The
next prominent figure among Muslim peripatetic philosophers after al-Kindi is
al-FÉrÉbÊ (257/870-339/950). Since he was well known in mastering logic[1]
Ibn Khaldun (332/732-339/950) claimed that al-FÉrÉbÊ was dubbed the second
teacher (al-mu‘allim al-thÉnÊ), second to Aristotle himself.
Nevertheless, al-FÉrÉbÊ does not fully follow Aristotle’s philosophy; he even
saw the lack of theological aspect in Aristotle metaphysics.[2] He adopted the doctrine of emanation to fill
the lacuna that had been left by Aristotle due to his failure to complete his
account as part of his metaphysics. It
is from this theology or divine science that al-FÉrÉbÊ wants to set forth the
causal relation between divine and natural being.[3]
In the opening of his FÊ aghrÉd al-×akÊm fÊ KitÉb al-×urËf, therefore, al-FÉrÉbÊ
noted that while Aristotelian metaphysics is often described as “divine
science”, the text is in fact dedicated to the study of being and its principles
and properties, not to study of divine as separate substance. He even observes
that this point has confused many readers, expecting the entire text to be
about God, the soul and the intellect and finding that these topics are all but
missing save the book Lambda.[4]
In
order to resolve this metaphysical discrepancy, al-FÉrÉbÊ made some
modifications, the final outcome of which is a kind of philosophy that is entirely
theocentric. God is placed in the central point of his metaphysics. As a
result, theology becomes an important part of his metaphysics, which is at
variance with Aristotle’s. Thus, al-FÉrÉbÊ’s contribution is not only to fill
in the theological elements within metaphysics, but also to forge a link
between the theological science of metaphysics and physics that is not clearly
articulated by Aristotle himself.[5]
From
among theological elements, that al-FÉrÉbÊ brought into his metaphysics is his
approach to describe the nature of God. He introduces two ways: by exclusion,
by which we remove from God whatever implies defect, limitation, dependence,
immutability; and by pre-eminence, by which we attribute to God an infinite
degree of all perfection.[6]
The principle of exclusion, which seems to be like al-Kindi’s negative
theology, is elaborated further in his other works where he describes God as
simple, free from every kind of composition, physical or metaphysical.[7]
God is one, because He is free from all quantitative divisions, and indivisible
in substance is one in essence.[8]
From
the foregoing conception of God, we notice that his concept of God’s unity
seems to be the starting point to describe the God-world relation and to solve
the problem of the One and the many. However, the concept of unity here is
based on the principle of Greek philosophy. It is not surprising, therefore,
that from his concept of God unity he adopts the doctrine of emanation, in
which he clarifies the process of One into many and the generation of the
universe from God. He posits that the emanation proceeds from God’s
self-contemplation or thought. Here God as the First Being is depicted as
having two types of thoughts, a thought of the First Cause and a thought of its
own essence. By virtue of the former thought, the existence of a first
intellect called the First Cause proceeds necessarily (yalzam) and by
virtue of the latter, the existence of the first sphere proceeds necessarily.
From the first intellect, thinking of the First Being flows forth a second
intellect and sphere. From the second intellect proceed a third intellect and a
sphere. The process goes on in necessary succession down to the lowest sphere,
that of the moon, which is the ninth sphere. From the moon flows forth a pure
intellect, called active intellect.[9]
From the Tenth Intellect the prime matter flows
and from the same intellect the different forms flows,
which unite with the prime matter to produce bodies.[10]
So the number of intellects is ten consisting of the first intellect and the
nine intellects of the planets and sphere. The tenth intelligence manages the
affairs of the terrestrial world.
Since,
the last in order is the earth and the world of matter or the terrestrial
world, which is only a series of different kinds of forms united with matter or
separated from it, generation is the result of the unity of form and matter and
corruption is the result of their separation. In this way, physics is fused
with cosmology and the terrestrial world is subjected to the heavenly world.[11]
Here it is obvious that the doctrine of emanation adapted by al-FÉrÉbÊ is
purposely to explain the action of God on matter in which the intellects of the
spheres are placed between God and the world. The theory of separate intellects
as taught by al-FÉrÉbÊ is a mixture of Aristotelian theories on the motion of
heavenly spheres (Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, chapter 7-8) and of the
neo-platonic doctrine of emanation.
