Hick’s
contribution to the theological question concerning the relationship between
Christianity and other religions cannot be ignored. Even if one chooses to
dismiss Hick’s pluralist hypothesis one cannot escape the issues Hick has
brought to our attention: the world is an ambiguous realm and can be variously
interpreted; religions have been guilty of both good and evil; no religion
appears to stand out as being morally superior than any other and seem united
in the soteriological goal of turning people from self-centredness to the wider
picture (Reality-centredness). For that alone will Hick long be remembered in
theological history.
By
far the most controversial aspect of Hick’s theory is his postulate of the Real
an sich as the noumenon of ‘religions’ when they are both in
soteriological alignment. This postulate is a positive attempt by Hick to move
away from Christian theological models which deliberately (exclusivism) or
unavoidably (inclusivism) exclude other religions (notably Eastern ones) from
them. (Hick’s thesis brings to the attention of Christians the uncomfortable
truth that at times even Jesus was more concerned with ‘spiritual fruit’ than
propositional truth e.g. Matthew 25.) The Real also unites religions within the
category of ‘religion’ rather than humanism or non-realist
ideologies/linguistic frameworks. Throughout his work Hick has fought hard for
the rationality and reasonableness of religious belief in a world which seems,
in the word’s of Deitrich Bonhoeffer, ‘come of age’. (A world in which science
and technology answer prayers and where psychiatrists are the new clergy.)
However despite his efforts, Hick’s pluralist hypothesis has weaknesses which
could be its downfall.
Certainly Hick seems
embarrassed by Christian exclusivism and fights hard to undermine it. But in
doing this has Hick taken the heart out of Christianity? This really depends on
whether one believes a core belief of the Christian faith is that Jesus was
uniquely God incarnate. Certainly there can be many interpretations of what
incarnation actually means in practice (and I agree with Hick that the language
associated with the incarnation has been mistakenly taken literally) but should
the incarnation be set up as a barrier that prevents Christian dialogue with
other worldviews? I think Hick does this because he has a negative opinion of
it due to its Imperialist heritage.
However,
D’Costa’s insistence that grace (salvation) be aligned to a person, Jesus
Christ, made Hick’s ineffable Real look significantly lacking and deficient as
an alternative soteriological foundation. And although Hick’s response to
inclusivism was a significant (but not mortal) blow to Christians we should
note that in his criticisms of inclusivist models he tends to overlook the
universal effects of the atonement as that which allows people in other
religious contexts to be saved.
In
chapter three a core problem with Hick’ pluralist hypothesis was clearly
exposed as the ineffable Real. Because Hick uses the Kantian epistemic
categories of noumenon and phenomenon to describe the Real the basic problem is
always going to be how one knows salvation is 'Reality-centred’ when the latter
is ineffable? Even more problematic for Hick is his soteriological alignment of
humanism to the Real. On Hick’s own admission this entailed the adoption of an
inclusivist model (‘anonymous Realists’). It seems that the ineffable Real,
whilst being a concept designed to benefit maximum ‘religious’ inclusion into
Hick’s system, has in fact become his ‘Achilles heel’.
In
chapter four Hick’s methodology was brought under the spotlight. Once again the
relationship between Hick’s soteriological criteria and the ineffable Real
became problematic. Even more difficulties were presented by the eschatological
dilemma highlighted by D’Costa. By maintaining ambiguity concerning the
veridicality of religious language before the eschaton, and the empirical
verifiability of religious language after the eschaton, Hick seems not only to contradict
his understanding of religious truth-claims (mythical/practical) but also has
an unresolved problem with conflicting truth-claims per se. The
ineffable Real is once again the problem. Hick cannot allow religious
truth-claims a cognitive status (for to postulate an ineffable Real they must
remain mythical/practical) yet at the same time he cannot avoid giving them
some cognitive status when it comes to pursuing the eschatological option.
I
believe Hick’s ineffable Real an sich (as the noumenon of religion) has
left him with numerous problems and because of its inclusivism is in danger of
undermining his thesis. (As a humanist I would find it strange to be presented
with the idea that despite my convictions I really am in a relationship with a
noumenal Reality.) However the Real is not the only option available to Hick.
One I am attracted to is described by Robert Mesle as ‘Other-centredness’. By
adopting this Hick could retain his basic understanding of salvation as moving
‘from self-centredness to’ yet allow a multiplicity of options as to what the
‘Other’ may consist. In this way Hick could more readily accommodate personal/
impersonal/humanist worldviews into his system, ‘since we could not describe
all of the traditions as revolving around a common transcendent reality’.
Furthermore, Hick would not stand accused of homogenising religions into a
Reality-centred whole (inclusivism).
In the end I find
Hick’s thesis fascinating in its attempt to retain a religious interpretation
of religion without imposing one religious belief onto all. Despite the
problems associated with it I also find the transcendental category of the
ineffable Real provocative. For not only does it provide a common source for
morality (something not easily identified within humanism) but it also creates
an interesting scenario for dialogue to take place between (and within)
religions. Yet ultimately, despite its positive contribution to Hick’s thesis
as the ground of soteriological transformation, the Real will need to be revised
for something similar to Mesle’s ‘Other-centredness’ to avoid remaining an
inclusivist model.
