possible only in the mind and not in external
reality, like absolute existence which never exists in the external world.133
As a
corollary to the above precept, we may assume that while attacking the
philosopher’s doctrine, Ibn Taymiyyah confirms his own belief by showing how the
unity of God can reconciled with the diversity of His attributes and by
insisting on the inseparability of essence and attributes. Moreover, he
precludes diversity in the nature and character of God by prohibiting
resemblance between God and the creature in a general sense and emphasising His
absolute incomparability.
107 NaqÌ
al-ManÏiq, p. 4.
108 MajmË‘at al-RasÉ’il al-KubrÉ,
Vol.I, pp. 440-465; NaqÌ al-ManÏiq, p. 6.
110 Sharh al-‘AqÊdah al-WÉsiÏiyyah, trans. M.R.
Khan, Darussalam Publications, Riyadh,
1996, p. 46.
111 “al-’AqÊdah al-WÉsiÏiyyah” , in MajmË‘at al-RasÉ’il al-KubrÉ, I, p. 438; “FÊ TahqÊq Mas’alat KalÉm Allah al-KarÊm” , in MajmË‘at al-RasÉ’il wa al-MasÉ’il, vol. V, ed. Muhammad RashÊd RidÉ, MaÏba‘ah al-ManÉr, Egypt, 1349 A.H. p. 54.
112 MinhÉj al-Sunnah, vol. I,
195; FÊ TahqÊq, pp. 54-55; al-AsmÉ’ wa al-ØifÉt,
vol. I, pp. 63.
113 FÊ TahqÊq, p. 55.
114 This idea refers fundamentally to the dispute
among the Muslim thinkers on the createdness of the Qur’Én which is the speech of God (kalÉm Allah). Ibn Taymiyyah’s comprehensive discourse
is represented in his treatise “KitÉb Madhhab al-Salaf al-QawÊm FÊ TahqÊq Mas’alat KalÉm Allah al-KarÊm”, in MajmË‘at al-RasÉ’il wa al-MasÉ’il, ed. Muhammad RashÊd RiÌÉ, MaÏba‘ah al-ManÉr, Egypt, 1349 A.H. p. 54ff
115 “al-‘AqÊdah al-Hamawiyyah al-KubrÉ“ , in MajmË‘at al-RasÉ’il al-KubrÉ, vol.
I, p. 474; cf. FÊ TahqÊq, p. 54.
116 FÊ TahqÊq,
p. 75.
117 Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, vol. I, p. 288.
118 Dar’ Ta‘ÉruÌ, vol. V, p. 163; See also MinhÉj al-Sunnah, ed.R.SÉlim, vol.II, p. 115.
119 The Qur’Én, 42 : 11.
120 The Qur’Én, 112 : 4.
121 TahrÊf, means introducing change in a
statement by leaving out its original meaning and accepting a meaning such as
indicates a doubtful sense. Ta’ÏÊl means leaving, vacating or denuding; in this present context it means negating the
attributes of God and denying their attachment to His Self. TakyÊf means believing the state of attribute of
God, but questioning the figuration of the attributes of God. TamthÊl means to believe that the
attributes of God are like the attributes of the creature. See Sharh al-’AqÊdah al-WasiÏiyyah, pp.32-33.
122 The Qur’Én, 7: 54.
123 al-istiwÉ’
ghayr majhËl, wa al-kayf ghayr ma‘qËl, wa al-ÊmÉn bihÊ wÉjib, wa al-su’Él ‘anhu bid‘ah. See NaqÌ
al-ManÏiq, p. 3.
124 The Mu‘aÏÏilah is the epithet of the Mu‘tazilah and the Jahmiyyah as they deny
all the attributes of God. The Mu‘tazilah believe that God the attributes is
the very essence of God. Thus, God’s attributes are not independent reality, but
simply a mental expression. To designate God’s attributes is to admit
the multiplicity of eternal attributes and hence resulted polytheism. Thus, the
idea that is rigidly maintained by the Mu‘aÏÏilah is the
absolute unity of God’s essence and attribute, that implies subsequent
denial of all God’s attributes. See Øubhi, Ahmad MahmËd, FÊ ‘Ilm al-KalÉm, DirÉsah Falsafiyyah, DÉr al-Nahdah al-‘Arabiyyah, Beirut, 1985,
pp.123-124; See also Sharh al-’AqÊdah al-WÉsiÏiyyah, p.124.
125 The term al-Mushabbihah, is employed for
those who understand the divine immanence which makes God essentially united
with or dependent upon the created universe. The exponents of this thought
believe that God possesses hands similar
to the hands of creatures, hearing as
hearing of creatures, sight as sight of creatures etc. See Thomas F. Michael, A
Muslim Theological Response To Christianity, p. 459; See also Sharh al-‘AqÊdah
al-WÉsiÏiyyah, p. 145.
126 Sharh al-‘AqÊdah al-WÉsiÏiyyah, pp. 144-145.
127 By tanzÊh he means that God transcends
everything or literally beyond everything: He is beyond the throne; He is
beyond the heavens. Neither is it said that God is not upon His throne, that He
is not in the heavens, that He is not everywhere, that all places are alike to
Him, that He is not in the world or outside. The term also means negation of
imperfection (naqÎ) and resemblance with other in perfect
attributes. See MajmË‘at al-RasÉ’il al-KubrÉ, vol.I.pp.419-421; See also MinhÉj al-Sunnah, ed.R. SÉlim,
vol. II, p. 115.
128Sharh al-’AqÊdah al-WÉsiÏiyyah, 149.
Basically, Ibn Taymiyyah does not claim his position to be named as such, since
the term tawhÊd, tanzÊh, tashbÊh and tajsÊm had been interpreted as having
different meanings. Every group has
their own understanding of the term. To the Jahmiyyah, for example, tawhÊd and tanzÊh
is understood as the negation of all attributes, while tajsÊm and tashbÊh is
the affirmation of some attributes. Others understood tawhÊd and tanzÊh as the
negation of informative attributes. However, Ibn Taymiyyah admits that the
terms tawhÊd and tanzÊh can be acceptable as far as it is compatible with the
Qur’Én and Sunnah.
See NaqÌ al-ManÏiq, pp. 118-124;
cf. Makari, V. E., Ibn Taymiyyah’s Ethics,
pp. 39-40.
129 MajmË‘at al-RasÉ‘il al-Kubra, vol.I, pp. 440-465; NaqÌ
al-ManÏiq, p. 6.
130 FÊ
TahqÊq, p. 55.
131 TafØÊl, p.
52.
132 Ibid,
p. 53.
133 al-AsmÉ’ wa al-ØifÉt, vol. II, p. 453-455.
