In fact, on the general principle
of God’s unity al-Ghazali shared the same idea with the falÉsifah, yet
in the detailed explication of the principle his position departed considerably
from them. Now let us see to what extent al-Ghazali and the falÉsifah agree
and disagree in their principle.
According to al-FÉrÉbÊ God’s unity
means that First: He is without any defect, not dependent in His
existence, has no contrary (Ìid).[1]
Second: God is not divisible in His essence as in a definition.[2]
God’s unity according to Ibn SÊnÉ is that there should be no multiplicity in
the Necessary Being; can not be a necessary being through another; cannot have
principle such as the parts of the quality (ajzÉ’ al-kammiyah), parts of
the definition (ajzÉ’ al-Íadd); is incorporeal, not matter of bodies,
not form of a body, not intellectual matter for an intellectual matter, and
neither is He an intellectual form in intellectual matter;”[3]
There are two points where al-Ghazali
agrees with the falÉsifah: firstly, is that “God is one which means
the negation of anything other than He and the affirmation of His essence”. Secondly,
the term “one’ means the denial of plurality in the sense that “He does not
accept divisibility”, i.e. He has no quantity, neither parts nor magnitude (lÉ
kammiyah wala juz’ wala miqdÉr); He
has no equal in rank and absolutely no equal in any manner. He has neither
partner nor rival. God is more perfect and has no equal in essence or
attributes. [4] So, Ghazali’s principles on God’s
unity agrees with al-FÉrÉbÊ and Ibn SÊnÉ only on His being indivisible, having no
quantity, no parts, no magnitude, and no duality and no multiplicity. This is
not inconsistency in the part of Ghazali, for this is his method argumentation.[5]
Using the opponent's ideas becomes one of the most conspicuous and important
attitudes of Ghazali, which is called by Watt “attention to the objections from
a Neoplatonic standpoint”,[6]
Despite
the fact that al-Ghazali takes benefit from his opponents principle he does not
inevitably follow them in their detail. He differs from the falÉsifah in
two important points. The first is on proving the oneness of the
Necessary Existence. al-Ghazali accuses the falÉsifah for their proof
which based on the premise that the Necessary Existence exists either by the reason
of Himself or by a cause. This premise, according to Ghazali, is flaw, for such
a kind of premise is only appropriate to depict the possible existence and not
the Necessary Existence. The term Necessary Existence, according to Ghazali,
already embraces the meaning of “existence without cause” and to prove whether
God exists by Himself or by a cause is unnecessary reiteration.[7] The second point in which al-Ghazali completely
differs from the falÉsifah is on the explanation of God’s unity through
the criterion of plurality.[8]
Al-Ghazali realizes that the source of this principle is al-FÉrÉbÊ’s idea of God
Who is indivisible, immutable and unalterable,[9]
which is traceable from Plato’s idea of absolute
simplicity of God. [10] The principle that result in the denial of
God's attributes is of Ibn SÊnÉ's modification of Aristotle’s idea of the
similarity of thought and object of thought. [11]
For al-Ghazali God’s attributes are different from and not identical with His
essence, they are concepts superadded to the essence.[12]
It is obvious that al-Ghazali renounce
the falÉsifah’s principle since he derives his explanation from kalÉm
that mainly taken from Revelation.[13]
Therefore, he does not dare to go into further detail to find out the truth
about the essence of God. He realizes that this “is not something which the
human faculties can encompass”. [14]
He then goes back to basic essential teaching of Islam, quoting the Prophet’s
tradition: “Ponder on the creation of God and do not think of the essence of
God.”[15]
Instead, he carries on explaining the essence and the attributes of God but
only insofar as it is in line with the injunction of Islam or for the
vindication of the true doctrine that he subscribes. However, he realizes in al-MaqÎad
that knowledge about God, which is derived from attributes, cannot enter into
the reality of His essence and quiddity.[16] For Ghazali, the most possible way to knowing
God other than knowing His attributes and rational demonstration, is by way of
experience. This is the highest level of knowing that he terms “cognitive
gnosis” (‘irfÉn al-‘ilmÊ).[17]
