Mental existence is
one of the much-discussed topics in philosophical fields. It was introduced for
the first time by Muslim philosophers. As we see, Ibn Sina has not made the
least reference to this issue in his books, and even the term ‘mental
existence’ is absolutely non-existent not only in his writings, but also in
those of philosophers living before him, such as Farabi. The problem of mental
existence was for the first time introduced and discussed in separation from
other issues by Fakhr al-Din Razi (d. 606 A.H) in his al-Mabahith
al-mashriqiyyah[1]
and Khwajah Nasir al-Din iusi (d. 672 A.H) in his Tajrid al-i‘tiqad.
[2]
Khwajah Nasir al-Din
iusi and his succeeding philosophers posed this discussion to react to the
theologians’ denial of philosophers’ definition of knowledge, according to
which ‘knowledge means the acquisition of the form of a thing by the
intellect.’ Later the theologians presented a new theory maintaining that
knowledge belongs to the category of relation and, in this way, denied the very
basis of mental existence. Such an approach prompted Muslim philosophers to
propound the issue of mental existence and try to adduce certain reasons to
prove it.[3]
3. In evaluating the
first part of the above-mentioned theory, it must be noted that although in Ibn
Sina’s books no independent chapter has been devoted to the problem of mental
existence, the concepts of ‘mental existence’ or ‘existent in the mind’ can be
found in his words. Accordingly, we cannot consider Fakhr al-Din Razi as the
first person to initiate this discussion. In his T‘aliqat, Ibn Sina
writes: “The universal (general) meaning exists in the mind rather than in the
outside. For example, when the existence of the universal animal is particularized
(and exits universality), it will change into a human or another animal form”.[4]
Ibn Sina has also
expressed his views in al-Isharat wal-tanbihat that completely conform
to the issue of mental existence:
The perception of
something involves the presence of the image of the reality of that thing
before the perceiver so that he could observe it. Therefore, either the
above-mentioned reality, when perceived, is exactly the same as the reality
outside the receiver, which is incorrect, … or an image or example of that
reality is formed in the essence of the perceiver so that the image of the
reality is exactly the same as the reality itself (in essence), which is
correct. [5]&[6]
4. In the discussion of
mental existence, it is claimed that objects, in addition to their external
existence, which is known, evident and certain, possess another existence that
is called mental existence and stands against external existence. As Mulla
Sadra says,
Unlike a small group
of exoteric scholars, philosophers unanimously maintain that objects, in
addition to their evident existence, which is clearly known to everyone,
possess another existence or manifestation which is referred to as mental
existence.[7]
Two claims have been
made in the above statement:
1.
There are two types of existence: mental existence and external existence;
2.
Mental existents are in quiddative unity with external existents.[8]
As far as it concerns
ontology, the main task of the Transcendent Philosophy- as a branch of philosophia
prima discussing the principles of existence qua existence- is
dealing with the first claim, or the primary kinds of existence, rather than
the second. However, an epistemological treatment of the issue directly
concerns the second claim. Accordingly, the proofs adduced to demonstrate
mental existence[9]
are directly related to the first claim. Nevertheless, the second is certainly
a part of what the people of the Transcendent Philosophy say, and that is why,
in order to prove their claim, they maintain, “Objects, in addition to their
existence in the outside, possess another existence in the mind”.[10]
And sometimes they state, “Things, in addition to this mode of apparent (external)
existence, possess another existence, too.[11]
The above quotations
explicitly denote that, a single thing exists both in the external world and in
the mind rather than two different things. Of course, this does not mean
objectivity in the existence of a single entity; it is rather a kind of
identity and unity on the basis of which one can claim that the same external
thing is known in the mind. This is an epistemological claim in relation to
ontology and has been the topic of several discussions. Due to the same reason,
and through perceiving the same point, some contemporary philosophers following
the Transcendent Philosophy have interpreted this claim as follows:
This hypothesis
(philosophers’ well-known theory concerning mental existence) is based on the
fact that our perception of objects means the presence of the very essence of
objects – rather than their existence – in our mind. The essence of objects
could exist in two places; the objective world, which is outside our mind, and
the world of our soul. Consequently, there is one essence with two types of
existence in two places.[12]
This claim of
philosophers could also be expressed in this way: What exists in our mind
exists exactly as it is in the external world, as well. In other words, instead
of saying what exists in the external world exists in our mind, and then trying
to demonstrate mental existence, through a little deliberation, we find out
that what is obvious and clear to us is in fact the mental existence of things,
and that if there is anything to be demonstrated, it is the external existence
of things. If the issue is posed in this way, its epistemological imprint will
be more evident, and the logical order of discussion will be followed more
properly.
