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| what is tolerance? |
by: Khaled Abou
El Fadl
The
terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon have focused public
attention on the state of Muslim theology. For most Americans, the utter
indifference to the value of human life and the unmitigated hostility to the
United States shown by some Muslims came as a great shock. Others were
confirmed in their belief that we face a
great struggle between civilizations. Islamic values, they say, are fundamentally
at odds with Western liberal values. The terrorist attacks are symptomatic of a
clash between Judeo-Christian civilization, with its values of individual
freedom, pluralism, and secularism, and an amoral, un-Westernized, so-called
"authentic Islam." Indeed, Islamic civilization is associated with
the ideas of collective rights, individual duties, legalism, despotism, and
intolerance that we associated with our former civilizational rival, the Soviet
bloc. We seem to project onto the other everything we like to think that we are
not.
This
intellectual trap is easy to fall into when we deal with the theology of Osama
Bin Laden, the Taliban, the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, and the Jihad
organizations. The theologically-based attitudes of these Muslim puritans are
fundamentally at odds not only with a Western way of life, but also with the
very idea of an international society or the notion of universal human values.
They display an intolerant exclusiveness, and a belligerent sense of supremacy
vis-à-vis the other. According to their theologies, Islam is the only way of
life, and must be pursued regardless of its impact on the rights and well-being
of others. The straight path (al-sirat al-mustaqim) is fixed, they say,
by a system of Divine laws (shari-ah) that trump any moral
considerations or ethical values that are not fully codified in the law. God is
manifested through a set of determinate legal commands that specify the right
way to act in virtually all circumstances. The sole purpose of human life on earth
is to realize the Divine manifestation by dutifully and faithfully implementing
God's law. Morality itself begins and ends in the mechanics and technicalities
of Islamic law (though different schools of Islamic law understand the content
of those laws differently).
A
life devoted to compliance with this legal code is considered inherently
superior to all others, and the followers of any other way are considered
either infidels (kuffar), hypocrites (munafiqun), or iniquitous (fasiqun).
Anchored in the security and assuredness of a determinable law, it becomes
fairly easy to differentiate between the rightly-guided and the misguided. The
rightly-guided obey the law; the misguided either deny, attempt to dilute, or
argue about the law. Naturally, the rightly-guided are superior because they
have God on their side. The Muslim puritans imagine that God's perfection and
immutability are fully attainable on earth—as if God's perfection had been
deposited in the Divine law, and, by giving effect to this law, we could create
a social order that mirrors Divine Truth. By attaching themselves to the
Supreme Being, puritan groups are able to claim a self-righteous perfectionism
that easily slips into a pretense of supremacy.
Extremism in Islamic history
Perhaps
all firmly held systems of belief, especially those founded on religious
conviction, are in some way supremacist: believers are understood to have some
special virtue that distinguishes them from adherents of other faiths. But the
supremacist creed of the puritan groups is distinctive and uniquely dangerous.
The supremacist thinking of Muslim puritans has a powerful nationalist
component, which is strongly oriented towards cultural and political dominance.
These groups are not satisfied with living according to their own dictates, but
are actively dissatisfied with all alternative ways of life. They do not merely
seek self-empowerment, but aggressively seek to disempower, dominate, or
destroy others. The crux of the matter is that all lives lived outside the law
are considered an offense against God that must be actively resisted and
fought.
The
existence of Muslim puritanism is hardly surprising. Most religious systems
have suffered at one time or another from absolutist extremism, and Islam is no
exception. Within the first century of Islam, religious extremists known as the
Khawarij (literally, the secessionists) slaughtered a large number of Muslims
and non-Muslims, and were even responsible for the assassination of the
Prophet's cousin and companion, the Caliph Ali b. Abi Talib. The descendants of
the Khawarij exist today in Oman and Algeria, but after centuries of bloodshed,
they became moderates if not pacifists. Similarly, the Qaramites and Assassins,
for whom terror became a raison d'etre, earned unmitigated infamy in the
writings of Muslim historians, theologians, and jurists. Again, after centuries
of bloodshed, these two groups learned moderation, and they continue to exist
in small numbers in North Africa and Iraq. The essential lesson taught by
Islamic history is that extremist groups are ejected from the mainstream of
Islam; they are marginalized, and eventually treated as heretical aberrations
to the Islamic message.