Having elaborated Ghazali’s
resemblance with and deviation of the FalÉsifah principle, we shall turn
to elaborate Ghazali’s concept of God’s unity. Upon extensive perusal of Ghazali's
various works we identify that there are at least three theories of God unity:
theory of divine uniqueness,
In MaqÎad, he defines God’s
unity (al-wÉÍid) as:
the one
who can neither be divided nor duplicated. Concerning its being indivisible, it
is like unitary substance which cannot be divided: it is said to be one in the
sense that no part of it is itself a substance, as a point has no parts. God
the most high is one in the sense that it is impossible for His essence to be
arranged into parts. Concerning its not being able to be duplicated, that
reflects its having no equal.[18]
More explicitly God’s unity is
expressed to be unlike anything “He is not like anything nor is anything like
Him.”[19]
This implies that “his attributes are unlike those of any creature just as His
essence unlike the essence of any created thing” and “God’s knowledge is
absolutely unlike that of His creature” [20]
Another way in which al-Ghazali expresses
God’s utter uniqueness or utter difference is by saying that there can be no
class to which God could belong for fear that God be considered one of a kind,
instead of the only one of His kind. In Ma‘Érij he asserts that “He is
above (munazzahun ‘an) having genus (jins) and a differentia (faÎl),
for what does not share (a genus) with others has no differentia to separate it
from anything else.”[21] Such a description as God’s uniqueness (aÍadiyyah)
and unity (wÉhidiyyah) is quite common among the mutakallimËn. So
God’s characterization cannot be like anything that man knows. However, to
assert that God in al-Ghazzali’s thought is utterly unknowable cannot be
unconditionally accepted,[22]
since knowing God is not the same as knowing His created being.
The second theory of God’s
unity is from the perspective of individual experience on the confession that
“There is no god but Allah”. He classifies this experience into four ways of
expressing the unity of God: firstly, the degree of statement in words
but filled up with denial of its truth in the heart, this is the tawÍÊd of
the hypocrites. Secondly, the degree of acceptance of the truth of this
statement; this is the tawÍÊd of ordinary Muslim, the tawÍÊd that
the theologians seek to defend against innovation and heresies, as al-Ghazali himself
did in IqtiÎÉd. The tawÍÊd of the theologians does not differ
from that of the ordinary Muslim except that the theologians know how to defend
their faith, whereas the ordinary Muslim does not know. Thirdly, the
degree in which the seeker perceives the multiplicity of things is produced by
the One, the Omnipotent; that whatever happens in the world is effected by God,
and whatever done by any one is in fact done by God. He is the one and only
actor and there is no actor beside Him. This is the stage of tawÍÊd fi‘li (the
belief in One Actor)[23]
and only attained by whom God has drawn near to Him (al-muqarrabËn);
Here a question may arise as to whether God’s act is attributed to men or
otherwise, but we shall discuss this point in the section dealing with the
problem of creation. Fourthly, it is the degree where the seeker sees
naught in the existence except the One. This is the level of ÎiddÊqËn, the
Sufi usually called it “dissolution in unity” (al-fanÉ’ fÊ al-TawÍÊd).
This level reflects the state of unconsciousness of the sight of oneself and
whatever is created is due to his intense possession of the Absolute reality of
God.[24]
The abovementioned degrees of
divine unity are consistent with his concept of al-Íaqq and al-ÍaqÊqah
or the truth and reality of existence, discussed in the beginning of this
Chapter. The first two degrees represent the meaning of truth, while the last
two correspond to the meaning of reality.
The next theory, which is related
to the second, is couched with reference to God-world relation in terms of two
different languages that might be called the language of act and the language
of being (wujËd).[25]
The former means the unity of actor or maker or composer. Here al-Ghazali describes
God’s unity being manifested in the notion that there is no Agent (fÉ‘il)
in reality (al-ÍaqÊqah) except God. In other words we would not see more
than One real Actor (fɑil) in all existence; He alone, without any
partner, fashions and creates everything.
