Before
we deal with the theory of accident in kalÉm, it is worth noting that
there were attempts from some mutakallimËn to trace the origin of the
term ‘araÌ. Al-Ash‘arÊ reported that AbË al-Hudhail and al-NaÐÐÉm argued
that ‘araÌ or accident is so called because it goes with (ta‘tariÌ)
bodies and subsists in them. al-BÉqillÉnÊ holds that a‘rÉÌ are so called
only because they do not possess endurance. Like other Ash‘arites al-BÉqillÉnÊ also
argued by referring to the Qur’anic verse, qÉlË hÉdhÉ ‘ÉriÌun mumÏirunÉ (Qur’an,
al-NaÍl 24). The cloud is called ‘ÉriÌ because it does not
endure. Also the verse turÊdËna ‘araÌa al-dunyÉ (Qur’an al-AnfÉl 67),
(you look for the temporal goods of this world), is interpreted as things
that passes away and disappears. Therefore, the material goods or wealth (al-mÉl)
are called ‘araÌ. This is another proof that just as the theory of atom
is taken from the Qur’an, the theory of accident was derived from the very
source.
After
all, this etymological discussion suggests that ‘araÌ is a technical term that had been established
in kalÉm tradition long before and it was influenced by the usage of the
term in the Qur’an.[1]
This offers further evidence that the Qur’an is quite instrumental in
understanding the world and in forming the worldview of Islam.
With
regard to the theories of accident in kalÉm we shall discuss some
pivotal principles which are quite central and widely accepted throughout
atomistic kalÉm.[2]
But, again, it will be limited to the theories that are directly related to the
problem of causality we are under current discussion. The three principles of
accidents are as follows: The first theory is that accidents (a‘rÉÌ)
are qualities superadded necessarily to atoms. In consequence, there is no body,
which has not one or more of them. These accidents are always in opposed
couples, such as life-death, motion-rest, knowledge-ignorance, but an atom must
have either one of the couple. If there is no accident of life subsists in an
atom, there necessarily subsists the accident of death, for the recipient
cannot receive two contradictory accidents at one moment. If the accident of life subsists, there exist
inevitably the corresponding accidents such as knowledge or ignorance, power or
powerlessness and the like.[3]
This point, as we shall see, is employed by al-Ghazali in supporting his
concept of causality. The second theory is that an accident may not bear
(yaÍtamil) another accident. The argument for this is as follows. An accident
already has an atom as its substratum, and that substratum in which an accident
may attach itself has to be stable and has to endure for a certain time. Since
an accident cannot last for two units of time it cannot serve as a substratum
of something other than itself.[4]
The
next theory is that a‘rÉÌ are ephemeral. All modes of being such
as creation (khalq), endurance (baqÉ’), extinction (fanÉ’)
are a‘rÉÌ, and a‘rÉÌ cannot endure in two units of time. The
argument is as follows: If accidents are regarded as continuously existing, their
existence must be either in and of themselves or by means of“endurance” (baqÉ’)
that inheres within them. But, accidents cannot exist in and of themselves, for
if it is so it would imply that they were already continuing to exist the
moment they come about and this is self contradictory. Accidents may not also
continue to exist by means of an “endurance” (baqÉ’) that comes about (Íadatha)
within them, for that would violate the rule that a‘rÉÌ may not bear
other a‘rÉÌ. Hence a‘rÉÌ do not endure but only have a momentary
existence.[5]
The
above theories of accident is in consonant with the theory of atom (jawhar)
posited by al-ØÉlihÊ and al-JubbÉ’Ê, that jawhar contains (iÍtamala)
accidents. Furthermore, the theories suggest that certain accidents can go with
one another but cannot be with their opposite; that accidents cannot exist in
another accident, for something unstable cannot be the place of something that
has no endurance. However, the theory does no rebuff that atom can possess more
than one accident. The most fundamental one is that accidents are temporal in
bodies.
Based on the temporality of
accident the Ash’arite construed that atoms are temporal.[6]
The temporality of atoms, according to their view, is accepted when the
proof of the temporality of accidents is established, since accidents are
qualities, which subsist in atoms. These accidents, according to the Ash‘arites
are the accident of motion, rest, taste, smell, heat, cold, moisture, dryness
and all other accidents. When the accidents occur in two different states they
require duration for each state and hence all accidents must exist in the atom
temporarily.[7]
Apparently,
the theories of atom and accident are the proper theories to prove the
temporality of the world. Since if it is established that the atom and the
accidents are temporal, then it follows that the world, which is composed of
atoms and accidents is also temporal. Moreover, since accidents are attributes
that bodies acquire or of which they are deprived and that accidents replace
each other, the state of a body (ÍÉl) changes.
Thus,
the temporality of the world presupposes the temporality of atoms and
accidents, on the ground of which the cause of the world’s transformation is
conceivable. It is from this theory that the mutakallimËn vindicate the
concept of omnipotent God Who Has pervasive power upon His creature, especially
in creating and destroying thing.
[1] Shlomo Pines, Studies in
Islamic Atomism, trans.
Michael Schwarz, ed. by. Tzvi Langermann. (Jerusalem
[2] For this purpose the report of Al-Ash‘arÊ’s
MaqÉlÉt and Moses Maimonides, The Guide, will be referred to.
[3] Moses Maimonides, The Guide,
200.
[4] Ibid., 205; al-Ash‘arÊ, MaqÉlÉt,
II, 44; Ibn ×azm, KitÉb al-FiÎal, vol.5, 106.
[5] The argument for the ephemerality
of a‘rÉÌ is ascribed to al-ShaÏawÊ, AbË al-QÉsim al-BalkhÊ ‘Abd AllÉh
al-IÎbahÉnÊ,
see al-Ash‘arÊ, MaqÉlÉt, II, 44.
[6] AbË ManÎËr al-BaghdÉdÊ, UÎËl
al-DÊn, (Beirut: DÉr al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1980), 3rd edition,, 33.
[7] Ibid., 56.