But
Islam is now living through a major shift, unlike any it has experienced in the
past. The Islamic civilization has crumbled, and the traditional institutions
that once sustained and propagated Islamic orthodoxy—and marginalized Islamic
extremism—have been dismantled. Traditionally, Islamic epistemology tolerated
and even celebrated divergent opinions and schools of thought. The guardians of
the Islamic tradition were the jurists (fuqaha), whose legitimacy rested
largely on their semi-independence from a decentralized political system, and
their dual function of representing the interests of the state to the laity and
the interests of the laity to the state.
But
in Muslim countries today, the state has grown extremely powerful and
meddlesome, and is centralized in ways that were inconceivable two centuries
ago. In the vast majority of Muslim countries, the state now controls the
private religious endowments (awqaf ) that once sustained the juristic
class. Moreover, the state has co-opted the clergy, and transformed them into
its salaried employees. This transformation has reduced the clergy's
legitimacy, and produced a profound vacuum in religious authority. Hence, there
is a state of virtual anarchy in modern Islam: it is not clear who speaks with
authority on religious issues. Such a state of virtual religious anarchy is
perhaps not problematic in secular societies where religion is essentially
reduced to a private matter. But where religion remains central to the dynamics
of public legitimacy and cultural meaning, the question of who represents the
voice of God is of central significance.
Puritanism and Modern Islam
It
would be wrong to say that fanatic supremacist groups such as the al-Qa'ida or
al-Jihad organizations now fill the vacuum of authority in contemporary Islam.
Though they are obviously able to commit highly visible acts of violence that
command the public stage, fanatic groups remain sociologically and
intellectually marginal in Islam. Still, they are extreme manifestations of
more prevalent intellectual and theological currents in modern Islam.
Fanatic
groups derive their theological premises from the intolerant puritanism of the
Wahhabi and Salafi creeds. Wahhabism was founded by the eighteenth-century
evangelist Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in the Arabian Peninsula. 'Abd al-Wahhab
sought to rid Islam of the corruptions that he believed had crept into the
religion. He advocated a strict literalism in which the text became the sole
source of legitimate authority, and displayed an extreme hostility to
intellectualism, mysticism, and any sectarian divisions within Islam. According
to the Wahhabi creed, it was imperative to return to a presumed pristine,
simple, straightforward Islam, which could be entirely reclaimed by literal
implementation of the commands of the Prophet, and by strict adherence to
correct ritual practice. Importantly, Wahhabism rejected any attempt to
interpret the divine law historically or contextually, with attendant
possibilities of reinterpretation under changed circumstances. It treated the
vast majority of Islamic history as a corruption of the true and authentic
Islam. Furthermore, Wahhabism narrowly defined orthodoxy, and was extremely
intolerant of any creed that contradicted its own.
In
the late eighteenth century, the Al Sa'ud family united with the Wahhabi
movement and rebelled against Ottoman rule in Arabia. The rebellions were very
bloody because the Wahhabis indiscriminately slaughtered and terrorized Muslims
and non-Muslims alike. Interestingly, mainstream jurists writing at the time,
such as the Hanafi Ibn 'Abidin and the Maliki al-Sawi, branded the Wahhabis the
modern day Khawarij of Islam, and condemned their fanaticism and intolerance.1 In 1818,
Egyptian forces under the leadership of Muhammad Ali defeated this rebellion,
and Wahhabism seemed destined to become another fringe historical experience
with no lasting impact on Islamic theology. But the Wahhabi creed was
resuscitated in the early twentieth century under the leadership of 'Abd
al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, who allied himself with Wahhabi militant rebels known as
the Ikhwan, in the beginnings of what would become Saudi Arabia. Even with the
formation of the Saudi state, Wahhabism remained a creed of limited influence
until the mid-1970s when the sharp rise in oil prices, together with aggressive
Saudi proselytizing, dramatically contributed to its wide dissemination in the
Muslim world.