Moreover,
al-FÉrÉbÊ’s depiction of the mechanics of emanation consists of six principles
of Being. The first is God, the First Cause (al-Sabab al-Awwal);
the second are secondary causes (al-asbÉb al-thawÉnÊ), i.e. ten
intellects, together with the nine spheres; the third is the Active
Intellect, which is a bridge between heaven and earth; the fourth is the
soul; the fifth is form and the sixth is matter.[12]
The first three principles, i.e. God, ten intellects and the Active Intellect, are
spirit per se, while the last three, i.e. soul, form and matter are not
bodies but only united to them. It is only the first of these principles that
represents unity, while the others represent plurality in the material world.
In
addition, the link between metaphysics and physical reality or God-world
relation in term of causality is also to be found in al-FÉrÉbÊ’s cosmological
arguments to prove God’s existence. From these cosmological arguments, al-FÉrÉbÊ
came up with at least three pivotal descriptions of God: God is the immovable
mover or Unmoved Mover[13];
God is Uncaused Efficient Cause[14]
and God is the First Cause.[15]
Having
described God as the First Cause, al-FÉrÉbÊ attempts to connect the First
Cause, who is the utmost perfection, devoid of any imperfection and therefore
immaterial, with the world of material and full of imperfection. The step taken
to connect them is by appointing the lowest of the pure intellect, i.e., the Active
Intellect and the heavenly bodies, as causes of our world.[16] However, al-FÉrÉbÊ has different views on the
manner by which the Active Intellect causes the material world. In the ÓrÉ’ and
the SiyÉsah al-FÉrÉbÊ speaks only of the influence on man’s mind, whereas
in the RisÉlah fi al-‘Aql the Active Intellect is said to give only
forms to prime matter and specific matter.[17]
In this discrepancy, we prefer to refer to his idea in his original works, the ÓrÉ’
and the SiyÉsah, according to which the heavenly bodies give both
form and matter,[18]
and the Active Intellect influences upon man’s mind and action, rather than the
RisÉlah, which is apparently his interpretation of Aristotle’s De
Anima.
As
regards the origination of the prime matter, al-FÉrÉbÊ asserts that it is from
motion common to all the heavenly bodies, that is the circular motion of the
most perfect of them, i.e., the first heaven. The interaction between the
motions specific to each of the heavenly bodies with its own particular motion
and speed resulted in different forms and successions. Then he matched the
perpetual change in our world through the succession of different forms with
the motion of heavenly bodies, their conjunction, appearances, disappearances
and others.[19]
This metaphysical approach shows that account of the causation of heavenly
bodies is in a hylomorphic composition.
In
the second part of the SiyÉsah al-FÉrÉbÊ gives a detailed explanation
that the heavenly bodies is first cause of the lower world, including the
differences among nations, geographical locations, differences in flora, fauna,
and human diet.[20]
The exact manner of how the heavenly bodies influence the lower world, however,
is explained in his Nukat, and that is by means of their light.[21]
The model of physical causation of the heavenly bodies does not deal with the
activities, which depends on soul, since heavenly bodies are only related to
form and matter. The activities of the human soul are under the guidance of the
Active Intellect,[22]
on which the human intellect and imagination depend.
The mechanical causation of the
heavenly bodies and that of the Active Intellect are two different causes that
may contradict each other. Since the influence of the heavenly bodies is not
necessarily conducive to man’s true good, its conflict with the Active
Intellect would hinder the attainment of human happiness, which is the union
the Active Intellect and the human intellect.
