The understanding of the nature of
God serves specific conceptual system, which necessarily provides the
conception of super system. Generally, in the realm of Islamic thought the
explanation of the nature of God presented by the theologians is at variance
with that of the falÉsifah. But, both parties place the concept of God as
metaphysical pedestal from which it towers over other concepts, including the
concept of world and its origination, of man, of knowledge and the likes. Once
a conceptual understanding of God is established some other concepts will
follow. Indeed, in the conceptual structure of the worldview of Islam the
concept of God is the groundwork of any key concept, such as the concept of
world, life, ethic, knowledge and others.
In the following section we will
expound al-Ghazali’s detailed explanation of the nature of God, emphasizing on
the concept of God’s unity and attributes, which is quite central in his other
concepts. Therefore, we shall explicate his concept of God in comparison with
that of the falÉsifah. It is because the centrality of the concept of
God in al-Ghazali’s thought can be best discerned from his earnest concern in
showing the incoherence of the concept of the falÉsifah. His concern is
not on the general principle, but on its detailed explanation. Therefore, in
the beginning of TahÉfut he asserts that:
“…..the falÉsifah
believe in God and His messenger but they have fallen into confusion in the
detailed explanation of these principles (wa annahum ikhtabatË fÊ tafÉÎÊl
hÉdhihi al-uÎËl)”….we will show how they slipped into error and falsehood.[1]
Obviously, what he means by
‘detailed explanation of these principles’ are theories or arguments on the
concept of God that he vehemently refutes. On the principle of God’s
knowledge, for example, the falÉsifah denied the possibility of one
single Being who knows all the universal, without this knowledge forming
plurality in His essence. al-Ghazali construes hastily, saying, “This is your
theory of God”,[2]
implying that their theory of God’s knowledge confuses the very nature of the
godhead in the Qur’an with the Greek theory.
Another example is about the
problem of God-world relation, which is rooted in their denial of God’s
attributes. Just as the falÉsifah stripped God’s attributes of life,
power, and knowledge, they believed in the concept that all other existence
emanated as a necessary consequence of God’s essence. Thus, God produces the
world by necessity like inanimate being, the concept of which, according to Ghazali,
opposes the Qur’anic concept of creation. It is clear that the falÉsifah
denial of God’s attributes resulted in the concept of emanation and certainly
in such other concepts as God-man relation, God-world relation and the like.
This implies that the detailed explanation of the concept of God has conceptual
consequences.
Al-Ghazali’s concern with the
concept of God can also be seen from the fact that all the sixteen disputations
in the first part of TahÉfut are connected with the issues of the divine
sciences (al-‘ulËm al-IlÉhiyyah), whiles the rest or the second part
falls within the ambit of the natural sciences (al-‘ulËm al-Ïabi‘iyyÉt).
Simon Van Den Bergh misunderstood this point, as he regards al-Ghazali not
attacking the philosophers’ concept of God from the very beginning, and hence
accuses him of being unsystematic.[3]
The truth is that al-Ghazali devoted more space for refutation of the issues
related to the divine sciences, since he considers the falÉsifah “attacking
the very basis of our religion”[4],
the impact of which is more hazardous to the concept of belief than the natural
sciences.
However, TahÉfut is not the
only clue of Ghazali’s concern with the importance of holding the true concept
of God. TahÉfut represents only his repudiation against the falÉsifah
that does not enclose his vindication of the concept that he regarded as
the sound one. His repudiation follows a demonstrative method used by the
philosophers, while in his vindication he employs the dialectic method of the
theologians. This method, however, is only a station of his intellectual
journey that anticipated other stations of the esoteric approach of Sufi.
Moreover, al-Ghazali emphasizes the
transcendent aspect of God - beyond the limit of space and time – and also
immanent in this spatio-temporal order; His eternal will is in action
throughout the universe.[5]
To accentuate the transcendence of God al-Ghazali avoids calling Him substance
(jawhar), because substance refers ordinarily to the objects of the
world.[6]
God is incorporeal reality beyond time and space. The Qur’anic notion of the
hand, the eye, the face of God, His ascending of the throne and His coming down
are to be interpreted in metaphorical sense (majÉz).[7]
This principle of tanzÊh is reiterated in his al-Arba‘Ên FÊ UÎËl
al-DÊn, where he asserts that, “God’s essence is unique, individual,
without companion, and there is nothing which looks like Him…He is everlasting,
continuous in His essence”[8]
He then depicts God’s concrete reality
as follows:
He is not
body with shape, or a measured or definite substance. Nothing looks like him,
either regarding measurability or regarding divisibility in parts. God is not
substance, nor can substance define Him; He is not an accident nor can accident
define Him. No existent being look like Him and nothing can be compared with
Him (al-Qur’an, al-ShËrÉ, 42:11). God is not like things. Quantity
cannot limit Him; no region can enclose Him; no side can surround Him.[9]
Nevertheless, the conspicuous point
that is worth noting here is that al-Ghazali disavows the falÉsifah’s
concept by employing Ash’arite argument, but then he develops the Asha’arite
doctrine into more sufistic method. Therefore, he can be regarded as being successful
in employing kalÉm method for an instrument for knowing spiritual
realities. Ghazali’s thought is thus a
combination of kalÉm, falsafah dan taÎawwuf, anticipated
Fakhr al-DÊn al-RÉzi’s philosophical theology.
However, having explicated Ghazali’s
approaches or stages in understanding the nature of God, though in cursory
manner, we elaborate now the detailed concepts. In connection with the issue of
causality we shall confine our discussion into the concept of God’s unity and
attributes
[1]
Al-Ghazali, TahÉfut, ed.
& trans by Marmura, 3.
[2] Ibid., 18; Cf. Ibn Rusyd, TahÉfut al-TahÉfut, 7
[3] Simon Van Den Bergh states
“Ghazzali’s book is badly constructed, it is unsystematic and repetitive. If
Ghazzali had proceeded systematically he would have attacked first the
philosophical basis of the system of the philosophers –namely their proof for
the existence of God, since from God, the Highest Principle, everything else is
deduced. But the first problem Ghazzali mentions is the philosophers’ proof for
the eternity of the world” Van Den Bergh, Averroes’s TahÉfut al-TahÉfut,
see translator’s Introduction, xv.
[4] Al-Ghazali, TahÉfut, ed.
& trans by Marmura, 8.
[5] The Qur’an, Ali ‘ImrÉn (3):190.
See also al-Ghazali, al-×ikmah fÊ MakhlËqÉt AllÉh, in al-QuÎËr AwÉlÊ
min RassÉ’il al-Ghazali. vol. 3. ed. M. MusÏafÉ Abu al-‘AlÉ, (Cairo:
Maktabah al-Jundi, 1972): 11-52.
[6] Al-Ghazali, TahÉfut, ed.
& trans by Marmura, 41; also Al-Ghazali,
al-IqtiÎÉd, 69-70.
[7] Al-Ghazali, TahÉfut, ed. & trans by Marmura, 56-58
[8]
Al-Ghazali, al-Arba‘Ên fÊ UÎËl al-DÊn, ed.
al-Shaykh MuÎÏafÉ AbË al-‘AlÉ, (Egypt: Maktaba al-JundÊ, n.d.), 13.
[9] Al-Ghazali, al-Arba‘Ên, 13;
cf. Al-Ghazali, KitÉb QawÉ‘id al-‘AqÉ’id, ed. RiÌwÉn al-Sayyid, DÉr
Iqra’, BeirËt, 1986, 12.