Wahhabism
did not propagate itself as one school of thought or a particular orientation
within Islam. Rather, it asserted itself as the orthodox "straight
path" of Islam. By claiming literal fidelity to the Islamic text, it was
able to make a credible claim to authenticity at a time when Islamic identity
was contested. Moreover, the proponents of Wahhabism refused to be labeled or
categorized as the followers of any particular figure including 'Abd al-Wahhab
himself. Its proponents insisted that they were simply abiding by the dictates
of al-salaf al-salih (the rightly-guided predecessors, namely the
Prophet and his companions), and in doing so, Wahhabis were able to appropriate
the symbolisms and categories of Salafism.
Ironically,
Salafism was founded in the early twentieth century by al-Afghani, Muhammad
Abduh, and Rashid Rida as a liberal theological orientation. To respond to the
demands of modernity, they argued, Muslims needed to return to the original
sources of the Qur'an and Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet), and engage in de
novo interpretations of the text. By the 1970s, however, Wahhabism had
succeeded in transforming Salafism from a liberal modernist orientation to a
literalist, puritan, and conservative theology. The sharp rise in oil prices in
1975 enabled Saudi Arabia, the main proponent of Wahhabism, to disseminate the
Wahhabi creed under a Salafi guise, which purported to revert back to the
authentic fundamentals of religion uncorrupted by the accretions of historical
practice. In reality, however, Saudi Arabia projected its own fairly
conservative cultural practices onto the textual sources of Islam and went on
to proselytize these projections as the embodiment of Islamic orthodoxy.
Despite
its intolerance and rigidity, however, Wahhabism itself does not bear primary
responsibility for the existence of terrorist groups in Islam today. To be
sure, Wahhabism and its militant offshoots share both attitudinal and
ideological orientations. Both insist on a normative particularism that is
fundamentally text-centered; both reject the notion of universal human values;
and both deal with the other, however defined, in a functionalist and even opportunistic
fashion. But Wahhabism is distinctively inward-looking—although focused on
power, it primarily asserts power over other Muslims. This is consistent with
its obsession with orthodoxy and correct ritualistic practice. Militant puritan
groups, however, are both introverted and extroverted—they attempt to assert
power against both Muslims and non-Muslims. As populist movements, they are a
reaction to the disempowerment most Muslims have suffered in the modern age at
the hands of harshly despotic governments, and at the hands of interventionist
foreign powers. These groups compensate for extreme feelings of disempowerment
by extreme and vulgar claims to power. Fueled by supremacist and puritan
theological creeds, their symbolic acts of power become uncompromisingly
fanatic and violent.
The Theology of Intolerance
Islamic
puritans, whether of the Wahhabi or more militant varieties, offer a set of
textual references in support of their exclusionary and intolerant theological
orientation. For instance, they frequently cite the Qur'anic verse that states:
"O' you who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as allies. They
are allies of each other, and he amongst you who becomes their ally is one of
them. Verily, God does not guide the unjust."2 Wahhabi and
militant puritanism read this and similar Qur'anic verses literally and
ahistorically, and therefore reach highly exclusionary conclusions. For
example, while Muslims may elicit the support or aid of non-Muslims over
particular issues when the self-interests of Muslims so require, they may not
befriend or share the normative values of non-Muslims. This orientation often
demands the performance of symbolic acts, which aim to distinguish Muslims from
non-Muslims—for instance, dressing in a particular way or marking non-Muslims
with distinctive symbols.
Islamic
puritanism also often invokes the Qur'anic verse asserting that,
"whomsoever follows a religion other than Islam this will not be accepted
from him, and in the Hereafter he will be among the losers."3 This verse is
invoked in arguing that the theology and rituals of Islam are the exclusive
path to salvation. Moreover, a mere testament of faith or a general act of
submission to God is insufficient to attain salvation in the Hereafter; rather,
a person must comply with the particulars of the Divine law in order to qualify
as a "true" believer. The puritan trend is thus uncompromising in its
rejection of all forms of belief and ritual that do not qualify as the
"true" religion of God.
