We have mentioned above that just
as Ghazali’s concept of God has conceptual centrality, his concept of the
Omnipotent God has profound bearing upon his concept of creation and the causal
theory that he subscribes. In this concept, God is depicted as the
Transcendental Creator of the world. He exists by Himself and is eternal and
everlasting. The centrality of the concept of God in Ghazali’s thought is
discernible from his affirmation and vindication of the concept of divine attributes,
where divine power and will are the principal elements in his concept of
creation. Therefore, the world, which means to him “everything other than God”,[1]
is brought into existence, out of nothingness, by Him through the process of
creation.
The starting point of Ghazali’s doctrine
of creation is that the universe has a beginning in time. In his IqtiÎÉd
he couched his argument in such a strong syllogistic form that serves also as
an argument for God’s existence:
“Every
being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is being which
begins; therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning” (kullu ÍÉdithin
faliÍudËthihÊ sabab, wa al-‘Élam ÍÉdithun fayalzam minhu anna lahu sababan).[2]
In his RisÉlah al-Ghazali reiterates
the same argument that: “the world began in time; and they know by
rational necessity that nothing which originates in time originates by itself,
and that, therefore, it needs a creator”.[3]
He even calls it the axiom of mind which is in itself obvious that anything
that begins must have begun in a certain definite time. Its being definite in
time and distinct from what preceded it and what succeeded it in existence,
will naturally require determinant to select the time for its appearance.
In his TahÉfut the argument
can be deduced into three premises and one conclusion as follows: 1) There are
temporal events in the world; 2) The temporal events have causes; 3) The series
of temporal events cannot regress infinitely.[4]
Therefore, the series must stop at the eternal. The first premise is
obvious since we experience in the world of the sense that there are around us
things coming to be and passing away. The second premise is somewhat
strange, for here al-Ghazali seems to be admitting the existence of secondary
causation which he thoroughly repudiates. But if we look the addressee of the
argument, i.e. the philosophers, who believed in the existence of real cause in
the world, we understand it as a concession to his opponents. In other words al-Ghazali
argues for the sake of his opponents that there are temporal phenomena in the
world and these phenomena are preceded by other temporal phenomena, and so on. The
premise does not uphold that the causation in the world is independent of God.
The third premise is the crux of the argument that directly goes against
the argument of the eternity of the world.
The gist behind this premise can be discerned from his query on the
standpoint of his opponent on the infinite regress of temporal phenomena.
So, Ghazali’s premise that the world
began in time is clear, for time itself had a beginning and was created.[5]
Al-Ghazali does not denounce the Aristotelian definition of time as the measure
of motion, nor does he question the legitimacy of the inference of the eternity
of motion from the eternity of time.[6]
Nonetheless, he upholds the argument that if temporal phenomena, or change in
time have an origin, then time, as the measure of such change, must have an
origin as well.
The above doctrine of creation is
then applied into the principle of causality for the existence of all created
things. Ghazali's position is clear that no created thing comes about through
another (created being), all temporal events came about through the power of
God, exalted be He.[7]
al-Ghazali alters the term cause in the falÉsifah sense with the term ‘agent’.
The argument to prove the divine power as an agent is couched as follows:
Every
well-designed act proceeds from a powerful agent; the world is a well-designed,
ordered act; therefore the world proceeds from a powerful agent.[8]
The argument is logically valid,
yet he does not explain the first premise concerning the world design. It seems
that he does not feel necessary to explain further, because of his conviction
that such a premise “is apprehensible by sense (Íiss) and by observation
(mushÉhadah) and hence is impossible to deny”,[9]
and he regards this kind of knowledge as self-evident (ÌarËrat al-‘aql).