5. No acceptable proof
can be found in the statements of the advocates of the Transcendent Philosophy
for demonstrating that what is in the mind and what is in the outside are the
same in essence. All the proofs for mental existence, as the historical
contexts of their presentation necessitate, have been adduced to prove
the first part of the claim; that is, when gaining the knowledge of something,
a specific thing is realized in the soul to which external effects could not be
applied, and which is called mental existence.
All we can say about
the second part of the claim is that it has been propounded to nullify the idea
of image merely through resorting to the rejection of sophistry. ‘Allamah
iabaiaba’i has summarized this issue in his book Nihayat al-hikmah. [13]
According to the
theory of images, what comes to the mind has no quiddative conformity with the
external object and does not reveal its essence and reality; it is rather an
image which represents the object in some way. In rejecting this theory,
‘Allamah iabaiaba’i says,
If what is realized
in the mind is just an image of the external object, and if the relation
between the two is like the one between a statue or picture and what it represents,
there will be no quiddative compatibility between that mental form and the
external object; as a result, sophistry will arise. This is because, in this
case, all our knowledge will be in fact the same as ignorance. Moreover, man
can shift from the signifier to the signified only if he has the previous
knowledge of the signified, whereas according to this theory, the knowledge of
the signified, itself, depends on signification and the transition from the
signifier to the signified. [14]
If it is stated that
what comes to the mind not only lacks any essential compatibility with external
objects, but is also incapable of signifying them, and that the relation
between the mental existent and the external existent is similar to that
between the code and the decoder, the answer according to ‘Allamah iabaiaba’i
is:
If all our knowledge
and perceptions are false and lack any external revelation, sophistry will
arise, and this will lead to contradiction. In other words, this theory
contradicts itself and its truth necessitates its falsity. This is because if
we claim that all types of knowledge are false, the very claim itself is false,
since it comprises a part of our knowledge. Thus the above-mentioned
proposition is false and, as a result, its opposite, i.e, ‘some of our
knowledge conforms to reality is true.[15]
The author of this
paper finds the claim that knowledge is the center of either everything or
nothing[16]
quite ambiguous. In other words, if we deny the quiddative similarity between
our perceptions and the external world, it does not indicate that we have no
knowledge of this world. We are not even allowed to say that ‘all our knowledge
is false’.
6. The truth is that
the possibility of the realization of the knowledge of external realities has
always been an evident and indisputable fact for Muslim philosophers, in
general, and for the advocates of the Transcendent Philosophy, in particular.
Now, if there has been anyone among them to believe in signified or
non-signified images and similar theories, it is because they have failed to
provide an answer to the criticisms targeted at the theory of mental existence.[17]
It goes without saying that if convenient answers are provided, there will
remain no reason for them to deviate from the theory of mental existence.
7. In a part of his
book, al-Asfar, Mulla Sadra argues that if the proofs of mental
existence are complete, they can demonstrate the second part of philosophers’
claim as well; that is, they can prove that external matters themselves, rather
than something different from them, can have a kind of existential mode in the
mind.
If the proofs of
mental existence are complete, they signify that all known things themselves
have an existence in the mind, rather than something whose reality is contrary
to them, such as written imprints (written words) and vocal forms (uttered
words). This is because nobody ever claims that writing Zayd and saying Zayd
are exactly the same as Zayd himself. Such a claim would be contrary to the
concept and perception of Zayd, since the principles of Zayd have been applied
to it, and the essential and accidental qualities of Zayd are predicted on it.[18]
The
fallacy of this statement lies in the fact that first we suppose we know the
reality of Zayd, then consider it identical with the mental form and
maintain that ‘the mental form is the same as Zayd”, and later predicate the
essences and accidents of that external reality on the mental form of Zayd according
to a known assumption. This reveals that what has occurred to our mind is the
same as the reality of Zayd.