As
to the principles that should guide the interaction between Muslims and
non-Muslims, the puritan trend cites the Qur'anic verse commanding Muslims to
fight the unbelievers, "until there is no more tumult or oppression, and
until faith and all judgment belongs to God."4 Moreover,
justifying an essentially supremacist view towards non-Muslims, proponents of
puritanism often quote the following Qur'anic injunction: "Fight those
among the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) who do not believe in God or
the Hereafter, who do not forbid what God and His Prophet have forbidden, and
who do not acknowledge the religion of truth—fight them until they pay the poll
tax (jizyah) with willing submission and feel themselves subdued."5
Relying
on such textual evidence, Muslim puritans assert that Muslims are the
inheritors of an objectively ascertainable and realizable Divine Truth; while
Jews and Christians may be tolerated, they cannot be befriended. Ultimately,
however, they must be subdued and forced to acknowledge Muslim supremacy by
paying a poll tax. The puritan doctrine is not necessarily or entirely
dismissive of the rights of non-Muslims, and it does not necessarily lead to
the persecution of Jews and Christians. But it does assert a hierarchy of
importance, and the commitment to toleration is correspondingly fragile and
contingent. So it is conducive to an arrogance that can easily descend into a
lack of respect or concern for the well-being or dignity of non-Muslims. When
this arrogant orientation is coupled with textual sources that exhort Muslims
to fight against unbelievers (kuffar), it can produce a radical
belligerency.
The Place of Tolerance in Islam
The
puritans construct their exclusionary and intolerant theology by reading
Qur'anic verses in isolation, as if the meaning of the verses were
transparent—as if moral ideas and historical context were irrelevant to their
interpretation. In fact, however, it is impossible to analyze these and other
verses except in light of the overall moral thrust of the Qur'anic message.
The
Qur'an itself refers to general moral imperatives such as mercy, justice,
kindness, or goodness. The Qur'an does not clearly define any of these
categories, but presumes a certain amount of moral probity on part of the
reader. For instance, the Qur'an persistently commands Muslims to enjoin the
good. The word used for "the good" is ma'ruf, which means that
which is commonly known to be good. Goodness, in the Qur'anic discourse, is
part of what one may call a lived reality—it is the product of human experience
and constructed normative understandings. Similarly, the Qur'anic term for
kindness is ihsan, which literally means to beautify and improve upon.
But beautification or improving upon can have meaning only in the context of a
certain sociological understanding and practice.
In
a further example, as to justice, the Qur'an states: "O you who believe,
stand firmly for justice, as witnesses for God, even if it means testifying
against yourselves, or your parents, or you kin, and whether it is against the
rich or poor, for God prevails upon all. Follow not the lusts of your hearts,
lest you swerve, and if you distort justice or decline to do justice, verily
God knows what you do."6 The idea that
Muslims must stand up for justice even against their own self-interests is
predicated on the notion that human beings are capable of achieving a high
level of moral agency. As agents, Muslims are expected to achieve a level of
moral conscientiousness, which they will bring to their relationship with God.
In regards to every ethical obligation, the Qur'anic text assumes that readers
will bring a pre-existing, innate moral sense to the text. Hence, the text will
morally enrich the reader, but only if the reader will morally enrich the text.
The meaning of the religious text is not fixed simply by the literal meaning of
its words, but depends, too, on the moral construction given to it by the
reader. So if the reader approaches the text without moral commitments, it will
almost inevitably yield nothing but discrete, legalistic, technical insights.
Similarly,
it is imperative to analyze the historical circumstances in which specific
Qur'anic ethical norms were negotiated. Many of the institutions referenced in
the Qur'an—such as the poll tax or the formation of alliances with
non-Muslims—can be understood only if the reader is aware of the historical
practices surrounding the revelation of the text. By emptying the Qur'an both
of its historical and moral context, the puritan trend ends up transforming the
text into a long list of morally non-committal legal commands.