The
above discussion illustrates al-FÉrÉbÊ’s system of causation of the heavenly
bodies and the Active Intellect. This system philosophically solves the problem
of One and many, but since his concept of God is a mixture of the Islamic and
Aristotelian God, the inference becomes untenable, especially on depicting the
power of God upon His creature. In the
FuÎËl mabÉdi’ ÓrÉ’ Ahl al-MadÊnat al-FÉÌilah he
describes God as the First Cause, who is the first cause of all beings as their
ultimate agent.[23]
In other words, he posits that God is the first principle or the efficient
cause of the world.
However,
in the SiyÉsah he
holds that the first cause of the lower world is the heavenly bodies and the
Active Intellect. The way the First Being causes all beings, however, is
restricted by such a concept of God, who cannot directly cause the material
world. God is only
the first cause of motion in the universe. The assumption that the plurality of
human souls is the result of the emanation of the tenth intellect implies that
God is not their direct efficient cause or their Creator. In order to avoid
saying that God is caused the falÉsifah placed God after the series of
causation. [24] This particular
concept of God is categorically rejected by the mutakallimËn, for it
implies the nature of God who has no power of producing multiplicity of matters
in the terrestrial world, and hence as the providence over all things, He has
no power.
In
addition, al-FÉrÉbÊ, following the principle of Greek philosophy, also conceded
that the universe is eternal. It is because, for him, in order to make the
world, God must have had materials to work upon; therefore, an eternal,
uncreated matter must have been the material cause of the universe.
When people say that God created the
world, they simply mean that God produced the world out of matter by clothing
it with a determinate form. The world is certainly God’s work, and though it
comes after Him as a world-form, yet it is equal to Him in time or eternal,
insofar as He could not begin to work on it in time. The reason for this is
that God is to the world exactly what cause is to its effect. Since the cause
in this case is inseparable from the effect, it follows that He could not start
making it in a given moment. For, if He could, that would simply imply
imperfection on His part while He had been trying to achieve His goal. This, of
course, is incompatible with the absolute perfection of God.[25]
The
foregoing quotation clearly shows that al-FÉrÉbÊ conceded the doctrine of the
eternity of the world. The doctrine of the eternity of the world and matter is
grounded on the principle of inseparability or the necessity of cause and
effect in the world of phenomena. In
short, al-FÉrÉbÊ was still unable to bring the Greek philosophical principle
into the worldview of Islam, whereby various Greek concepts can be applied
without any incongruity. Even though there were still many tasks that remained
to be done, yet he has successfully paved the way for Ibn SÊnÉ to take further
step of appropriating Greek philosophy.
[1] For the
elaboration of his contribution
to Aristotelian logic see Majid Fakhry, “Al-FÉrÉbÊ’s contribution to the Development of
Aristotelian Logic”, in Majid Fakhry, Philosophy, Dogma and The Impact of
Greek Thought in Islam, (Great Britain: Variorum, 1994), III, 1—15.
[2] The most eminent work of
Aristotle on metaphysics known by the Muslim is his collection of the 14
articles, called as KitÉb al-×urËf (The Book of Letters). MadhkËr and RahmÉn
suggested that Aristotle used nowhere the term ‘metaphysic’; the
term used by him was “The First
Philosophy” or Theologikè (theology). According to MadhkËr quoting Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, t, I,XXXII, the first who used the term ’metaphysics’ was Nicolas al-DimashqÊ
who took from Andronicus. See Ibn SÊnÉ, al-ShifÉ’: IlÉhiyyÉt edited
by. IbrÉhÊm MadhkËr, see editor’s introduction,11; See also M.A.Rahman Marhaban, Min al-Falsafah al-YËnÉniyyah ilÉ al-Falsafah
al-IslÉmiyyah, (Beirut: ManshËrÉt ‘Uwaydah, 1975): 178.
[3] Druart, Th.-A.
“Al-FÉrÉbÊ’s Emanationism”
in John F. Wippel (ed.) Studies in Medieval Philosophy, (Washington DC
[4] See Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna
and the Aristotelian Tradition, (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1988), 238-42.