8. In his treatise, Tasawwur
wa tasdiq, Mulla Sadra adduces another proof that originally belongs to
Shaykh al-Ishraq to demonstrate the compatibility of knowledge with the
external world: “When acquiring the knowledge of something, two things might
happen: we know something or we do not, and in the second case, either we lose
something or we do not”.
After rejecting the
last two assumptions and, consequently, demonstrating the first one, Mulla
Sadra says:
Therefore, the former
assumption that considers the acquisition of knowledge as a kind of increase in
the effect of the known object and its appearance in the knower’s soul will be
constant and evident. However, the point that the effect of a particular object
is certainly contrary to the effect of any other object must be inquired.
Hence, the acquisition of the perceived object in the mind means that a form of
the very perceived and known object has appeared in the mind. Accordingly, this
form does not ever belong to another object which is obtained by the mind
through a different kind of knowledge. Thus it can be safely concluded that the
knowledge of anything is the same as the scientific existence of that known
object and not that of another known thing. The reason is that nothing could be
in existence unless one of its forms which is the same as its scientific
existence exists in the mind, exactly in the same way that there is an objective
form for it in the outside the mind. This scientific form is undoubtedly the
scientific existence of the same thing possessing an objective existence. What
is more the mental existence of this thing is in contrast to the mental forms
and beings of other objects, as its objective existence is also contrary to the
objective existences of other objects. Therefore, it should be accepted that
the mental form of everything is the same as its reality and essence in the
mind. Due to its complexity, this point requires more deliberation.[19]
In the above
statements, Mulla Sadra emphasizes that there are distinctions among different
types of knowledge and perceptions, that knowledge is a reality the essence of
which is relation, and that we have the knowledge of one thing rather than
anything other than that. Here, he concludes that the form of anything must be
exactly similar to its reality and quiddity. However, it seems that here we are
dealing with a confusion of conceptual conformity with affirmative conformity.
The author’s
intention of conceptual conformity is that each mental form represents what it
belongs to. For example, the mental form of whiteness truly represents
whiteness, and it is absolutely impossible for it to represent something
different. At the stage of conception, all mental forms demonstrate their
determinant reality, and this is an undeniable way of essential signification.
In this regard and according to modern epistemology, when we say that ‘I see
this white object,’ its truth is accepted and there is no place for its denial.
However, what is important in epistemological discussions is affirmative
conformity, that is, to say, ‘the external reality is also similar to what I
have seen’. This means that the color of this object in external reality and
independent from my perception is like what I have observed. Obviously, this
cannot be proven through resorting to the above statements.
9. Do the principles of
the Transcendent Philosophy pave the ground for the recognition of the external
reality through acquired knowledge? In other words, do the principles proposed
by Mulla Sadra, particularly, the principiality of existence, enable us to
grasp the external reality and perceive the truth as it is through acquired
knowledge, that is, the very common knowledge which is the subject matter of
epistemology, and which all types of theoretical knowledge are considered as
its components? According to a common definition, wisdom means the knowledge of
the truths of objects as they really are, and as far as man can perceive them.[20]
And a related question is: Is it possible to accomplish the task of obtaining
wisdom through thinking, experience, sense perception, or other methods of
acquired knowledge? Our answers to the aforementioned questions are negative
for the following reasons:
1. According to the
principiality of existence and the mentally posited nature of quiddity, the
attribution of existence and realization to quiddity is metaphorical. This is
because what is there in the outside, comprises external realities and fills the
context of reality is existence rather than quiddity. The same principle
indicates that the quiddity of everything is its rational representation, the
mental image for its observation in the outside, and its shadow.[21]
In other words, quiddity is the imagination of existence and its reflection
appearing in rational and sensory objects.[22]
Therefore, quiddity does not exist in the outside world, while what is in the
mind is quiddity. Thus, on the basis of the principilaity of existence, even if
the knowledge of quiddity is certainly demonstrated in the discussion of mental
existence, it will not be the same as external realities.