This can be discerned in various places in IÍyÉ’ and al-MaqÎad al-AsnÉ where he describes the relation
of God with the world in terms of an actor and his acts, an author and his
composition, a maker and the thing he makes. In IÍyÉ’ for example, he
states that, “Existence is of God alone by Whom all acts exist. One whose
condition is this, does not look at any act but looks in it as the Actor, and
forgets the acts. He rather looks at heaven, earth, animal, tree etc. as the
work (Îun’) of the Real One.”[26]
In al-MaqÎad he asserts that “there is nothing in existence except God
and His acts, this means that when one looks at God’s acts they are not as
heaven and earth and trees, but as His work (Îun‘atuhË)”.[27] Thus the language of act is essentially the
language of creation interpreted in a special way. This is related to the third
degree of the second theory of God's unity, the result of which is a spiritual
impact upon individual consciousness such as reliance upon nothing other than
God, fear, hope and confidence.[28]
As matter of fact, al-Ghazaliincorporates this concept in his discussion about
knowledge, love, repentance (tawbah), gratitude (shukr) and other
spiritual exercises. He makes the divine attributes, especially the unity of
God, the final end, which should govern the entire process of traveling towards
a complete fulfillment.
Regarding the language of being, al-Ghazali
explains that one perceives the unity of being when one does not see the whole
as a multiplicity but perceives it as a unity. The manner in which we perceive
this apparent multiplicity of thing as unity according to Ghazali:
..depends upon how you look at a
thing. If you look at a thing from one angle, it is one. For instance, if you
look at the various parts of man, his body, soul, arteries, bones etc. you see
him many. But if you look at him as a man, you see him one. Similarly, there
are many ways of looking at what is in existence – the Creator, and the created
object. If you look at existence from one angle it is one and if you look at it
from another angle, it is many, and in some ways of looking, the multiplicity
is much more prominent than in others.[29]
This explanation shows that the
ultimate stage of tawÍÊd is not to identify the existence of man with
the existence of God. Unity in Ghazali’s concept is only a matter of ru’yat
(perception), or unity of shuhËd, in which things do not appear as existing
separately from God but forming a unity with Him, and the seer is so much
occupied with the perception of that unity that he is no more conscious of the
object of the world or even his own being.
Depicting God’s unity in this
language of being, wujËd means that God’s unity is not seen from the
multiplicity in the world, but is understood from the comprehensive standpoint
of the unity of existence. This theory is parallel with the fourth degree in
the second theory of God unity mentioned above. This is the stage in which man perceive
nothing other than the One Real Being (al-WÉÍid al-×aqq). In IÍyÉ’
he emphasizes the meaning of God’s unity (tawÍÊd) on His being the only
source of all existences to Whom everything will return; there is nothing in
existence other than God; he then quotes the Qur’anic verse “every thing is
perishing except His face (wajhahË)”, by which he interprets that other
thing that exists by another cannot be regarded as the Real Existence (al-MawjËd
al-×aqq).[30]
In al-MaqÎad al-Ghazali stresses the meaning of God’s unity not only in
His being undivided, unduplicated and having no equal,[31]
but also on His being Absolutely Real (al-×aqq al-MuÏlaq). Real in this
sense implies that He is Necessary in Himself (al-wÉjib bi dhÉtihÊ). This
is quite different from the possible in itself but necessary by another, which is
real in one respect and unreal in another. Again he quotes the Qur’anic verse
that “every thing is perishing except His face”, but here he means that
everything other than God would deprive of its existence and exists only by
Him.[32]
In MishkÉt al-Ghazali reiterates
his explication in al-MaqÎad that God is the Real Existent (al-MawjËd
al-×aqq) for He exists by Himself, whereas other than Him are not the real
existence whose existence borrowed (musta‘Êr) from Him; in the higher
level of gnostics (al-‘ÉrifËn) there is nothing visible in the existence
except the One the Real (al-WÉÍid al-×aqq). In the Sufi thought this
state in relation to the One who possesses it is called fanÉ’ (extinction)
and when the possessor of the state is extinct from himself or from his own
extinction is called fanÉ’ al-fanÉ’, “extinction
from extinction”. This stage in relation to the one immersed in it, is called
“unification” (ittÍÉd), but it is only in metaphorical language, while
in the language of reality it is called tawÍÊd.[33] The verse “every thing is perishing except
His face” is interpreted in different manner from al-MaqÎad, that every
thing has two faces, one turned to its own essence, and the other to its Lord.
