Al-Ghazali wrote at least two works on theology, al-Iqtisad
fi'l-i'tiqad (The Middle Path in Theology) and al-Risala
al-Qudsiyya (The Jerusalem Epistle). The former was composed towards
the end of his stay in Baghdad and after his critique of philosophy, the latter
soon afterwards in Jerusalem. The theological position expressed in both works
is Ash'arite, and there is no fundamental difference between al-Ghazali and the
Ash'arite school (see Ash'ariyya and
Mu'tazila). However, some changes can be seen in the theological
thought of his later works, written under the influence of philosophy and
Sufism .
As Ash'arite theology came into being out of criticism of
Mu'tazilite rationalistic theology, the two schools have much in common but
they are also not without their differences. There is no essential difference
between them as to God's essence (dhat Allah); al-Ghazali proves the
existence of God (the Creator) from the createdness (hadath) of the
world according to the traditional Ash'arite proof. An atomistic ontology is
presupposed here, and yet there are also philosophical arguments to refute the
criticism of the philosophers. As for God's attributes (sifat Allah),
however, al-Ghazali regards them as 'something different from, yet added to,
God's essence' (al-Iqtisad: 65),
while the Mu'tazilites deny the existence of the attributes and reduce them to
God's essence and acts. According to al-Ghazali, God has attributes such as
knowledge, life, will, hearing, seeing and speech, which are included in God's
essence and coeternal with it. Concerning the relationship between God's
essence and his attributes, both are said to be 'not identical, but not
different' (al-Iqtisad: 65).
The creation of the world and its subsequent changes are produced by God's
eternal knowledge, will and power, but this does not necessarily mean any
change in God's attributes in accordance with these changes in the empirical
world.
One of the main issues of theological debate was the
relationship between God's power and human acts. The Mu'tazilites, admitting
the continuation of an accident ('arad) of human power, asserted that
human acts were decided and produced (or even created) by people themselves;
thus they justified human responsibility for acts and maintained divine
justice. In contrast, assuming that all the events in the world and human acts
are caused by God's knowledge, will and power, al-Ghazali admits two powers in
human acts, God's power and human power. Human power and act are both created
by God, and so human action is God's creation (khalq), but it is also
human acquisition (kasb) of God's action, which is reflected in human
volition. Thus al-Ghazali tries to harmonize God's omnipotence and our own
responsibility for our actions (see Omnipotence).
As for God's acts, the Mu'tazilites, emphasizing divine justice,
assert that God cannot place any obligation on people that is beyond their
ability; God must do what is best for humans and must give rewards and
punishments according to their obedience and disobedience. They also assert
that it is obligatory for people to know God through reason even before
revelation. Al-Ghazali denies these views. God, he says, can place any
obligations he wishes upon us; it is not incumbent on him to do what is best
for us, nor to give rewards and punishments according to our obedience and
disobedience. All this is unimaginable for God, since he is absolutely free and
is under no obligation at all. Obligation (wujub), says al-Ghazali,
means something that produces serious harm unless performed, but nothing does
harm to God. Furthermore, good (hasan) and evil (qabih) mean
respectively congruity and incongruity with a purpose, but God has no purpose
at all. Therefore, God's acts are beyond human ethical judgment. Besides, says
al-Ghazali, injustice (zulm) means an encroachment on others' rights,
but all creatures belong to God; therefore, whatever he may do to his
creatures, he cannot be considered unjust.
The
Mu'tazilites, inferring the hereafter from the nature of this world, deny the
punishment of unbelievers in the grave from their death until the resurrection,
and also the reality of the various eschatological events such as the passing
of the narrow bridge and the weighing on the balance of human deeds (see Eschatology). Al-Ghazali,
on the other hand, rejecting the principle of analogy between the two worlds,
approves the reality of all these events as transmitted traditionally, since it
cannot be proven that they are rationally or logically impossible. Another
important eschatological event is the seeing of God (ru'ya Allah). While
the Mu'tazilites deny its reality, asserting that God cannot be the object of
human vision, al-Ghazali approves it as a kind of knowledge which is beyond
corporeality; in fact, he later gives the vision of God deep mystical and
philosophical meaning. In short, the Mu'tazilites discuss the unity of God and
his acts from the viewpoint of human reason, but al-Ghazali does so on the
presupposition that God is personal and an absolute reality beyond human
reason.