2. According to the
principiality of existence, motion is the mode of the existence of the flowing
object and represents its gradual but continuous change. What is more, in the
light of trans-substantial motion, the substance and essence of objects are in
constant transformation and change, and since quiddity is the limit of
existence, one quiddity is abstracted from each level of the moving object. And
this reveals that quiddity lacks any actual realization for the moving thing,
and that it is abstracted from its hypothetical limits and levels.
In fact, the meaning
of motion in a category, according to the principles of the Transcendent
Philosophy, is that at each moment of an object’s motion, the moving object
turns into one of the species of the different species of the category it
belongs to, so that each species does not last more than one moment and
immediately gives its place to its subsequent one. In addition, since the
existence of moments within motion is hypothetical, the quiddities that emerge
at each moment would be hypothetical, too.[23]
In sum, considering
the fact that motion takes place in existence, and that the existence of the
moving object is continually in change, a quiddity is abstracted at each moment
of motion, and since the existence of moment in time is hypothetical, the
existence of quiddity along motion would be hypothetical, too, and the moving
object would not have an actual quiddity except for in Origin and Resurrection,
i.e, when all motions stop. This is another reason indicating that the
knowledge of quiddity is not the knowledge of an external reality.
3. According to the
principiality of existence, external reality is the reality of existence. This
reality lacks a mental form and never comes to mind, thus it could never be
perceived by means of acquired knowledge. Mulla Sadra and his followers have
frequently referred to this issue in several places. According to Mulla Hadi
Sabziwari, although the concept of existence is extremely evident and obvious,
its depth and reality are extremely hidden.[24]
‘Allamah iabaiaba’i writes, “Obviously, the reality of existence lacks a mental
form”,[25]
and, therefore, cannot be perceived by acquired knowledge. The reason is that
the reality of existence is the same as externality, and if it occurs to the
mind, it will be necessary for external existence to transform into mental
existence, which is impossible.[26]
The reality of
external existence cannot be known and perceived unless through presential
observation. In fact, by means of concepts and acquired types of knowledge, one
can only learn about the effects and concomitants of the reality of external
existence. [27]
4. On the basis of
the analysis provided by the Transcendent Philosophy concerning the problem of
causality, the existence of the effect is a kind of copulative and connective
existence.[28]
That is, every effect is the same as its dependence on its cause and its
relation to it; there is no dependence or essential existence for it. The
relation between the existence of the effect and the cause is like the one
between a letter and its nominal meaning. The meaning of a letter - since it is
a letter - has no independent meaningful form in the mind; likewise, copulative
existence – since it is copulative – has no independence by itself and is not
considered alone or independently; therefore, it lacks quiddity.[29]
In fact, quiddity is
abstracted from external existences only when one pays attention to those
existences which are indeed copula, rather than viewing them as they are; i.e,
copulative as such, or as independent existences. When the existences of
external effects are considered this way, a series of related and independent
concepts called quiddity are imprinted on the mind. For example, the meaning of
a letter such as fi (in Arabic) when considered independently is
capacity, and it is said that fi is used for denoting capacity. However,
as fi loses its reality of being a letter here and becomes a noun,
copulative existence, when considered independently, loses its feature of being
a copula at the level of knowledge, rather than at the level of reality, and is
taken into account as an independent existent. And this, itself, means getting
far from reality.
Consequently,
whatsoever existing in the outside is existence, and all existences are effects
except for the Necessary Being. Besides, the existence of the effect is
copulative and, therefore, lacks quiddity, yet by our acquired knowledge, we
will know about nothing but quiddity. This indicates that, according to the
Transcendent Philosophy, the distance between our acquired knowledge and
external reality is too long.
5.