In respect to its own face (wajh nafsihÊ) it is non-existent; and only in
respect to the face of God (wajh Allah) it exists. Hence nothing exists
except God and His face, while every thing is perishing eternally.
Referring to the last principle of
God’s unity in the language of being, obvious question that might come to our
mind is how the existence of things stands with
God’s own existence. In this respect one might assume that al-Ghazali believes
in the doctrine of pantheism, oneness of being, for he asserts that things
exist by the existence of God. Likewise, his assertions in MishkÉt that
“whenever you point to any thing, you really point to Him, even if you may not
be aware of it, because of your ignorance of the ultimate reality (ÍaqÊqat
al-ÍaqÉ’iq) we have talked of”,[34]
can be inferred as being very close to the doctrine of waÍdat al-wujËd.[35]
Nevertheless, this assumption is untenable since such an assertion cannot
be interpreted as that thing exists by the same existence by which God Himself
exists. The fact is that there are fundamental differences between waÍdat
al-wujËd and Ghazali’s view. One of such difference is that Ghazzali never
says that God (al-×aqq) is the world. He only says that, in the
real sense, nothing exists except God and the world has no existence except as
a reflection of God’s existence in it, just like the reflection of the moon on
various mirrors.
The most cogent statement that
frees al-Ghazali from a sort of belief in waÍdat al-wujËd is to be found
in MishkÉt where he explains that “God is with every being as light with
object” (inna Allah ma‘a kulli shay’ ka al-nËr ma‘a al-ashyÉ’), [36]
meaning that God is before every thing and above every thing and the producer
of every thing. To say that God is before every thing, according to Ghazali, is
to state that God is eternal, and to say that He is above every thing is to
affirm His transcendence, and the belief in the transcendence (of God) in true
religious sense is not consistent with the doctrine of waÍdat al-wujËd. It
is true that al-Ghazali holds that every thing is His light, or rather He is
all, but it does not mean that al-Ghazali believes in the identity of the
existence of the world and that of God. The unity held by al-Ghazaliis best
understood from his IÍyÉ’, that is only a matter of ru’yat
(perception), or shuhËd. Hence we could infer that al-Ghazali holds the
idea of waÍdat al-shuhËd rather than waÍdat al-wujËd. In this
sense things do not appear existing separately from God but forming a unity
with Him, and the seer is so much engaged with the discernment of that unity
that he is no more conscious of the object of the world or even of his own
being.
In conclusion we may infer that Ghazali’s
principle of God’s unity is relevant to the concept exposed in the Qur’an
above. His objection against the falÉsifah’s concept that God’s essence
and existence or essence and attribute are identical is only to pave a way to
his project of vindicating plurality of God’s attributes in God’s unity. Unity
in the language of act is the very meaning of the oneness of God in pervasive
sense in which God is the only author that watches and governs all things. Likewise, unity in the language of being is
the affirmation of the Qur’anic assertion that God is the source of reality and
existence. To sum up we shall quote David Buchman’s statement on Ghazali’s MishkÉt,
that the book is “instrumental for the contemporary readers to understand the
depth and beauty of Ghazali‘s interpretation of divine unity and in elucidating
the general tawÍÊd-centered worldview of Islam.”[37]
[1] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, KitÉb
al-SiyÉsah al-Madaniyyah, ed. FM.Najjar, (Beirut: Dar El-Mashreq
Publisher, 1964), 42; al-FÉrÉbÊ, ÓrÉ’ Ahl al-MadÊnat al- FÉÌilah, 2nd
edition, ed. al-Kurdi, Cairo, 1948):
42-43; Al-FÉrÉbÊ, ÓrÉ’ Ahl
al-MadÊnah, 4-5
[2] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, al-SiyÉsah al-Madaniyyah, 44; Al-FÉrÉbÊ, ÓrÉ’ Ahl al-MadÊnah, 8
[3] Ibn SÊnÉ, KitÉb
al-NajÉt, fi al-×ikmah al-ManÏiqiyyah wal al-ÙabÊ‘iyyah wa al-IlÉhiyyah, edited
by Majid Fakhry, (Beirut: ManshËrÉt DÉr al-ÓfÉq al-JadÊdah, 1405/1985):
263-265; Cf. Ibn SÊnÉ, al-IshÉrÉt wa al-TanbÊhÉt:
al-ManÏiq, part. IV, ed. SulaymÉn DunyÉ, (Cairo: DÉr al-Ma‘Érif, 1958, 78.