al-Ghazali prefers to regard God as a powerful agent, rather than a First Cause
in the falÉsifah sense, because by conceding God as a cause they mean
that His act proceeds by virtue of His essence. If this were the case, the act
would be co-eternal with the essence, or if God acts through His essence, His
very essence necessitates His act, which is impossible. He is thus compelled to
act. He has no choice and so has neither will nor power. The truth, according
to Ghazali, is that an act proceeds from a meaning additional to the essence,
which is called the attribute of power.[10]
Ghazali’s argument is back to the
Ash’arite views. God, for the Ash’arite, is an agent, not a cause. Agent is a
term applicable for a living, willing and knowing being. An agent does not act
or create because of necessity. He does not create by “nature” (bi al-Ïab‘).[11]
This concept of agent which is the basis of Ash’arite’s proof for the existence
of God,[12]
is to be found in al-BÉqillÉnÊ's TamhÊd that the world cannot be
eternal; it must have a creator; and this creator must be a living, willing,
knowing agent. In a lengthy argument, he ardently insists that God does not act
through any necessity in His nature.[13]
Ghazali, in QawÉ‘d al-‘AqÉid, reproduces similar proof for creation ex
nihilo, and for God’s existence.[14]
In his TahÉfut, al-Ghazali provides
more space to discuss this issue and maintain that the term agent (al-fɑil)
entails the idea of will and the knowledge of the thing willed. A simple
example, given by Ghazali, is that if someone throws another into the fire and
the latter dies, it is said that the former is the agent of killing and not the
fire, because the former has will and the knowledge. Hence the term agent is
applicable only to animate beings. In this regard, God cannot be depicted as
similar to inanimate, for He always acts by will.
By positing God as the agent of
creation al-Ghazali does not have any problem in proving the existence of the
world at a specific time. It is because His power and will play a pervasive
role in the process of creation. Ghazali's argues that divine power is attached to divine will.
For him every object of power is at the same time an object of will (nurÉd);
therefore everything that exists in time is an object of will (kullu hÉdith
murÉd). It seems that al-Ghazali distinguishes God’s power from God’s will,
but both work together when it stands in nexus with thing existing in time (ÍawÉdith).
This position was then disapproved of by Ayn al-QuÌÉÍ al-HamdÉnÊ who posits
that there is no difference between qudrah and irÉdah.[15]
In fact, al-Ghazali was not entirely wrong for if we refer to the Qur’an: “Verily
when He wills a thing, His command is Be and it is” (ÎËrah YÉsÊn:82), we
discern that the will precedes the power; and for al-Ghazali this verse conveys
the idea of the ultimate power. In Ghazali’s concept, the existence of the
world at a specific time can be proven on the basis of such power-will
attachment, meaning that Divine power is not undistinguishable from divine will,
but attached to it; and that all temporal events were brought about by divine
power, while the time of its occurrence is chosen and decreed by the divine
will.
Moreover, al-Ghazali asserts that divine
attributes (khuÎËÎ al-ÎifÉt) has specific effect, which are manifest in
the world in the form of specific measure (miqdÉr makhÎËÎ) and specific
position. The world as we experience it is, in fact, ‘specified’, and
therefore, there must be something which specifies its existence and its
non-existence and this specifier is that which is called will. The principle
offered by al-Ghazali on this point is that will stand in nexus with all temporal
events and that every temporal event (ÍÉdithÉt) is created by God’s
power (kullu ÍÉdith fa mukhtara‘ bi qudratihi) and everything created by
God power stands in need of the divine will (kullu mukhtara‘ bi al-Qudrah
muÍtÉj ilÉ irÉdatin).
The world comes to be at the time
when eternal will stands in nexus with its coming to be at that time without the
occurrence of a new will or changing in the eternal will. This principle is
based on the concept of seven essential attributes, in which God does not will
essentially, but will by virtue of a will. So the divine will is itself
determinant, as he characterized it in a sentence “what He wills is and what He
does not will is not”.[16]
However, just as God’s will is
attached with power, it is also related to knowledge. In his QawÉ‘id al-‘AqÉ’id
al-Ghazali depicts God as the one who creates, governs and knows everything.
Everything was created with measure. The universe is contrived by knowledge and
wisdom of One Author in a single scheme. So everything works together according
to the measure and has its place and importance that are assigned to it by God.
He watches over all and He is nearer to man than his jugular vein. He rewards
each according to his part. Though God’s power is infinite and absolute, He
will never violate anything in the scheme according to which the universe
moves.[17]
This portrayal does not deviate too far from the concept of causality in the
Qur’an that we have elaborated in Chapter One, yet we shall prove in more
detail in Chapter Four, especially in his concept of particularization (takhÎÊs).