In the last stage, the Transcendent Philosophy deals with the personal unity of
existence and considers external existences as the shadows and manifestations
of the single Truth of existence which belongs to the Necessary Being. This
school of philosophy presents for external existences the same analysis that it
does for quiddity, indicating that quiddity is the shadow and manifestation of
personal existences. Accordingly, external existences are the shadow and
manifestation of the unique existence of the Almighty. Regarding this Mulla
Sadra makes the following remarks
The conclusion is
that every existent, whether the intellect, the soul or an archetypal form, is
one of the levels of the beams of true lights and the manifestation of the
self-subsisting Divine existence from the view point of the people of truth and
the Transcendent Philosophy. And when the light of the Truth is radiated (and
the truth is revealed), all the illusions of veiled minds, indicating that
possible quiddities have an existence in their essence, are removed and drowned
in darkness (and their falsity is revealed), and one must say that the
principles and concomitants of quiddities emerge out of the levels of
existence; those existences which are themselves among the rays and shadows of
the True Existence and the Unique Light (the Essence of the Necessary Being).
The reasoning for this principle is among the types of knowledge God has
granted me on the basis of His Eternal Wisdom and made it my share of knowledge
through the emanation of His Bounties . . . Therefore, as the God Almighty,
through His Excellence and Mercy, granted me the grace of getting aware of
sempiternal annihilation and eternal nullification of contingent quiddities and
possible objects, He directed me to the right path through His luminous
celestial reasoning. This path leads to the fact that existents and existence
are restricted to a unique personal reality for which there is no partner in
real existence, which comes second to none in the external world, and except
for which, there is nothing in the world of being. And what in this world seems
to be other than the Necessary Object of Worship is nothing but a beam of the
manifestations of His Essence and Attributes, which are indeed the same as His
Essence.[30]
10. In conclusion,
from one point of view, the process of the historical development of
epistemology in Islamic philosophy is as follows:
In the first phase
quiddities are considered as external realities. It is believed that our system
of acquired knowledge perceives these external realities (quiddities) by
themselves, forms them exactly as they are in the mind and, as a result, gains
access to external reality through knowing these quiddities. This reasoning is
what we might interpret as raw realism.
In
the second phase, quiddities are considered as being mentally-posited and also
as the manifestation of external multiple existences. Since quiddity is mentally-posited,
and since existence is principial, our knowledge of quiddities, as emphasized
before, is limited to the surface or only one layer of external reality. At
this stage, we do not and cannot perceive the depth and essence of existence
and being by means of acquired knowledge; however, we can perceive the
appearance, manifestation and shadow of external reality through knowing the
quiddity. It is here that the distance between reality and appearance shows
face. Reality is out of the reach of mental perception, and what is accessible
to it is merely appearance.
In the third phase,
external existences are also eliminated from the scene of reality and are
limited and related to our perception of reality. In other words, like
quiddities, particular existences are the manifestations of external reality; a
reality which is inaccessible to our acquired knowledge, and, at the same time,
whose essence and truth are out of the domain of Gnostic intuition and
unveiling. Thus we can only acquire the knowledge of the reality of existence
through unveiling and intuition, and the two, taken together, could merely open
a small window towards reality.
The epistemological
principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, themselves, demand a comprehensive
study whose details could only be included in a separate book. It is the
writer’s heartfelt wish to be able to accomplish the task of writing
it.
Notes
[1]. al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah, vol. 1, p. 41.
[2]. Tajrid al-i‘tiqad,
ch. 1, problem 4.
[3]. Murtaèa Muiahhari,
Sharh-i manîumah, vol. 1, pp. 255-299.
[4]. al-T‘aliqat, p.
183.
[5]. Ibn Sina,
al-Isharat wal-tanbihat, iabiiyyat, part 3, ch.7.
[6]. ‘Abdul Razzaq
Lahiji in his book, Shawariq al- ilham (p. 520), in the chapter on the
necessary knowledge and in relation to demonstrating mental existence, quotes a
part of a treatise that he attributes to Ibn Sina. The quoted material includes
the issue of mental existence and its related proofs. Therefore, it
cannot be claimed that this discussion was first opened by a theologian such as
Fakhr Razi. For more information refer to: Jawadi Amuli, Rahiq makhtum, vol. 1,
part 4, pp. 311-319.
[7]. Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 263.