[4] al-Ghazali, al- IqtiÎÉd,
69.
[5] The sources of his method
consist of six points, they are: 1) data of senses (al-ÍissiyÉt), 2)
immediate intuition (al-‘aql al-maÍÌ), 3) universal report (tawÉtur),
4) conclusion drawn from 1-3, 5) data of revelation (al-sam‘iyyÉt) and
6) proposition drawn from or conceded by one’s opponent see Al-Ghazali, al- IqtiÎÉd, 26-27; cf. al-Ghazali, Mi‘yÉr
al-‘Ilm, ed.SulaymÉn DunyÉ, 91-92; Cf. al-Ghazali, Al-MustaÎfÉ min ‘Ilm
al-UÎËl. 2 vols. ed. M.SulaymÉn al-Ashqar. (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-RisÉlah, 1997): 94-95
[6] Watt, W.M., Muslim
Intellectual, A study of al-Ghazali, (Edinburgh :The University Press),
1963, 123; Abrahamov also tries to prove Ibn Sina’s influence on al-Ghazali including
on TahÉfut, but lack of evidence on the fundamental concept of God.
B.Abrahamov, “Ibn Sina’s Influence on al-Ghazali’s Non-Philosophical Woks”, Abr
Nahrain, vol. xxix, (1991), 1-17; the same case in with Jules Janseens, “al-Ghazali’s
TahÉfut: Is It Really A Rejection of Ibn Sina’s Philosophy”, Journal of
Islamic Studies, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, (2001), 12:1 , 1-17.
[7] al-Ghazali, TahÉfut,
ed. & trans by Marmura, 85, 87.
[8] The five criterions of plurality
according to the falÉsifah are: 1) being receptive to division whether
actually or conceptually; 2) from the intellectual division of a thing into two
different concept, not quantitatively, like the division of body into matter (hayËlÉ)
and form (ÎËrah); 3) plurality through attributes by the supposition of
knowledge, power and will, for if the existence of such attributes were
necessary, necessary existence would be common to both God’s essence and these
attributes, thereby negating unity; 4) an intellectual plurality resulting from
the composition of genus and differentia’ 5) the plurality of the essence and
existence. Ibid, 87-88.
[9] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, KitÉb
al-Jam‘ Bayn Ra’yay al-×akÊmayn, ed.A. Nadir, (Beirut: 1960), 105-109; also
Aristotle, Physics, VIII, 10, 267b, 25-26, Aristotle,
De Caelo, 19, 279a, 19-21.
[10] Plato, “Phaedo”, The
Dialogue of Plato, vol. 1, transl. B.Jowett, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1953): 432-78; Plato, The Republic,
Translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford. (Oxford- New York: Oxford University
Press, 1965, 369-507.
[11] Aristotle, Metaphysic, Translated
by Hippocrates G. Apostle. (Indiana, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1966): 1016b, 22.
[12] Al-Ghazali, al- IqtiÎÉd, ed. M. AbË al-‘AlÉ, 76
[13] The example can be perused
from his al-MaÌnËn, where he draws the principle of God’s unity from the
Qur’an (al-IkhlÉÎ 1) resulting in the concept of aÍadiyyah, which
means without partner. Likewise, God’s unity, which reveals the meaning of
oneness (waÍÊdiyyah) is the result of his interpretation of the Qur’an (al-Baqarah
163), which means having no composition nor parts in every respect. Further perusal over his two important works,
TahÉfut al-FalÉsifah and al-IqtiÎÉd would suggest that by taking
benefit of the falÉsifah’s arguments and maintaining his
Ash’arite background he comes up with the concept that reconciles God’s unity
with multiplicity of attributes. Al-Ghazali, “al-MaÌnËn bihi ‘AlÉ Ghayri
AhlihÊ”, in al-QuÎËr al-‘AwÉlÊ min RasÉ’il al-Ghazali, ed. MuÎÏafÉ AbË
al-‘AlÉ, vol.II, (Cairo: Maktabah al-JundÊ, 1980): 130.