The
Qur'anic discourse, for instance, can readily support an ethic of diversity and
tolerance. The Qur'an not only expects, but even accepts the reality of
difference and diversity within human society: "O humankind, God has
created you from male and female and made you into diverse nations and tribes
so that you may come to know each other. Verily, the most honored of you in the
sight of God is he who is the most righteous."7 Elsewhere, the
Qur'an asserts that diversity is part of the Divine intent and purpose in
creation: "If thy Lord had willed, He would have made humankind into a
single nation, but they will not cease to be diverse… And, for this God created
them [humankind]."8 The classical
commentators on the Qur'an did not fully explore the implications of this
sanctioning of diversity, or the role of peaceful conflict resolution in
perpetuating the type of social interaction that would result in people
"knowing each other." Nor does the Qur'an provide specific rules or
instructions about how "diverse nations and tribes" are to acquire
such knowledge. In fact, the existence of diversity as a primary purpose of
creation, as suggested by the verse above, remained underdeveloped in Islamic
theology. Pre-modern Muslim scholars did not have a strong incentive to explore
the meaning and implications of the Qur'anic endorsement of diversity and
cross-cultural intercourse. This is partly because of the political dominance
and superiority of the Islamic Civilization, which left Muslim scholars with a
sense of self-sufficient confidence. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the
Islamic civilization was pluralistic and unusually tolerant of various social
and religious denominations. Working out the implications of a commitment to
human diversity and mutual knowledge under contemporary conditions requires
moral reflection and attention to historical circumstance: precisely what is
missing from puritan theology and doctrine.
Other
than a general endorsement of human diversity, the Qur'an also accepted the
more specific notion of a plurality of religious beliefs and laws. Although the
Qur'an clearly claims that Islam is the Divine Truth, and demands belief in
Muhammad as the final messenger in a long line of Abrahamic prophets, it does
not completely exclude the possibility that there might be other paths to
salvation. The Qur'an insists on God's unfettered discretion to accept in His
mercy whomever He wishes. In a rather remarkable set of passages that, again,
have not been adequately theorized by Muslim theologians, the Qur'an recognizes
the legitimate multiplicity of religious convictions and laws. In one such
passage, for example, the Qur'an asserts: "To each of you God has
prescribed a Law and a Way. If God would have willed, He would have made you a
single people. But God's purpose is to test you in what he has given each of
you, so strive in the pursuit of virtue, and know that you will all return to
God [in the Hereafter], and He will resolve all the matters in which you
disagree."9
On this and other occasions the Qur'an goes on to state that it is possible for
non-Muslims to attain the blessing of salvation: "Those who believe, those
who follow Jewish scriptures, the Christians, the Sabians, and any who believe
in God and the Final Day, and do good, all shall have their reward with their
Lord and they will not come to fear or grief."10
Significantly, this passage occurs in the same chapter that instructs Muslims
not to take the Jews and Christians as allies. How can these different verses
be reconciled?
If
we read the text with moral and historical guidance, we can see the different
passages as part of a complex and layered discourse about reciprocity and its
implications in the historical situation in Mohammed's Medina. In part, the
chapter exhorts Muslims to support the newly established Muslim community in
Medina. But its point is not to issue a blanket condemnation against Jews and Christians
(who "shall have their reward with their Lord"). Instead, it accepts
the distinctiveness of the Jewish and Christian communities and their laws,
while also insisting that Muslims are entitled to the same treatment as those
other communities. Thus it sets out an expectation of reciprocity for Muslims:
while calling upon Muslims to support the Prophet of Islam against his Jewish
and Christian detractors, it also recognizes the moral worth and rights of the
non-Muslim "other."
The
challenge most often invoked against an argument for tolerance in Islam is the
issue of jihad. Jihad, especially as portrayed in the Western media, is often
associated with the idea of a holy war that is propagated in the name of God
against the unbelievers. Therefore, jihad is often equated with the most vulgar
images of religious intolerance.
At
the most rudimentary level, the Qur'an itself is explicit in prohibiting any
form of coerced conversions to Islam. It contends that truth and falsity are
clear and distinct, and so whomever wishes to believe may do so, but no duress
is permitted in religion: "There is no compulsion in matter of
faith."11
Of course, this response is incomplete—even if forced conversions to Islam are
prohibited, aggressive warfare to spread Islamic power over non-believers might
still be allowed. Does the Qur'an condone such expansionist wars?