[5] Nasr, S.H. and O.Leaman, (ed.) History, vol.I, 189.
[6] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, “The Knowledge of God”, as quoted by
Robert Hammond in The
Philosophy of al-FÉrÉbÊand Its Influence On Medieval Thought,
(New York: The Hobson Book Press,
1947), 23.
[7] Physical
composition can be substantial or accidental. It is substantial if the
composite substance consists of body and soul, of matter and form. Now, an
infinite being cannot be a substantial composite of matter and form, because
this would mean that God results from the union of finite parts which would
exist before Him in time, and therefore be the cause of His being. Nor can an
accidental composition be attributed to the infinite, because this would imply
a capacity, which the very notion of the infinite excludes. By metaphysical
composition he means composition which results from the union of two different
concepts. If a metaphysical composite of
essence and existence can be applied to the contingent being or be conceived and
abstracted from actual existence, such a kind of composition is not applicable
to self-existence being or infinite being in whom essence and existence is one.
Therefore, there is no composition of essence and existence in God. See al-Farabi,
“al-SiyÉsah
al-Madaniyyah”, in RasÉ’il al-Farabi, (Heyderabad, Deccan :
Majlis DÉ’irat al-Ma’Érif
al-UthmÉniyyah, 1346): no. 6,
115-125.
[8] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, Al-SiyÉsah
al-Madaniyyah, 7-8; cf. Al-FÉrÉbÊ, al-MadÊnat al-FÉÌilah, ed. and trans.
R.Walzers, al-Farabi on the Perfect State, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1985, 5-10.
[9] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, al-MadÊnat al-FÉÌilah, ed. and trans. R.Walzers,
100-105.
[10] There are six kinds of bodies for
al-Farabi: the celestial, the rational animal, the irrational animal, the
vegetal, the mineral and the four elements (air, water, fire and earth), see
al-Farabi, “al-SiyÉsah al-Madaniyyah”, in RasÉ’il, no. 6, 67-75.
[11] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, al-MadÊnat, trans. Walzers, ch. XVII and XVIII.
[12] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, “al-SiyÉsah
al-Madaniyyah”, in RasÉ’il al-Farabi, Majlis DÉ’irat al-Ma’Érif al-UthmÉniyyah, Heyderabad, Deccan ,
1346, no.6. 1.
[13] Ibid, no.13, 70-71
[14] Ibid, RasÉ’il, 115-125.
[15] Ibid, RasÉ’il, no.3, 66.
[16] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, al-MadÊnat, trans Walzes, ch. XVII and XVIII, 27-30
[17] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, RisÉlah fÊ al-‘Aql, ed.
by M.Bouyges, (Beirut
[18] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, al-MadÊnat, trans. Walzers, ch. XVII, 27-28, Al-FÉrÉbÊ, SiyÉsah,
55-56.
[19] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, al-MadÊnat, ch. XVI and XVII, 26-28.
[20] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, SiyÉsah,
70-71
[21] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, Nukat FÊ mÉ lÉ
yaÎsiÍÍu min AhkÉm al-NujËm, ed. F.Dieterici, in al-Farabi’s Philosophische
Abhandlungen, Leiden
[22] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, al-MadÊnat, ch.
XX-XXI, 34-37.
[23] Al-FÉrÉbÊ, FuÎËl al-MadanÊ, ed.
by Muhsin Mahdi,
Journal of Near Eastern Studies,
(Chicago) XXIII (1964), 140-143.
[24] Positing that God is the efficient
cause of the world al-Farabi argues that the world is composed of beings which
have a cause and this cause is the cause of another. This series of efficient
causes cannot proceed to infinity. For if A were he the cause of B, B of C, C
of D, and so on here A would be the cause of itself, which is impossible.
Therefore, outside the series of efficient causes, there must be an uncaused
efficient cause, and this is God. See al-FÉrÉbÊ, The Source of Questions, as
quoted by Rev.Robert Hammond, in The Philosophy of al-Farabi, 20.
[25] Ibid, 32.