[8]. Jawadi Amuli
writes, “Mental existence indicates the following issues: first, during the
process of perception, something comes into existence in the mind; second,
there is only one thing which exists in the mind; third, when perceiving
something, the reality of the same external object is transferred to the mind,
rather than its image or the distorted form of the that thing; fourth,
knowledge belongs to the category of quality; and fifth, categories are
essentially different from each other. Rahiq makhtum, vol. 1, part
4, vol. pp. 351-352.
[9]. There are three
reasons in this regard: a) positive judgments of non-existents; b.
conception of universal things; and c. conception of absolute and pure
things. See ‘Allamah iabaiaba’i, Bidayat al-hikmah, phase 2, Nihayat
al-hikmah, phase 3, Mulla Hadi Sabziwari, Sharh al-manîumah, part 1, on
universal issues and in relation to mental existence, Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar,
vol. 1, first journey, part 3, ch. 1. It is worthy of mention that although
Mulla Sadra quotes, defends and explains the reasons for demonstrating mental
existence and confirms its foundations, it can be inferred from some of his
statements that the proofs of mental existence, or at least some of them, are
incomplete. In this regard refer to: al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 315. Here he
expresses his doubts concerning the incompleteness of the related proofs and
explicitly argues that the demonstration of mental existence through resorting
to universal concepts is incomplete. Refer to al-Asfar, vol. 2, p. 72. Accordingly
Jawadi Amuli maintains, “Judging Mulla Sadra’s words concerning mental
existence requires more deliberation and attention (Rahiq makhtum, vol.
1, part 4, pp. 356-357.
[10]. Mulla Hadi
Sabziwari, Sharh-manîumah, part 1, on mental existence.
[11]. Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 263.
[12]. Muiahhari, Sharh-i mabsui manîumah , vol.1, p. 264.
[13]. Nihayat al-hikmah,
phase 3.
[14]. Here, sophistry
means lacking the knowledge of the external world (See Nihayat al-hikmah, phase
11, ch.9).
[15]. For more
information about the explanation provided by the Transcendent Philosophy
concerning mental existence refer to Ali Shirvani, Sharh-i Nihayat
al-hikmah, vol. l , pp. 121-143, and Sharh-i bidayat al-hikmah, vol.
1, pp.175-258, Lessons of Philosophy.
[16]. This claim has also
been repeated in Jawadi Amuli’s statements: “In the issue of knowledge, there
is an emphasis on the identity and oneness of the mental form and the external
form; otherwise, the acquisition of knowledge will certainly be blocked and
sophistry will arise (Rahiq makhtum, vol. 1, section 4, p.371).
[17]. Mulla Sadra, al- Asfar, vol.1, p. 314.
[18]. Ibid, p.315.
[19]. Risalat al-Tasawwur
wal tasdiq, published along with al-jawhar al-nadid, p.308.
[20]. Sharh-i risalat
al-mashair, p. 4. In his al-Mabda wal ma'ad (p. 146), Mulla Sadra refers to
this point, too.
[21]. Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. 2, p. 236.
[22]. Ibid, vol.1, p.198.
[23]. Nihayat al-hikmah,
phase 9, ch. 6.
[24]. Sharh al-manîumah,
part 1, section 1, on the evidence of existence.
[25]. Nihayat al-hikmah,
phase 1, ch. 2.
[26]. This point has also
been mentioned in Martin Heidegger’s works. Accordingly, the concept of
existence in the meaning of the a priori comprehension of the verb ‘to be’ is
absolutely evident. Nevertheless, he maintains that its being evident in
ordinary life does not necessarily mean that it is also obvious from a
philosophical point of view. Heidegger’s major goal is to clarify such a
meaning of existence in his works. See T. Izutsu, The Foundations of
Sabziwari’s Philosophy, translated by Jalal al-Din Mojtabavi, p. 21.
[27]. al-Asfar, vol.1, p. 53
[28]. Ibid, vol. 3, p.19.
[29]. Regarding this
point, ‘Allamah iabaiaba’i writes: “ Copulative existences lack quiddity,
because quiddities are concepts that are put forward in response to the
questions concerning the what of objects, and are, therefore, independent in
meaning, whereas copulative existences have no meaning which could be perceived
independently. Nihayat al-hikmah, phase 2, ch. 1.
[30]. al-Asfar, vol. 2,
pp. 291-292.
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