Interestingly,
Islamic tradition does not have a notion of holy war. "Jihad" simply
means to strive hard or struggle in pursuit of a just cause, and according to
the Prophet of Islam, the highest form of jihad is the struggle waged to
cleanse oneself from the vices of the heart. Holy war (in Arabic al-harb
al-muqaddasah) is not an expression used by the Qur'anic text or Muslim
theologians. In Islamic theology, war is never holy; it is either
justified or not, and if it is justified, those killed in battle are considered
martyrs. The Qur'anic text does not recognize the idea of unlimited warfare,
and does not consider the simple fact of the belligerent's Muslim identity to
be sufficient to establish the justness of his cause. In other words, the
Qur'an entertains the possibility that the Muslim combatant might be the unjust
party in a conflict.
Moreover,
while the Qur'an emphasizes that Muslims may fight those who fight them, it
also insists that Muslims may not transgress.12 Transgression
is an ambiguous term, but on several occasions the Qur'an intimates that in
order not to transgress, Muslims must be constrained by a requirement of
proportionality, even when the cause is just. For instance, it states,
"Mandated is the law of equality, so that who transgresses against you,
respond in kind, and fear God, and know that God is with those who exercise
restraint."13
Despite
the prohibition against transgression and the condemnation of unlimited
warfare, many classical jurists adopted an imperialist orientation, which
divided the world into the abode of Islam and the abode of war, and supported
expansionist wars against unbelievers. But this view was not unanimous.
Classical Muslim jurists debated whether unbelief is a sufficient justification
for warfare, with a sizeable number of classical jurists arguing that
non-Muslims may not be fought unless they pose a physical threat to Muslims. If
non-Muslims seek peace, Muslims should make an effort to achieve such a peace.
This discourse was partly inspired by the Qur'anic injunctions concerning
peace. The Qur'an asserts that God does not prohibit Muslims from making peace
with those who do not fight Muslims, but God does prohibit Muslims from making
peace with those who have expelled Muslims from their homes and continue to
persecute them.14
Elsewhere, the Qur'an pronounces a stronger mandate in favor of peace in
stating: "If your enemy inclines towards peace, then you should seek peace
and trust in God."15 Moreover, the
Qur'an instructs Muslims not to haughtily turn away unbelievers who seek to
make peace with Muslims, and reminds Muslims that, "If God would have
willed, He would have given the unbelievers power over you [Muslims], and they
would have fought you [Muslims]. Therefore, if they [the unbelievers] withdraw
from you and refuse to fight you, and instead send you guarantees of peace,
know that God has not given you a license [to fight them]."16 These
discussions of peace would not make sense if Muslims were in a permanent state
of war with non-believers, and if non-believers were a permanent enemy and
always a legitimate target.
The
other major issue on the point of tolerance in Islam is that of the poll tax (jizyah)
imposed on the People of Book (Christians and Jews) who live in Muslim
territory. When the Qur'an was revealed, it was common inside and outside of
Arabia to levy poll taxes against alien groups. Building upon the historical
practice, classical Muslim jurists argued that the poll tax is money collected
by the Islamic polity from non-Muslims in return for the protection of the
Muslim state. If the Muslim state was incapable of extending such protection to
non-Muslims, it was not supposed to levy a poll tax. In fact, 'Umar (r.
13-23/634-644), the second Rightly-Guided Caliph and close companion of the
Prophet, returned the poll tax to an Arab Christian tribe that he was incapable
of protecting from Byzantine aggression.