So, it is clear from the above
argument that Ghazali’s argument of creation corroborates the concept of God
who has creative power and who is the only creator of the world. Just as
creation implies the act of creating, the concept of living God cannot be
depicted as the Agent, but as the powerful Agent. Certainly the whole argument
on creation diametrically opposes the philosophers’ argument of emanation.[18]
Their concept of emanation, adopted from Plotinian theory, considers the world
to be a necessary outflow from the being of God, like light from the sun, and
hence no will, power and knowledge are entailed. Therefore, it is not a coincidence
that their theory of emanation is parallel to their denial of divine attribute
which, according to Ghazali, arises from their over-emphasis on the abstract
unity and absolute perfection of God. Therefore, Ghazali’s argument noticeably vindicates
the primacy of the divine will in the whole process of world origination, whereas
the falÉsifah defended the unity of God’s essence in so absolute ways
that they disallow any notion that would imply the act of creation. The falÉsifah
justify the Aristotelian “necessitarianism” and Plotinian doctrine of
emanation and hence maintain the doctrine of the eternity of the world. In
contrast, al-Ghazali maintains the concept of the creative power of God that has
some bearing upon the concept of the creation of the world. His renowned theory of causality is basically
the necessary corollary of this concept, which came into conflict with the falÉsifah’s
doctrine of necessity.
[1] Ibid., 29.
[2] Ibid.
[3] The book is part of “KitÉb QawÉ’id
al-‘AqÉ’id,’ of IÍyÉ’, vol.I, translated with notes by
Nabih Amin Faris, “al-Ghazali, The Foundation of the Article of Faith”,
Sh.Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1974, 59-60.
[4] Al-Ghazali, TahÉfut, ed.& trans. by Marmura, , 27, translation
is taken from Marmura with some modification.
[5] Ibid., 36.
[6] Marmura have the same conclusion,
see Michael E. Marmura, ‘The Logical Role of The Argument from Time in the TahÉfut’s
Second Proof for the World’s Pre-eternity’, Muslim World, 49 (1959),
306.
[7] Al-Ghazali, al-IqtiÎÉd,
ed. M.AbË al-‘AlÉ, 90.
[8] Ibid., 75.
[9] Ibid.
[10]
Ibid., 76.
[11] This point of view is not only
directed against the falÉsifah, but also against the Mu’tazilah. See Ibn
×azm, KitÉb al-FiÎal, 5 vols., vol. III,
55, 58.
[12]. Al-Ash’arÊ, KitÉb al-Luma’,
edited and translated by Richard Mcarty (Beyruth): Imprimerie Catholique, 1953,
Arabic text, 6-7; English translation 6-8.
[13] Al-BÉqillÉnÊ, KitÉb TamhÊd
al-AwÉ’il wa TalkhÊÎ al-DalÉil, edited ‘ImÉd al-DÊn AÍmad ×aydar, (Beirut:
Mu’assasat al-Kutub al-ThaqÉfiyyah, 1987/1407):
44,47-48, and 52-56.
[14] Al-Ghazali, IÍyÉ’, ed.
A.A. SirwÉn , vol. I, 181-182.
[15] For ‘Ayn al-QuÌÉÍ’s statement see
Omar Jah, Zubdah al-×aqÉ’iq, An annotated English translation from
Arabic, (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 2000), 13; Cf. Al-Ghazali, QawÉ‘id al-‘AqÉid, English trans., 45.
[16] Al-Ghazali, al-IqtiÎÉd,
ed. M.AbË al-‘AlÉ 108.
[17] Al-Ghazali, “QawÉ‘id al-‘AqÉ’id fÊ
al-TawhÊd”, in al-QuÎËr al-‘AwÉlÊ min RasÉ’il al-Ghazali, vol. IV, ed. (Cairo:
MuÎÏafÉ AbË al-‘AlÉ, Maktabah al-JundÊ, 1972): 149-150.
[18] For good discussion on this
discrepancy see M.Saeed Sheikh, “al-Ghazali Metaphysics” in M.M.Sharif, History
of Muslim Philosophy, 601-608.