[14] Al-Ghazali, TahÉfut, ed. &
trans. Marmura, 77.
[15] There are at least three expressions of this
ÍadÊth in Syaikh al-AlbÉnÊ Silsilah al-AÍÉdith al-ØaÍÊÍah (v..4, No.
1788) it is written: tafakkarË fÊ ÉlÉ’ Allah, wa lÉ tafakkarË fÊ dhÉtihi fa
tuhlikË; in Kasyf al-KhafÉ’ it is
written: tafakkarË fÊ khalq AllÉh, wa lÉ tafakkarË fÊ AllÉh, fa innahË lÉ
tuÍÊÏ bihÊ al-afkÉr. See MuÍammad al-AjlËnÊ, Kasyf al-KhafÉ‘,
v.1, (Beirut: Mu’assasah
al-RisÉlah, 1405): 371; cf. al-ManÉwÊ, FayÌ
al-QÉdÊr, v. 3, (Cairo: Maktabah TijÉriyah KubrÉ,1356): 263; in al-Firdaus
bi Ma’thËr the expression is as follows: tafakkarË fÊ khalq Allah, wa lÉ
tafakkarË fi Allah, fa innakum lÉ tuqaddirË qadrah, see AbË SujÉ‘, al-Firdaus
bi Ma’thËr al-KhiÏÉb, v. 2, (Beirut: DÉr al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, (1986)):
56.
[16] Al-Ghazali, Al-MaqÎad
al-AsnÉ, ed.MaÍmËd al-NawÉwÊ, 29- 30, English trans, The Ninety-Nine, 37
[17] Al-Ghazali, MishkÉt, 57
[18] Al-Ghazali, Al-MaqÎad, English Trans. The Ninety-Nine,
130-131.
[19] Ibid., 34.
[20] Al-Ghazali, Arba‘Ên,
18 and 23.
[21] Al-Ghazali, Ma‘Érij
al-Quds fÊ MadÉrij Ma‘rifat al-Nafs. ed. A.Shams al-DÊn, (Beirut: DÉr al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1988): 193; Cf.
Al-Ghazali, IÍyÉ, vol. I, 2.
[22] A work that discusses al-Ghazalistandpoint
on this is written by Fadlou Shehadi. See Fadlou Shehadi, Ghazali’s Unique
Unknowable God, A Philosophical Critical Analysis of Some of the Problem Raised
by Ghazzali’s View of God as Utterly Unique and Unknowable, (Leiden: I.J.Brill
1964), especially Chapter I, 13-21, and VI,
92-100.
[23] Al-Ghazaliexplains that TawÍÊd
fi‘li means that you realize that there is no actor (fÉ‘il) except God, and every thing
that is there…is created solely and entirely by God without the participation
of any other. If you truly realize this you would not look to others, fear no
one, put your faith and hope in nobody, and rely on no being except God. For He
is the one and the only doer (fɑil) and every thing else is absolutely
controlled. Nothing has a power of its own to move a single particle in the
heaven and the earth. Al-Ghazali,
IÍyÉ’, vol. IV, ed. A.A. SirwÉn, 232.
[24] Ibid., 230
[25] Abdul Haq Ansari, “The
Doctrine of Divine Command: A Study in the Development of Ghazzali’s View on
Reality”, Islamic Studies, No. 3, vol. XXI, (autumn 1982): 19-20.
[26] Al-Ghazali, IÍyÉ’, ed A.A. SirwÉn, vol. I, 310
[27] Al-Ghazali,al-MaqÎad,
45.
[28] Al-Ghazali, al-IqtiÎÉd, 10
[29] Al-Ghazali, IÍyÉ’, ed. A.A. SirwÉn, vol.I, 231
[30] Ibid., 83-84
[31] Al-Ghazali, al-MaqÎad, 95-96
[32] Ibid., 90-91.
[33] Al-Ghazali, MishkÉt, trans.
D. Buchman, 17-18
[34] Ibid., 20.
[35] Al-Ghazali, MishkÉt,
ed. Abu’l-‘AlÉ ‘AfÊfÊ, 55-56
[36] Al-Ghazali, MishkÉt, trans.
D. Buchman, 24
[37] Ibid. See Translator’s Introduction,
xviii