Aside
from the juristic theory justifying the poll tax, the Qur'an does not, however,
pronounce an absolute and unwavering rule in favor of such an institution. Once
more, attention to historical circumstance is essential. The Qur'an endorsed a
poll tax as a response to particular groups in Arabia who were persistently
hostile to the early Muslims. Importantly, the Prophet did not collect a poll
tax from every non-Muslim tribe that submitted to Muslim sovereignty, and in
fact, in the case of a large number of non-Muslim but non-hostile tribes, he
paid them a periodic sum of money or goods. These tribes were known as
"those whose hearts have been reconciled." Furthermore, 'Umar entered
into a peace settlement with Arab Christian tribes pursuant to which these
tribes were obligated to pay the Islamic annual tax known as the zakah
(almsgiving), and not the poll tax. Reportedly, although they refused to
convert to Islam, the Christian tribes contended that paying the jizyah
(poll tax) was degrading, and instead, asked to pay the zakah, and 'Umar
accommodated their request.17
In
short, there are various indicators that the poll tax is not a theologically
mandated practice, but a functional solution that was adopted in response to a
specific set of historical circumstances. Only an entirely ahistorical reading
of the text could conclude that it is an essential element in a
Divinely-sanctioned program of subordinating the non-believer.
Final Thoughts
Ultimately,
the Qur'an, or any text, speaks through its reader. This ability of human
beings to interpret texts is both a blessing and a burden. It is a blessing
because it provides us with the flexibility to adapt texts to changing
circumstances. It is a burden because the reader must take responsibility for
the normative values he or she brings to the text. Any text, including those
that are Islamic, provides possibilities for meaning, not inevitabilities. And
those possibilities are exploited, developed and ultimately determined by the
reader's efforts—good faith efforts, we hope—at making sense of the text's
complexities. Consequently, the meaning of the text is often only as moral as
its reader. If the reader is intolerant, hateful, or oppressive, so will be the
interpretation of the text.
It
would be disingenuous to deny that the Qur'an and other Islamic sources offer
possibilities of intolerant interpretation. Clearly these possibilities are
exploited by the contemporary puritans and supremacists. But the text does not
command such intolerant readings. Historically, Islamic civilization has
displayed a remarkable ability to recognize possibilities of tolerance, and to
act upon these possibilities. Islamic civilization produced a moral and
humanistic tradition that preserved Greek philosophy, and generated much
science, art, and socially benevolent thought. Unfortunately, however, the
modern puritans are dissipating and wasting this inspiring moral tradition.
They are increasingly shutting off the possibilities for a tolerant
interpretation of the Islamic tradition.
If
we assess the moral trajectory of a civilization in light of its past record,
then we have ample reason to be optimistic about the future. But the burden and
blessing of sustaining that moral trajectory—of accentuating the Qur'anic
message of tolerance and openness to the other—falls squarely on the shoulders
of contemporary Muslim interpreters of the tradition.
Click
here to return to the exchange, Islam and Tolerance with
Abou El Fadl and respondents.
Khaled Abou El Fadl is the Omar and Azmeralda Alfi
Distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law at UCLA and author of Rebellion and
Violence in Islamic Law.
1 Muhammad
Amin Ibn 'Abidin, Hashiyat Radd al-Muhtar (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi 1966),
6:413; Ahmad al-Sawi, Hashiyat al-Sawi 'ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn (Beirut:
Dar Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, n.d.), 3 :307-308. See also Ahmad Dallal,
"The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought,
1750-1850," Journal of the American Oriental Society 113/3 (1993),
who demonstrates that Wahhabism in the nineteenth century was considered a
fringe fanatic group.
2 Qur'an
5:51.
3 Qur'an
3:85.
4 Qur'an
8:39.
5 Qur'an
9:29.
6 Qur'an
4:135.
7 Qur'an
49:13.
8 Qur'an
11:118-9.
9 Qur'an
5:49.
10 Qur'an
5:69; 2:62.
11 Qur'an
2:256; 10:99; 18:29.
12 Qur'an
2:190; 5:2.
13 Qur'an
2:194.
14 Qur'an
60:9.
15 Qur'an
8:61.
16 Qur'an
4:90. Also 4:94.
17 Abu
Zakariyya al-Nawawi, Rawdat al-Talibin, 3rd edition, edited by Zuhayr
al-Shawish (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1991), 10:316-317.
Originally Published in
December 2001/January 2002 issue of the Boston Review
